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I. QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY THE
MEMORANDUM
A. The question of international law: when the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics ("USSR") dissolved in 1991, did the Anti-
Ballistic Missile ("ABM") Treaty of 1972 lapse, i.e., cease to have
further legal effect?
B. The question of constitutional law: does a President have the
authority, without a concurring vote of two-thirds of the Senate, to
bring the ABM Treaty into effect between the United States and the
Russian Federation?
II. BACKGROUND
This Memorandum concludes that, following the extinction of the
USSR, the ABM Treaty of 19721 did not become a treaty between
the United States and the Russian Federation. Rather, as a bilateral,
non-dispositive treaty, the ABM Treaty of 1972 between the United
States and the USSR lapsed when the USSR ceased to exist.
In December 1991, new states that emerged on what was USSR
territory declared independence, announced the formation of the
"Commonwealth of Independent States" ("CIS"), and proclaimed the
USSR "as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no
longer exists."2 By December 21, 1991, the following states joined
the CIS: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,
and Uzbekistan. These states reiterated the dissolution of the USSR,
declaring that, with the CIS's establishment, "the Union of Soviet
1. See Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Systems, May 26, 1972,
U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter 'ABM Treaty"] (providing generally
for the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems and their deployment).
2. Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States, Dec. 8,
1991, pmbl., 31 I.L.M. 143.
3. See Protocol to the Agreement establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 147 (noting the addition of more
States to the CIS).
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Socialist Republics ceases to exist."4 Soon thereafter, the United
States acknowledged that the USSR "is no more. '
In recent centuries, instances in which treaties ceased to exist are
not numerous. The United States officially expressed its view that,
upon the extinction of a state, such state's bilateral political treaties
automatically lapse. The United States acted in accordance with that
view in connection with the extinction of the Kingdom of -lawaii in
1898, the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at the end of'
World War I, and the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1992. The U.S.
view is consistent with the opinion of international legal scholars
who addressed this issue. With consistency over more than two
hundred years, scholarly writings acknowledge that when a state
ceases to exist (and therefore becomes "extinct"), that State's
bilateral treaties have no further effect.6 Such treaties are said to
lapse or "fall to the ground."7 The lapsing occurs by operation of
law-that is, automatically upon the state's extinction. It does not
require action by any other treaty party. No judicial decision or
applicable treaty contradicts this principle, and the U.S. Supreme
Court has established that "where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision," works of
international legal scholars are acceptable as evidence of the law.'
President William Jefferson Clinton took the view that the ABM
Treaty of 1972 remains "in force."'  Representative Benjamin
Gilman, Chairman of the House Committee on International Affairs,
4. Id. at 149 (describing the dissolution of the USSR).
5. President's Address to the Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent
States, 27 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1883 (Dec. 25, 1991) (recounting the
dissolution of the USSR).
6. See KRYSTYNA MAREK, IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY OF STATES IN PUBUIC
INTERNATIONAL. LAW 6 (1968) (describing expired states as "extinct"); see also
discussion infra part IV.D. (highlighting the notion that bilateral treaties do not
survive a nation's termination).
7. See Amos S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 AM. J. INT'L L. 285. 287
(1911 ) (describing the effect of a state's extinction on treaties).
8. See The Pacquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting the
persuasive evidentiary value of works of legal "commentators").
9. See Letter from President William J. Clinton, to Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman.
Chairman, Comm. on International Relations, H. R., 2 (May 21, 1998) [hereinafter
"May Clinton Letter"] (expressing his opinion on the ABM Treaty).
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asked President Clinton, in a June 1997 letter, which state, if any,
does the United States believe was its ABM Treaty partner.'
President Clinton, in November 1997, replied that the "succession"
issue was "unsettled," adding:
Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which
would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM
interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS [newly independent states]
as full ABM successors would have preserved fully the original purpose
and substance of the Treaty. as approved by the Senate in 1972."1
Representative Gilman and Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote President Clinton in
March 1998 and noted that, if the Administration cannot identify any
country in addition to the United States that is bound by the treaty,
then Congress would have to conclude that the treaty was no longer
in force. 12 In May 1998, President Clinton replied that the ABM
Treaty was in force between the United States and the Russian
Federation. 3 He did not articulate the principle of law on which he
based this conclusion. Nor did he explain how this conclusion could
be squared with his November 1997 response to Representative
Gilman.
10. See Letter from Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Comm. on
International Relations, H. R., to President William J. Clinton 2-3 (June 16, 1997)
(on file with author) [hereinafter "June Gilman Letter"] (discussing the vitality of
the ABM treaty).
11. Letter from President William J. Clinton, to Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman,
Chairman, Comm. on International Relations, H. R. 2 (Nov. 21, 1997) (on file with
author) [hereinafter "November Clinton Letter"] (explaining the U.S. objective to
substantively preserve the original treaty after succession).
12. See Letter from Rep. Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman, Comm. on
International Relations, H. R., and Sen. Jesse Helms, Chairman, Comm. on
Foreign Relations, S., to President William J. Clinton 2 (iar. 3, 1998) (on file with
author) [hereinafter "Gilman-Helms Letter"] (responding to the President's
position concerning the ABM Treaty).
13. See May Clinton Letter. supra note 9. at 2 (reasserting the continued
existence of the ABM treaty).
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A. THE THESIS THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW THE ABM
TREATY OF 1972 WITH THE USSR BECAME A TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
1. The Position Stated by Assistant Attorney General Walter
Dellinger
The most extensive publicly available discussion of the ABM
Treaty's current legal status produced by a Clinton Administration
official was in the June 29, 1996, memorandum from Walter
Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General ("AAG"), Office of Legal
Counsel, to Presidential Counsel Jack Quinn ("Dellinger Paper"). 4
The Dellinger Paper contends that as a matter of international law the
ABM Treaty did not lapse, for these reasons: (i) the treaty imposed a
permanent burden on the parties' respective territories, which would
bring the ABM Treaty of 1972 within the international legal doctrine
of dispositive treaties (a treaty is dispositive if it irrevocably fixes a
right to particular territory, e.g. it delineates a border between two
States); 5 (ii) past U.S. diplomatic practice assumes that bilateral
treaties "generally" survive a State's extinction; and (iii) Article 34
of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of'
Treaties embodies a general principle of law that bilateral treaties
survive a State's extinction. 6 This Memorandum, concluding that the
Dellinger Paper is incorrect regarding international law, refutes those
three bases for the contention that the ABM Treaty of 1972 did not
lapse.
AAG Dellinger separately argues that irrespective of international
law, the President can bring a treaty into existence without Senate
consent by exercise of "exclusive" Executive powers. 7
14. See Memorandum from Walter Dellinger, Assistant Attorney General, to
John M. Quinn, Counsel to the President (June 26, 1996) [hereinafter "Dellinger
Paper"] (providing an in-depth analysis of the legal status of the ABM treaty).
15. See infra Part IV.K. and accompanying text (elaborating on the concept of
dispositive treaties).
16. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14 (basing the justifications for the survival
of the ABM Treaty in international law).
17. See id. at 3-6 (arguing that the President's power to execute treaties is
unconstitutionally infringed by section 233(a) of S. 1745, the Department of
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997).
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2. The Positions of Other Commentators
The thesis that the ABM Treaty of 1972 became a treaty with
Russia is also propounded in Ballistic Missiles: Threat and
Response: Hearing Before the S. Comnl. ol Foreign Relations, 106th
Cong. 276 (1999) (statement of Michael J. Glennon, Professor at
Law, University of California at Davis) (relating his views on the
ABM Treaty); George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, The Arms
Control Obligations of the Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L.
323, 339 (1993) (commenting that evidence of the applicability of
the ABM treaty to Russia can be found in Russian statements
concerning succession to Soviet treaties): State Succession and the
Legal Status of the ABM Treaty, OCCASIONAL PAPER (Lawyers
Alliance for World Security/Committee for National Security,
Washington, D.C.) May 5, 2000 (noting the ABM treaty remains in
effect); and in Council for a Livable World Education Fund, Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty's Legal Status. Talking Points on the Case
Against the ABM Treaty (providing talking points on the case against
the ABM treaty) at http://www.clw.org/nmd/abmlegal.html (last
visited Oct. 16, 2001).
On May 25, 1999, Professor Michael Glennon of the University of
California at Davis Law School, testified that the ABM Treaty of
1972 became a legally binding agreement between the United States
and Russia by the following process: (i) on or shortly before January
29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin stated Russia regarded
itself as the "legal successor" to the USSR's bilateral treaties that
were still in effect, including arms limitations and disarmament; see
Ballistic Missiles: Threat and Response: Hearing Bejbre the S.
Commn. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. at 278 (noting affirmative
Russian statements); (ii) Secretary of State James Baker expressed
the U.S. response to President Yeltsin as follows: "I made the point
to President Yeltsin that the United States remains committed to the
ABM Treaty .... [W]e expect the States of the commonwealth to
abide by all of the international treaties and obligations that were
entered into by the former Soviet Union, including the ABM Treaty."
Id. at 278-79; (iii) according to Professor Glennon, in 1994, the
Congress concurred in Secretary Baker's statement, by way of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 as follows:
"[t]he United States shall not be bound by any international
2002]
00AM. U. IVTL L. REV.[
agreement entered into by the President that would substantively
modify the ABM treaty unless the agreement is entered pursuant to
the treaty making power of the President under the Constitution." I.
at 283 (citing National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-337 § 232(a), 108 Stat. 2700 (1994)).
Professor Glennon also stated that the Senate, in 1997,
independently manifested its concurrence by way of Condition 9 to
the ratification resolution for the CFE Flank Document. Id. at 283-
84. Condition 9 provides that:
[T]he President shall certify to the Senate that he will submit for Senate
advice and consent to ratification any international agreement: that would
add one or more countries as State Parties to the ABM Treaty. or
otherwise convert the ABM Treaty from a bilateral treaty to a multilateral
treaty; or that would change the geographic scope or coverage of the
ABM Treaty, or otherwise modify the meaning of the term "national
territory" as used in Article VI and Article IX ofthe ABM Treaty.
Id. at 284 (quoting Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty.
143 Cong. Rec. 5445 1-01, S4478 (1997)).
Finally, Professor Glennon contended, as a general proposition,
that the concurrence of the Congress may be inferred from its
silence, i.e. by its failing to make a "timely objection" to a
President's "determination" that a treaty exists between the United
States and another state. Professor Glennon offered no rule to
determine Congressional timeliness, and in any event did not contend
that the time for Congressional objection to the making of an ABM
treaty with Russia expired before the Congress in 1994 allegedly
concurred by way of Section 232(a) of the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY 1995.
The conclusion of this Memorandum is, contrary to the positions
taken by Dellinger and the other commentators, that the President
has no power to bring an agreement into existence without Senate
consent if the breach of that agreement might create a signiicant risk
to the security of the United States.
That the ABM Treaty is no longer in force is propounded also in
Professor Robert F. Turner's monograph, THE ABM TREATY AND
THE SENATE: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
183-205 (Center for National Security Law, Occasional Paper Series
1999) (concluding that the ABM Treaty likely expired with the
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downfall of the USSR), by the law firm of Hunton and Williams in a
Memorandum to the Heritage Foundation, David B. Rivkin Jr., ET
AL., The Collapse of the Soviet Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Treaty: A Memorandum of Law (June 15, 1998) (on file
with author) (concluding that the ABM Treaty is no longer binding
as a result of the dissolution of the USSR), and by John Yoo, Politics
as Law? The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. the Separation of Powers,
and Treaty Interpretation, (2001) 89 CAL. L. REV. 851, 903-07
(reviewing FRANCES FITZGERALD, WAY OUT THERE IN THE BLUE:
REAGAN, STAR WARS AND THE END OF THE COLD WAR (2000))
(examining the consequences of the demise of the USSR).
B. THE THESIS THAT THE CONSTITUTION EMPOWERS THE
PRESIDENT TO MAKE A LEGALLY BINDING TREATY WITH RUSSIA
ON ABM MATTERS WITHOUT A CONCURRING VOTE OF Two-
THIRDS OF THE SENATE
The Dellinger Paper argued the President's implied powers to
interpret treaties, to implement treaties, and to recognize the
existence of a foreign state constitute a further implied power, i.e.,
without a concurring vote of two-thirds of the Senate, to make a
legally binding treaty with a foreign state." Dellinger was wrong.
The Constitutional granting of powers to the President by implication
does not nullify the express specification of a limit on the powers
granted. That rule includes implied "foreign policy" powers.
The Constitution expressly delegates to the President some
foreign-policy making decisions, as well as the power to conduct
some governmental activities that touch upon external relations.
Article II, Section 3, requires the President to receive ambassadors
from foreign states. Article II, Section 2, empowers the President
(with concurrence of a vote of two-thirds of the Senate) to "make
treaties," and to conduct the office of Commander-in-Chief of the
Army of the United States and of the Militia of the several states,
when called into the actual service of the United States. The
Constitution's words, fairly read according to their apparent intended
meanings, imply the President has the authority to make certain other
18. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14 (arguing that such powers are powers
that are exclusive to the President).
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foreign-policy decisions and conduct certain other governmental
activities that touch upon foreign relations. Some examples of these
include: declaring that the United States "recognizes" the existence
of a regime claiming to govern a state and declaring ("recognizing")
that a particular foreign state has come into existence.
The treaty-making power is unique among expressed foreign-
policy powers. It is the only power to which there is an explicit
formula as to how the President and the Congress share power, i.e.,
the President, "shall have the Power by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the
Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II § 2.
Concerning the other powers touching on external relations
(expressed and implied), the sharing is inferred from the context. In
some cases, the inference is manifest, i.e., the President's exercise of'
the office of Commander-in-Chief would be a nullity without armed
forces. Article I, Section 7, delegates to the Congress the exclusive
authority to raise and support Armies, to provide and maintain a
Navy, and to provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the laws
of the Union, and to suppress insurrections and repel invasions.
Likewise, the Constitution delegates to Congress the power to
declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water. Central to the sharing of the
external relations power is the exclusive power of the Congress to
craft laws (effective on Presidential signature or by veto-override) to
raise revenue, (Article I, Section 7), coupled with the rule that "no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of
Appropriations made by Law." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
None of the arguments put forth by AAG Dellinger support a
conclusion that the President, by acting alone or with a simple
majority of one or both Houses of Congress, can make a treaty
without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate.
1. The President's power to interpret treities is not exclusive.
Indeed, it is subordinate to judicial power to interpret treaties
definitively. Hence, the President cannot make Treaty A into Treaty
B simply by declaring that he is only interpreting Treaty A.
2. The President's power to implement treaties is not exclusive,
and is subordinate to Congressional power to make laws to
implement the laws of the land. Hence, the President cannot make
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Treaty A into Treaty B by declaring that he is only implementing
Treaty A.
3. The President's power to declare that a state has come into
existence (to "recognize" that state) does not allow the President to
disregard the rule of international law that if a state possesses the
attribute of statehood, then states must fulfill the obligations that
each state owes to all other states irrespective of whether the former
has diplomatic relations with the latter. Hence, "recognizing" a
newly emerged state A does not establish that state B is a state, let
alone a continuation of state A.
4. Senate concurrence in a treaty with one state cannot be
construed as concurrence to the making of a treaty with another state
because such a construction would alter or amend the treaty, a
process that itself requires a two-third concurrence by the Senate.
5. The President's implied powers to make some agreements
with States without consent of either House of the Congress ("sole-
Executive Agreement"), and to make some agreements upon
favorable majority votes in both Houses ("Congressional-Executive
Agreements"), have not been transformed into a power to make any
legally binding agreements with states, without a two-third
concurrence by the Senate.
6. The few cases upholding agreements made without
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate do not arise from any
agreement that legally binds the United States to a substantial
national security course of action.
7. The record of the Constitutional Convention shows that the
Framers did not intend the Senate's treaty concurrence power to be
an option giving the President unlimited discretion to disregard the
requirement. The two-thirds requirement was adopted in lieu of a
simple majority of Senators to prevent the President and a minority
of the population from pushing treaties down on the nation. The
concern arose out of Southern states' fear that that President, with
Northern states' support, would make a treaty with Spain to close the
Mississippi River to navigation, plus a general concern expressed by
George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Madison that it
was dangerous to enter into treaties (at least non-commercial
treaties).
8. In 1992, President George Bush, acting through Secretary of
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State James Baker, did not give Russian President Boris Yeltsin a
legally binding commitment that the United States would observe the
ABM treaty of 1972 as though it had been made between the United
States and Russia.19 Secretary Baker's words of commitment were
consonant with the diplomatic practice of "political" or "moral"
commitments that do not legally bind the parties. Such a
commitment made perfect sense because:
(a) the United States has a general practice of "presumptive
continuity," i.e., acting as though a treaty remained in effect while
deliberating what to do when a state dissolves;"
(b) the United States announced that it was approaching U.S.-
USSR treaty issues from the point of view of presumptive continuity;
(c) the Baker-Yeltsin exchange was not treated by the Executive
Branch as the creation of a legally binding commitment because it
was oral and never reported to Congress as the Case-Zablocki Act
requires for legally binding commitments;
(d) the Congress understands the difference between legally
binding commitments on the one hand and moral or political
commitments on the other; and
(e) to conclude that the Executive Branch intended to make a
legally binding commitment would require an assumption that the
Executive Branch committed the United States to a one-sided
bargain to continue to abjure strategic missile defense while Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and the Ukraine (which together had massive Inter-
Continental Ballistic Missile ("ICBM") delivery capability and
substantial ABM early warning radar on their western and southern
19. See State Succession and the Legal Status of the ABM Treaty, OCCASIONAL
PAPER (Lawyers Alliance for World Security/Committee for National Security,
Washington, D.C.) May 5, 2000 (quoting Secretary Baker's statement that "we
expect the states of the Commonwealth to abide by all of the international treaties
and agreements that were entered into by the former Soviet Union, including the
ABM Treaty.").
20. See Ballistic Missiles: Threat and Response: Hearing Before the S. ('omin.
on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. 276, 281-2 (1999) (statement of Michael J.
Glennon, Professor at Law, University of California at Davis) (quoting Legal
Advisor to the State Department, Edwin D. Williamson, that "[a]s an operating
principle... agreements between the United States and the USSR that were in
force at the time of the dissolution of Soviet Union have been presumed to
continue in force with respect to the former republics.").
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peripheries) were legally free to develop and deploy full ABM
systems.
C. METHODOLOGY AND SCOPE OF THIS MEMORANDUM
This Memorandum examines the sources of international law
bearing on the question of whether, upon the USSR's extinction, the
ABM Treaty became a treaty between the United States and the
Russian Federation. This analysis does not describe the principles of
international law that govern the question of whether a party to a
treaty in force has grounds to terminate that treaty.' Nor does it
describe the rules of international law for allocating the assets, the
debt or the archives of a state that becomes extinct. Those rules, parts
of the law of "state succession," do not resolve the question of how a
state's extinction affects what had been that state's bilateral treaties.
For example, although the United Nations and the European
Community declared that no state is a continuation of the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("SFRY"), they nonetheless expect
the successor states of the extinct SFRY to bear portions of the
SFRY's debt (in proportions to be determined by a continuing
conference of the successor states that is called the "Brussels
Process"). 2
21. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TH4E FOREIGN RELATIONS LA\\ OF Tilt
UNITED STATES §§ 331, 335-36 (1987) [hereinafter 'REST:T-MENT"] (listing other
party's breach, fraud, or a fundamental change of circumstances that defeat the
treaty's object and purpose as grounds for treaty termination). Unilateral
termination of a treaty is permitted for a material breach because of a fundamental
change of circumstances that was not foreseen by the parties. See id. at § 336.
22. See Declaration of Christopher R. Hill. at 3, 5 (describing the succession
process) Federal Republic of Yugoslavia v. Park-71st Corp.- 913 F. Supp. 191
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 95 Civ. 3659 (AGS)) (Sept. 21, 1995); see also The Ottoman
Debt Arbitration I R.I.A.A. 529 (1925), noted in PARRY & GRANT, ENCYCLOPEDIC
DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (1986) (adjudicating debt of the
dissolved Ottoman Empire): RESTATEMENT. supra note 21, at § 209 (reciting the
rule for passage of title to the state property and responsibility for public debt
between predecessor and successor states): Thomas Baty, Division of States: Its
Effect on Obligations, in 9 TRANSACTIONS OF THE GROTIUS SOCIETY, PROBLEMS
OF WAR AND PEACE 119, 121-26 (1923) (examining issues involved in state
division); ARTHUR BERRIDALE KEITH, THE THEORY OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH
SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ENGLISH AND COLONIAL LAW 99-100 (1907) (discussing
debts of divided states); P. K. MENON, THE SUCCESSION OF STATES IN RESPECT TO
TREATIES, STATE, PROPERTY. ARCHIVES AND DEBT 158-201 (1991) (discussing
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This Memorandum describes international law as it would be
understood by a disinterested judicial tribunal resolving a dispute
between two states as to whether a particular treaty is in force i.e., is
legally binding between them. This analysis assumes that the tribunal
would: (i) decide for itself the relevant questions of fact and law; and
(ii) give the parties' contentions the weight they deserve but would
not be bound by these contentions. This Memorandum uses the
phrase "legally binding" in the sense that it is used in scholarly
writings on international law, i.e., a promise is legally binding if the
parties intend it to be legally binding, irrespective of whether the
promise can be enforced by third-party resolution without the
parties' consent to such a resolution.
Also, this Memorandum addresses the Constitutional law
assertions in the Dellinger Paper and in other works proffering
similar arguments.
D. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
1. International Law
The pertinent sources of international law support the conclusion
that, upon the USSR's extinction, the ABM Treaty lapsed, so it no
longer has the force of international law. This conclusion is based on
the following observations:
a. in December 1991, as accurately characterized by declarations
of the CIS States and of the United States, the changes that had
recently occurred on what had been the USSR's territory caused the
USSR, by operation of law, to cease to exist as a state-that is, such
changes brought to an end the international legal personality of the
USSR;
b. the ABM Treaty of 1972 was a bilateral treaty;
c. the opinions of recognized scholars constitute evidence of
customary international law in a case in which there is (i) no
controlling judicial decision, (ii) no controlling State practice, and
(iii) no otherwise controlling treaty;
d. scholars are nearly unanimous in concluding that, upon a
state debt and succession).
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state's extinction, its bilateral treaties that are not "dispositive" do
not by operation of law automatically become treaties between the
extinct state's successor and the extinct state's treaty partner-that is,
such bilateral treaties lapse;
e. no judicial decision contradicts the scholarly view that a non-
dispositive bilateral treaty of an extinct state does not automatically
become a treaty of its successor or successors. The U.S. practice is
generally consistent with the scholars' view;
f. the United States has never before considered itself bound by
international law to accept as its treaty partner the successor to an
extinct state;
g. the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties does not bind the United States because the
United States is not a party to the Convention;
h. the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in
Respect of Treaties in any event would not impose the ABM Treaty
on the United States because the imposition would be incompatible
with the ABM Treaty's object and purpose;
i. Article 34.1 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of
States in Respect of Treaties has not passed into customary
international law;
j. the ABM Treaty did not become a treaty between the United
States and the Russian Federation by devolution; and
k. the ABM Treaty was not a dispositive treaty.
2. U.S. Constitutional Law
The conclusions reached through an examination of U.S.
constitutional law are based on the following findings:
a. the President does not have exclusive authority to interpret
treaties;
b. the President does not have exclusive authority to implement
treaties;
c. Presidential authority to recognize the existence of a foreign
state does not imply authority to make treaties with that state without
Senate concurrence;
d. the Senate's concurrence in the making of a treaty with one
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state does not constitute consent to the making of a treaty with a
successor-state;
e. except for cases of monetary-claims settlements, the Supreme
Court has never ruled that a President acting without Senate
concurrence can make an agreement with a foreign state that legally
binds the United States;
f. the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp., does not authorize a President, acting without
Senate concurrence, to make an agreement with a foreign state that
would legally bind the United States with respect to a significant
national-security course of action;
g. the Record of the Constitutional Convention shows that the
Framers of the Constitution did not intend the Senate's treaty-
concurrence power to be an option giving a President unlimited
discretion to disregard the requirement for a two-thirds concurrence:
(i) the Framers' purpose was to prevent a minority of citizens from
forcing a treaty on the majority, and (ii) the Framers saw grave
consequences in the breach of a treaty;
h. assuming arguendo that the Constitution gave a President
unlimited discretion without Senate concurrence to make an
agreement with a foreign state that would legally bind the United
States, President Bush (acting through Secretary Baker) did not
exercise that option by way of a January 1992 exchange between
Secretary Baker and Russia's President Boris Yeltsin. Secretary
Baker's Press Statement on January 29, 1992, cannot reasonably be
interpreted as accepting a Russian offer to make a legally binding
agreement between the United States and Russia;
i. the non-publication of the Baker-Yeltsin exchange and the
failure to send the documents to the Congress suggest that the State
Department did not consider the Baker-Yeltsin exchange to be either
a treaty requiring Senate concurrence, or otherwise a legally binding
international agreement to which the United States was a party;
j. the distinction between legally binding commitments on the
one hand, and moral and political commitments on the other, is
understood by the Congress;
k. Secretary of State James Baker could not have intended to
create a legally binding agreement;
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1. Secretary of State Baker's remarks can be read as expressing a
moral or political commitment;
m. the Executive Branch's conduct after January 1992
independently shows Secretary Baker's words were not understood
to have created a legally binding ABM Treaty with Russia;
n. the United States is not required by international law to
denounce a lapsed treaty;
o. neither Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on
Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, nor the principle that it
exemplifies, is legally binding on the United States;
p. the United States is not estopped to deny that it has a legally
binding ABM treaty with Russia;
q. the Nuclear Test Case decision of the International Court of
Justice does not support a conclusion that Secretary Baker intended
to make a legally binding ABM treaty with Russia; and
r. the Baker-Yeltsin exchange does not qualify as the kind of
binding international agreement that the President can make without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators voting.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
As a predicate to the legal analysis below, it is useful to review
facts pertaining to the USSR's extinction and the U.S. State
Department's position thereon, President Clinton's position on the
ABM Treaty of 1972, and the purpose of the ABM Treaty of 1972,
as seen by the U.S. Government at the time of Senate approval of
ratification.23
23. See ABM Treaty, supra note I (noting the general intent of the Treaty).
The Treaty was amended in 1974 to reduce the allowed number of ABM
deployment areas of each party from two to one. See Protocol to the Treaty on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Systems, July 3. 1974. U.S.-U.S.S.R., 27 U.S.T. 1645,
art. I [hereinafter "Protocol"] (amending the original Treaty in regards to
deployment areas). Each party was given a single option to shift its defense area
upon advance notice at the time of a scheduled five-year Treaty review. See
Protocol, supra, at art. II (outlining provisions concerning ABM dismantling in
conjunction with Treaty review). Scholars offer a variety of interpretations on the
scope of the ABM Treaty. See generally David Edward Grogan, Powver Play:
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, National Ballistic Missile Defense and the ABA'!
Treaty, 39 VA. J. IN'L L. 799 (1999) (noting that Article I of the ABM Treaty
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A. THE UNITED STATES' 1972 VIEW OF HOW IT WOULD BENEFIT
FROM AN ABM TREATY
In 1972, Gerard Smith, Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency in the Nixon Administration, told the Congress
the following:
The treaty contains a general commitment not to build a nationwide ABM
defense nor to provide a base for such defense. This general undertaking
is supplemented by certain specific provisions. By this general
undertaking and the specific commitments, both countries in effect agree
not to challenge the effectiveness of each other's missile deterrent
capabilities by deploying widespread defenses against them. This means
that the penetration capability of our surviving deterrent missile forces
can be assured. This, to my mind, bears directly on concerns about a first
strike against the United States. As long as we maintain sufficient and
survivable retaliatory forces, this new assurance of their penetration
capability makes "first strike" as a rational act inconceivable, in my
judgment. I believe this is a development of prime significance for U.S.
security.
24
Hence, according to that view, a party without ABM defenses
would be less likely to launch first strikes, and therefore would be
expressly prohibits U.S. deployment of a certain nationwide ballistic missile
defense system); see also David A. Koplow, Arms Control Treatv
Reinterpretation: Article: Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executive
Reinterpretation of Arms Control Treaties, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1353 (1989)
(arguing that the ABM Treaty is among treaties that has been entangled in an
attempt by the Executive to reserve the right unilaterally to reinterpret the treaty):
see also Abraham D. Sofaer, Armis Control Treaty Reinterpretation: Commentary:
Treaty Interpretation: A Comment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1437 (1989) (citing that the
Senate's power to change the meaning of an international treaty is to "exclude,
limit or modify" treaty obligations through a formal reservation, or to give "its
advice and consent to a treaty on the basis of a particular understanding of its
meaning."); see also Eugene V. Rostow, Arnms Control Treaty Reinterpretation:
Commentaiy: The Reinterpretation Debate and Constitutional Law, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1451 (1989) (responding to Prof. Koplow's article, Arns Control Treaty
Reinterpretation: Article: Constitutional Bait and Switch: Executiv'e
Reinterpretation ofAris Control Treaties).
24. Strategic Arms Limitations Agreements: Before the S. Armned Serv. Contn.,
(1972) (statement of Gerard C. Smith, Director, United States Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,
Documents on Disarmament, 423) (1972) (commenting on the benefits of the
ABM Treaty).
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less likely to start a nuclear war.25
B. EXTINCTION OF THE USSR
On December 8, 1991, in Minsk, the Republic of Belarus, the
Russian Federation ("RSFSR"), and Ukraine. as the USSR's
founders and as signatories to the Union Treaty of 1922 that created
the USSR, declared that the USSR, "as a subject of international law
and a geopolitical reality no longer exists. '26 Also, they signed the
Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States. 7
The Agreement invited other states to join. On December 21, 1991,
at Alma Ata, eight other states joined.28 The Agreement included a
provision supporting the Russian Federation's assumption of the
USSR's permanent seat on the United Nations ("U.N.") Security
Council.29
President George H. W. Bush, in his December 25, 1991, address
to the nation on the CIS, said that "[t]he Soviet Union itself is no
more."30 On January 22, 1992, President Bush. in addressing the
International Conference on Humanitarian Assistance to the former
USSR, referred to "the dramatic revolution that swept away Soviet
communism and left in its place 12 new nations .... " He also
25. See U.S. SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., TREATY ON LIMITATION OF
ANTI-BALLISTIC-MISSILE SYSTEMS. S. EXEC. REP. NO. 92-28, at 6 (1972) (quoting
former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul
Wamke, that "[a]ccordingly, both sides have accepted the principle that safety
resides not in physical defense but in the certainty that the attacker would be
destroyed by the retaliatory strike that the other side would be able to mount.").
26. See Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States,
supra note 2 (recognizing the demise of the USSR).
27. See id. at 146 (noting the signatories of the Agreement Establishing the
Commonwealth of Independent States).
28. See Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States, supra note 3, at 147 (noting the addition of Azerbaijan,
Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan to the Commonwealth of Independent States).
29. See id. at 151 (noting Russia's assumption of the USSR's seat on the U.N.
Security Council).
30. See President's Address to the Nation on the Commonwealth of
Independent States, supra note 5 (acknowledging the end of the USSR).
31. See President's Remarks at the International Conference of Humanitarian
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referred to the "dissolution of the Soviet Union .... ."'2 On April I,
1992, he referred to "Russia, Ukraine and the other new states that
have replaced the Soviet Union."33 President Bush stated that he was
"seeking to conclude trade, bilateral investment and tax treaties with
each of the new Commonwealth States.
' 34
According to the State Department, "[o]n December 29, 199 1, the
U.S.S.R. was formerly dissolved." U.S. Dep't of State, Off. of
Russian Affairs, Background Notes: Russia, October 1998, at
http://www.state.gov/www/background-notes/russia_98 10_bgn. html
(last visited Oct. 15, 2001). Russia obtained its independence on
August 24, 1991. See id. (providing information on the Russian
government).
Cases stating that the USSR had ceased to exist include Bickel v.
Korean Air Lines Co., Ltd., 83 F.3d 127, 130-31 (6th Cir. 1996)
(stating that the court took "judicial notice of the fact that by the time
the respective actions involved in this appeal came to trial, the USSR
ceased to exist."); Kuibyshevnefteorgsynthez v. Lev Model, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIs 1896, at *19 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 1995) (noting that "[t]he
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the USSR, the country
whose laws defendant argues were originally chosen by the parties,
ceased to exist a few months after the contract was signed."), l'in.
Matters, Ihc. v. Pepsico, 806 F. Supp. 480, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
(noting the "dissolution of the USSR"); and Techsnabexport, Ltd. v.
United States, 802 F. Supp. 469 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1992) (recognizing
the dissolution of the USSR).
Assistance to the Former U.S.S.R., I PUB. PAPERS 127 (Jan. 22, 1992)
(commenting further on the downfall of the USSR).
32. See id. (noting the end of the "mortal threat" of the cold war and dawn of
an new era of "peace and prosperity").
33. See The President's News Conference on Aid to the States of the Former
Soviet Union, I PUB. PAPERS 522 (Apr. 1, 1992) (expressing optimism for the
future of the former USSR).
34. See President's Remarks to the American Society of Newspaper Editors, I
PUB. PAPERS 564, 566 (Apr. 9, 1992) (citing a recently signed agreement with
Armenia as an example).
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C. STATE DEPARTMENT STUDY OF THE EFFECT OF THE USSR's
EXTINCTION
In early 1992, State Department Legal Advisor Edwin D.
Williamson announced that the State Department expected to engage
each republic in discussions to determine whether each bilateral
agreement should continue in force or should be modified or
terminated. 5 In 1997, President Clinton described the process as
follows:
When the USSR dissolved at the end of 1991. it became necessary to
reach agreement as to which former Soviet states would collectively
assume its rights and obligations under the [ABMI Treaty (which clearly
continued in force by its own terms). The United States took the view
that, as a general principle, agreements between the United States and the
USSR that were in force at the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union
would be presumed to continue in force as to the former Republics. It
became clear, however, particularly in the area of arms control, that a
case-by-case review of each agreement was necessary.
36
Assistant Legal Adviser Charles I. Bevans described the State
Department's practice of studying the status of treaties between the
United States and extinct states in 1965:
The practice is to negotiate with a new State "as soon as possible." If a
new State has a "devolution" agreement with or otherwise announces it
would be bound by its predecessor's treaties, the fact is "noted" in
Treaties in Force, but the United States does not consider itself bound by
35. See Edwin D. Williamson, Remarks at the American Society of
International Law Proceedings in Panel Discussion, State Succession and Relations
with Federal States, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 1, 13 (1992) [hereinafter
Williamson Remarks] (stating that in the interim, they would continue to assume
that bilateral agreements remained until they make a clearly contrary
determination); compare U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE, A LIST OF
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1996, 275 (1996) (stating that the U.S. is reviewing the
continued applicability of several treaties, one of which is the ABM Treaty), with
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE. A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1,
1992, 247 (1992) (listing the ABM Treaty as one whose status is under review as a
result of the 1991 developments in the USSR).
36. See November Clinton Letter, supra note I1, at I (providing background
information before dealing with ABM Treaty succession).
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the devolution agreement to accept such a treaty as being in force between
the United States and the successor State.
37
State Department practice regarding devolution agreements and
proclamations is consistent with the view expressed in scholarly
writings. For example, in 1969 a Committee of the United Nations'
International Law Commission stated:
Conversely, on the date of the succession, the territory passes into the
treaty r6gime of the newly emerged state; and, since the devolution
agreement is incapable by itself of effecting an assignment of the
predecessor's treaty obligations to the successor state, the agreement does
not of itself establish any treaty nexus between the successor state and
third states parties to the treaties of the predecessor state. Thus, even if a
newly emerged state has concluded a devolution agreement, the only
treaty obligations of the predecessor state which can immediately become
obligations also of the successor state vis-A-vis the other contracting
parties are such obligations, if any, as would in any event pass to the
successor state by operation of the general rules of the international law
independently of the devolution agreement.
38
State Department Legal Adviser Edwin D. Williamson stated that
while the study of the ABM treaty was pending, the State
Department would use a presumptive continuity model in its dealings
with the USSR's successor states. 39 "Continuity," as applied to
37. See Letter from Charles I. Bevans, Assistant Legal Adviser, United States
Department of State, to Professor William W. Bishop, Jr., Editor-in-Chief:
American Journal of International Law (July 27, 1964), reprinted in
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, COMMITrEE ON STATE SUCCESSION To
TREATIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATIONS, THE EF:FECT OF
INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES: A HANDBOOK 382, 385-86 (1965) (explaining U.S.
practice with regard to treaty agreements with newly independent states); see also
Sari T. Korman, The 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect
of Treaties: An Inadequate Response to the Issue of State Succession, 16 SUIFIOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 174, 180 (1992) (discussing general issues concerning treaty
succession).
38. Sir Humphrey Waldock, Second Report on Succession in Respect q/
Treaties, [1969] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 45, 57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/214 AND
ADD.1 AND 2 (discussing that upon independence, treaty obligations of a
predecessor state cease to be binding upon that newly independent territory).
39. See Williamson Remarks, supra note 35, at 12 (recognizing it as an
unsettled area of law but deciding to presume continuity of treaties between the
United States and the former Soviet Union).
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treaties, is a term used by scholars to describe the fact that a treaty
between two particular states (the "treaty partners") has become a
treaty between one of the partners and another state. For example,
when a State dissolves and a successor state (or states) emerges on
what had been the territory of the dissolved state, a successor State
may agree with the dissolved state's treaty partner that the dissolved
state's treaties should "continue" in effect as between the successor
state and the dissolved state's treaty partner. In that event, the treaty
in question is said to have come into effect with the successor state
by a process of "continuity." Thus, when Norway and the Russian
Federation agreed that they would consider as treaties between them
certain designated treaties that had been in effect between Norway
and the USSR, those treaties are said to have come into effect
between Norway and the Russian Federation by the process of
continuity.4 °
The United States, various European states, and the successor
states have not all dealt in the same manner in all cases with treaties
since the respective dissolutions of the USSR, the former Yugoslavia
(the "SFRY"), and Czechoslovakia. A few examples: Armenia and
Azerbaijan chose not to enter continuation agreements with any state
as to any USSR treaty." Austria, regarding the treaties with the
dissolved SFRY, described its practice as a "principle of pragmatic
application" of the continuation process-that is, Austria denied that
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY") (Serbia and
Montenegro) was a continuity of the SFRY, and yet, in practice,
treated the FRY as though it were the continuity of the SFRY' 2
The U.S. State Department, though expressing a general desire
40. See Martti Koskenniemi, The Present State of Research Carried Out by the
English-Speaking Section of the Centre for Studies and Research, in STATE
SUCCESSION: CODIFICATION TESTED AGAINST THE FACTS 98-118 (Hague
Academy of International Law 1996) (exploring the issue of treaty continuity); see
also Paul R. Williams, The Treaty Obligations of the Successor States of the
Former Soviet Union, Yugoslavia. and Czechoslovakia: Do They (ontinue in
Force?, 23 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 31-35 (1994) (examining continuity by
examining the deficiency of the U.S. approach to securing continuation of bilateral
treaties with successor states).
41. See Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 112 (noting that some states reject
succession to treaties by the former Soviet Union).
42. See id. at 115 (describing Austria's dealings with SFRY treaties).
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that the USSR's successor states (a term that does not include
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) be bound by the same treaty
obligations vis-At-vis the United States as was the USSR, "abandoned
any assertions of automatic continuation of treaty obligations and
relied entirely on assurances provided by the successor states."4
Also, in seeking assurances of treaty continuation from the successor
states, the State Department accepted non-specific (what one
commentator has called "feigned") assurances, 44 and unilateral
commitments that the successor states may rescind, and that gave the
United States the effective right to discontinue the treaties at its
option.45 Similarly, the State Department, by accepting assurances of
treaty continuity that were linked by context to non-justiciable
political commitments-such as promises to develop market
economies-rendered the treaties unenforceable as a practical matter
and thereby made "continuity" illusory.46 Moreover, "Treaties in
Force," the annual State Department publication of the U.S. treaties
that are in force, shows as "in force" only those treaties concluded
between the United States and the Russian Federation after the
USSR's dissolution.47 A similar treatment is provided by listings of
treaties in force involving other successors of the USSR and other
successors of the SFRY.48
Likewise, the Russian Federation advised the United States that it
does not deem itself bound by any USSR treaty obligation to the
United States that conflicts with Russian law, a position that is
consistent with the pre-dissolution view of the USSR that a new state
is not bound by the treaties of its predecessor. 9
43. Williams, supra note 40, at 32 (arguing that the State Department erred in
its objective).
44. See id. ("[F]eigning the receipt of commitments is not sufficient under
international law or international diplomacy to require a state to be bound by those
commitments.").
45. See id. at 32-33 (discussing the problems raised by the unilateral
commitments).
46. See id. at 33 (noting that such commitments are political rather than legal).
47. See id. at 34-35 (indicating a lack of clarity with many countries, with the
exception of Russia, regarding treaties that remain in force).
48. See id. (examining the issue of succession with respect to the successor
states of Yugoslavia).
49. See Williams, supra note 40, at 35-36 (stating that Russia regards itself as
[17:189
2002] ABM TREATY 217
Regarding Ukraine, in May, 1996, the Executive Branch and a
representative of Ukraine agreed that the United States and Ukraine
would regard as in effect as between the two states thirty-five
designated agreements that were in effect between the United States
and the USSR.5 0 Of the thirty-five U.S.-USSR agreements in
question, thirty-two never received Senate consent, perhaps because
they were among the kinds of binding agreements with foreign
nations that the President "may enter into .. without complying
with the formalities required by the Treaty Clause of the
Constitution .... ."I' The three U.S.-USSR treaties that had received
Senate consent were a consular convention of 1968, a tax convention
of 1976, and a convention of 1854 relating to the rights of neutrals at
sea.
The wide variety of recent State practice has been summed up as
follows:
the continuation of the former Soviet Union and will fulfill treaty obligations
unless falling under this one exception): see also Gannady I. Danilenko, The
Russian Law of Treaties: by William E. Butler, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 356, 357 (1998)
(book review) (emphasizing that the Russian Constitution always takes precedence
over a contrary treaty).
50. See 143 CONG. REC. S4451-01, S4462-63 (1997) (describing and including
the agreement between the U.S. and Ukraine).
51. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 30 n.6 (1982) (citations omitted)
(holding that agreements to protect U.S. nationals on military bases abroad did not
require Senate approval, but limiting its holding to construing a statute); see also
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 679-82 nn.8-10 (1981) (discussing the
President's ability to settle claims by executive agreement without congressional
approval); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942): United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324 (1937). An "Executive Agreement" or a "'Sole-Executive
Agreement" is made between the United States and another state without the
concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate, and without the consent of a majority of
both Houses of the Congress. If the Agreement has received the consent of a
majority of both Houses of Congress, it is called a "'Congressional-Executive
Agreement." The Court has explained that an agreement of that nature, though
sometimes called a "treaty," is not a treaty "'possessing the dignity of one requiring
ratification by the Senate of the United States.. ." See B. Altman & Co. v. United
States, 224 U.S. 583, 601 (1912) (examining the constitutionality of import duties
as resulting from a reciprocal trade agreement concluded between the President
and France); see also Weinberger. 456 U.S. at 29 ("[t]he word 'treaty' has more
than one meaning."); Regan. 453 U.S. at 679-84 (1981); Pink, 315 U.S. at 225:
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324. No case has been presented to a court, however, to decide
whether an arms-control treaty can constitutionally be made by the President
acting alone or with the consent only of a majority of both Houses.
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[P]arties have normally negotiated and negotiations have led to the
adoption and publication of lists of treaties that are to be continued or
allowed to lapse. The more weight is given to such lists, and the
agreements they embody, the less practical significance the "presumption
of continuity" enjoys-until the presumption must altogether yield to the
a contrario argument that a treaty absent from a list must be deemed to
have lapsed.
52
"Continuity" (or "continuation") is also used to identify a state
that, notwithstanding a loss of territory, continues to exist because it
has not lost its international legal personality.53 In that usage,
"continuity" (or "continuation") is the antonym of "dismemberment"
or "disembratio," terms that are used interchangeably to identify
states that have ceased to exist.54 For example, the United States
stated that it is the position of the "international community
generally" that, as a result of the SFRY's "dissolution" in 1992,
"[t]he SFRY has ceased to exist and no... [s]tate represents the
continuation of the SFRY ....
In June 1996, U.S. AAG Walter Dellinger advised Counsel to the
President John Quinn that the presumption of "continuity" employed
in the State Department during the Bush Administration remained in
effect in the Clinton Administration. Dellinger stated that the notion
52. Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 116.
53. See Republic of Croatia v. Girocredit Bank A.G. Der Sparkassen, 4 Ob.
2304 96V (Supreme Court 1996) (Austria), reprinted at 36 I.L.M, 1523 (1997)
(holding that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not continue the legal
personality of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but is a successor State
to the former Yugoslavia); see also Konrad G. Buhler, Casenote: Two Recent
Austrian Supreme Cou-t Decisions on State Succession from an International Law
Perspective, 2 Aus. REV. INT'L & EUR. L. 213, 224-26 (1997) (examining whether
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia continued the international legal personality of'
the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
54. See Girocredit Bank A.G. Der Sparkassen, at 1524 (using the term
"disembratio" to describe a state that ceases to exist); see also Buhler, supra note
53, at 224 (using the terms dismemberment and "'disembratio").
55. Declaration of Christopher R. Hill, at paras. 5, 6, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia v. Park-7st Corp., 913 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 95 Civ. 3659
(AGS)) (Sept. 21, 1995) (expressing the view of Christopher R. Hill, Director of'
the Office of South Central European Affairs in the United States Department of'
State, in a case where the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sought a declaratory
judgment that would recognize its ownership of certain property within the United
States that had been owned by the SFRY).
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of continuity was "rooted" in U.S. "past diplomatic practice" and in
the U.S. Executive Branch's understanding of international law. 6 As
to past diplomatic practice, Dellinger is in error. The practice is to
presume continuity temporarily while deliberating a course of
conduct, until continuity questions are resolved. Dellinger's
disregard for U.S. practice as regards treaties of extinct states is
described later in section IV.F.
D. PRESIDENT CLINTON'S STATEMENT OF POSITION
On June 16, 1997, Representative Benjamin A. Gilman, Chairman
of the House Committee on International Relations, asked President
Clinton: if the Senate were to reject the President's proposal
regarding ABM Treaty succession, "[w]hat countries in addition to
the United States will, in the view of the Administration, be parties to
the ABM Treaty?"57 The President did not reply until November 21,
1997, by which time the Secretary of State had signed (in September,
1997) a Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU") with Russia,
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to "multi-lateralize" the ABM
Treaty.5 The MOU would create an arrangement embodying features
that were in effect between the United States and the USSR. 9
56. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14. at 3 (noting the presumption that
successor states remain subject to bilateral treaties): see also Letter from William
C. Danvers, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Legislative
Affairs, to Rep. Newt Gingrich. Speaker, H.R. (Nov. 29, 1996) (on file with
author) (transmitting Report on the Livingston ABM Amendment (Nov. 25, 1996)
and noting the executive authority concerning succession agreements); Letter from
Sen. Bob Livingston, Chairman. Comm. on Appropriations, S., Rep. Benjamin A.
Gilman, Chairman, Comm. on International Relations, -l.R., and Rep. Floyd
Spence, Chairman, Comm. on National Security. H.R.. to President William J.
Clinton 3 (Dec. 11, 1996) (on file with author) (noting the President's notion that
his powers included the ability to enter in agreements without the consent of
Congress).
57. See June Gilman Letter, supra note 10. at 3 (asking the President for
information regarding the ABM Treaty in preparation for a conference on the
European Security Act).
58. See November Clinton Letter, supra note 11, at 1-4 (addressing Rep.
Gilman's inquiries regarding the ABM treaty succession and explaining the details
of the MOU reached with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus. and Kazakhstan).
59. Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, Sept. 26. 1997, U.S.-Belr.-Kaz.-
2002]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
President Clinton's November 21, 1997, letter stated that he would
provide the MOU to the Senate for its advice and consent.' The
November 21, 1997 letter also stated:
[N]either a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor
(which would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant
ABM interests) nor a simple recognition of all CIS states as full ABM
successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance
of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972).61
In addition, the letter stated that if the Senate did not consent to the
MOU as a Treaty, succession arrangements would "simply remain
unsettled," and that in any event the ABM Treaty that was in force
between the United States and USSR "would clearly remain in
force. ' 62 On March 3, 1998, Representative Gilman and Senator
Jesse Helms observed that if none of the four USSR successor states
that signed the MOU were bound by the ABM Treaty, it followed
that the Treaty was no longer in force.63
On May 21, 1998, President Clinton reasserted the Executive
Branch's position that "there is no question that the ABM Treaty has
continued in force and will continue in force .... -' President
Clinton also stated "[t]he United States and Russia clearly are Parties
to the Treaty .... -"5 The President explained neither the basis for this
Russ.-Ukr., art. II [hereinafter "MOU"] (formalizing the recognition of four former
Soviet Republics as new parties to the ABM Treaty) available at
http://www.state.gov/www/globabl/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm,uscore.mou.htmI
(last visited Oct. 17, 2000).
60. See November Clinton Letter, supra note 1I, at I (noting that the MOU
would be provided to the Senate).
61. Id. at 2. (explaining the rationale behind the signing of the MOU with the
four former Soviet Republics).
62. See id. at 3 (explaining what would happen if the Senate were to disapprove
the MOU).
63. See Gilman-Helms Letter, supra note 12, at 3 (suggesting if the U.S. were
the only country bound by the ABM Treaty then it ceased to remain in force).
64. See May Clinton Letter, supra note 9, at 1-2 (responding to Sen. Hlelms
Mar. 3, 1998, letter, and reaffirming that the four former Soviet Republics are
bound by the ABM Treaty).
65. See id. at 2 (explaining the relationship between the U.S., Russia, and the
ABM Treaty). But see Letter from Senators Trent Lott, Don Nickles, Larry E.
Craig, Jon Kyl. Jesse Helms, Connie Mack, Paul Coverdell, and Bob Smith to
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conclusion, nor how the conclusion could be reconciled with his
November 1997 response to Representative Gilman.
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW: LONG ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPORT
THE CONCLUSION THAT THE ABM TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE USSR
DID NOT, UPON THE USSR'S EXTINCTION,
BECOME A TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
A. THE DECEMBER 1991 DECLARATION THAT THE USSR HAD
CEASED TO EXIST CORRECTLY CHARACTERIZED THE CHANGES
THAT OCCURRED ON WHAT HAD BEEN THE USSR's TERRITORY
It is not necessary to resolve any dispute as to whether the USSR
became extinct in December 1991, for there has been no dispute
between the United States and the USSR's successor states on this
point. It bears noting, however, that had the parties put the question
to a disinterested tribunal, the tribunal would have had ample
grounds for concluding that the USSR did become extinct in
December 1991. Therefore, after December 1991, the USSR lacked
the attributes of "statehood" that are essential elements of a state's
existence, i.e., sovereignty over defined territory inhabited by a
permanent population, and the power to conduct foreign relations.
66
President William J. Clinton 4 (Oct. 5, 1998) (on file with author) [hereinafter
"October Lott Letter"] (maintaining that "the ABM Treaty lapsed and is of no
force and effect unless the Senate approves the MOU, or some similar agreement,
to revive the treaty."). President Clinton's response was that he would provide the
MOU to the Senate for its advice and consent, but that the ABM Treaty would
remain in force even if the Senate would not approve the MOU. See Letter from
President William J. Clinton to Rep. Benjamin Gilman, Chairman, Comm. on Int'l
Relations, H.R. (Dec. 17, 1998) (on file with author).
66. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 201 (1986) [hereinafter 'RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS"]
(holding that a state must have a defined territory, a permanent population, a
government, and capacity to engage in formal relations with other states); see also
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospastiale v. United States, 482 U.S. 522, 557
(noting that under territorial sovereignty, "no state may perform an act in the
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By the end of December 1991, Gorbachev resigned and the USSR
dissolved. Each of its former fifteen states had sovereignty over a
part of what had been the USSR's territory, and no state claimed that
even one pyt of territory remained as USSR territory.67
Moreover, the USSR's dissolution was marked by other
consequential changes: (1) it occurred abruptly, out of strong
secessionist pressures that created the risk of widespread civil strife,
rather than by a deliberate and peaceful evolution; (2) the USSR
government was not a party to any of the declarations of dissolution
or independence or to the organizational agreements of the CIS or to
any other agreements among the newly independent states; (3) within
the several years immediately before dissolution was declared
formally, the USSR government had yielded its political and military
control over the other Warsaw Pact states; (4) in that period before
formal dissolution, the USSR government abolished the Communist
Party's monopoly on domestic political power, thereby facilitating
the USSR's constituent "republics' control over their territories and
economies, and removing an obstacle to the emergence of the new
states; (5) the demography of the new states was markedly different
from that of the USSR, the former being far more ethnically
homogeneous than the latter was; and (6) none of the newly
independent states separately has military/strategic resources
(including agricultural and mining assets and geographical assets
such as access to various ports and contiguity with certain regions on
territory of a foreign state without consent."); Hoyt v. Sprague, 103 U.S. 613, 630
(1880) (holding that a state has territorial sovereignty if it has a monopoly on the
exercise of governmental power within its borders); Cherokee Nation v. Southern
Kan. R. Co., 33 Fed. 900, 906 (W.D. Ark. 1888) (describing sovereignty as the
"supreme, absolute, uncontrollable power; thejus summi imperii; the absolute right
to govern."). The fifteen former Soviet States included the Baltics, i.e., Latvia,
Lithuania, and Estonia, which the United States and Western Europe did not regard
as having been absorbed into the USSR. See generally Lawrence S. Eastwood, Jr.,
Secession, State Practice and International Law after the Dissolution of the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 299, 316-22 (1983) (noting
that governments declined to recognize their incorporation into the USSR); see
also Ruta M. Kalvaitis, Citizenship and National Identity in the Baltic States, 16
B.U. INT'L L.J. 231, 234-39 (1998) (narrating the Baltic states' struggle for
independence).
67. See KENNETH KATZNER, RUssIAN-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 925 (1984)
(defining "pyt" as a small measure of area).
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land) comparable to those possessed by the former USSR. "
International law does not consider a state extinct solely because it
has lost some territory or population. But no USSR successor state
embodies the USSR's international legal personality; indeed, none
even claimed to do so. Given the abruptness of the loss of territory,
population, empire, central control over the inhabitants of the fifteen
sub-states, and the changes in ethnic concentrations and military and
strategic resources, it is not hard to understand why the United States
agreed that the USSR's identity disappeared. Hence, the successor
states and the United States aptly concluded that the USSR "'ceased
to exist," i.e., "was no more."69
B. THE ABM TREATY WAS A BILATERAL TREATY
A bilateral treaty is a treaty between two "sides," which usually
are two States.70 Only the United States and the USSR were parties to
the ABM Treaty and the Treaty specified no means for adding
parties.7
68. See generally THE DECLINE AND FALL OF TIlE SOVIET EMPIRE (Bernard
Gwertzman & Michael Kaufman, eds. 1992) (detailing the events leading to, and
the aftermath of, the Soviet Union's collapse): see also RICHARD PIPES, RUSSIA
UNDER THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME (1993) (discussing the role of Russia in the former
USSR).
69. See Protocol to the Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of
Independent States, supra note 3, at 149 (expressing the recognition by the new
members of the CIS of the demise of the USSR): see also President's Address to
the Nation on the Commonwealth of Independent States, supra note 5 (noting the
United States recognition of the fall of the USSR): see also AMOS S. HERStHEY,
THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 215 (rev.
ed. 1935) (stating that "states fully extinguished lose all international
personality.").
70. See ARNOLD DUNCAN MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES: BRITISH PRACTICE
AND OPINIONS 5 (1938) (defining the arrangement to which the term "bilateral
treaty" applies).
71. Although this Memorandum's main thrust is bilateral treaties, that does not
imply that a state's extinction has no effect on the multilateral treaties of which it
was a party. See Hubert Beemelmans, State Succession in International Law:
Remarks on Recent Theory, and State Pra'is, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 71, 85 (1997)
(discussing State succession to multilateral treaties); see generally Yehuda Z.
Blum, U.N. Membership of the "'New'" Yugoslavia: Continuit*, or Break?, 86 AM.
J. INT'L L. 830 (1992) (discussing the consequences to a multilateral treaty
resulting from the extinction, break-up, or territorial modification of a member
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C. IF JUDICIAL DECISION, DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, OR TREATIES
Do NOT PROVIDE TRUSTWORTHY EVIDENCE ON A DISPUTED
POINT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW, A COURT WILL
CONSULT THE WORKS OF SCHOLARS TO DETERMINE THE LAW
International law, like common law in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, can grow out of long-practiced custom that becomes
accepted as law.72 In ascertaining custom, courts often consult the
works of scholars. As the Supreme Court explained in the landmark
1898 case, The Paquete Habana,"
[W]here there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations, and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and
commentators who by years of labor, research and experience, have made
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subject of which they
treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the
speculations of their author concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
74
Courts continue to look to distinguished commentators for aid in
ascertaining customary international law.75
D. THE WORKS OF SCHOLARS SUPPORT THE CONCLUSION THAT A
BILATERAL TREATY OTHER THAN A DISPOSITIVE TREATY DOES
country).
72. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON TIlE LAW OF ENGLAND
*69-80 (arguing that customs arose and became part of the common law by serving
as the basis for early judicial decisions); see also ARTHUR REED HOGUE, ORIGINS
OF THE COMMON LAW 190-200 (1966) (discussing the role of custom in the
development of the common law); see also I D.P. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 15-20, 35-36 (1965) (exploring the role of custom in international law); see
also David J. Bederman, The Citrious Resurrection oj Custom: Beach Access antd
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1451 (1996) (discussing what makes
custom binding international law).
73. 175 U.S. 677 (1900) (involving the disposition of fishing vessels seized in a
blockade of Cuba).
74. Id. at 700 (citing Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163, 164, 214, 215 (1895))
(highlighting the value of works by jurists and commentators in ascertaining
international law).
75. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (suggesting that where there
is no written law upon the subject, it is the judiciary's duty to obtain aid from the
works ofjurists, commentators, or the acts and usage of civilized nations).
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NOT SURVIVE THE EXTINCTION OF ONE OF THE TREATY PARTNERS
In very general terms, a dispositive treaty creates a disposition-as
of a political boundary, for example-that is intended to be
perpetually respected. That the ABM Treaty is not a dispositive
treaty is shown at Part IV.K. below. A treaty that is not dispositive is
called a "personal," a "real," or a "political" treaty. An example of a
dispositive treaty is the Treaty of 1970 between the United States and
the United Mexican States ending boundary disputes between the
two nations.1
6
A widely-quoted author on the law of State succession is D.P.
O'Connell, who stated:
There has been, at least since the late nineteenth century, almost
unanimous agreement that personal treaties of a totally extinguished State
expire with it because they are contracted with a view to some immediate
advantage, and their operation is conditional on the nice adjustment of the
political and economic relations which they presuppose. When this
adjustment is upset, the rationale of the treaty is destroyed.'
The principle that bilateral treaties of a state lapse on the state's
extinction became a part of the scholarly tradition of international
law even before the United States was founded, and European
scholarly works on international law were well known in the United
States in the early Nineteenth Century. The most prominent work
was by Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss scholar in the second half of the
76. See Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio
Grande and Colorado River as the International Boundary, Apr. 18, 1972, U.S.-
Mex., 23 U.S.T. 371 (ending the pending boundary differences and maintaining the
boundary between the two nations).
77. See D.P. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 16 (1956) (noting
the common view that personal treaties of an extinguished State expire with the
State); see also David B. Rivkin Jr., et. al., The Collapse of the Soviet Union and
the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treat': A Memorandum of Law, to the
Heritage Foundation 4-10 (June 15, 1998) (arguing that a treaty lapses because of
"impossibility of performance," i.e., it is impossible for an extinct State to do
anything; ergo, it is impossible for an extinct State to perform its predecessor's
treaty obligations) available at
http://www.nationalsecurity.orellegalbrief/legalbrief.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2001); see generally United States v. Steinmetz, 973 F.2d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 1992)
(quoting United States v. Huckabee, 83 U.S. 414, 434 (1872)) (implying that a
state becomes extinct when its government ceases to exist).
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Eighteenth Century. Vattel wrote:
In the same manner as a personal treaty expires at the death of the king
who has contracted it, a real treaty is dissolved, if one of the allied nations
is destroyed-that is to say, not only if the men who compose it happen
all to perish, but, also if, from any cause whatsoever, it loses its national
quality, or that of a political and independent society.7
Another of the prominent early works was Frederic de Martens'
THE LAW OF NATIONS, published in 1788. Martens' career included
professorships of law at the Imperial School in St. Petersburg and at
the University of Gottingen. He was a representative of Russia at
many official conferences, and an arbiter in international disputes,
for which he became known as "Chief Justice of Christendom.1 7' An
English translation of Martens' work, dedicated to President George
Washington, was published in Philadelphia in 1795. Martens wrote:
"TREATIES, properly so called, cease to be obligatory when the
foreign power with whom they were concluded ceases to exist, and
when the state passes under the dominion of another power. '
Henry Wheaton made the same point in his ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW in 1836, perhaps the first treatise exclusively
on international law written in the United States. Wheaton was
Justice of the Marine Court of New York. Later, as the official
reporter of the U.S. Supreme Court, he edited twelve volumes of the
Supreme Court's reports. He then became, in succession, Charg6
d'Affaires of the United States to Denmark, U.S. Minister to Prussia,
and Lecturer on International Law at Harvard University." Professor
78. EMMERICH DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 312 (Joseph Chitty ed., T &
J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883) (arguing that a treaty is void by the destruction of one
of the contracting powers). Vattel's work was first published in French, L[. DRIOT
DE GENS (1758). The U.S. Supreme Court has a long history of looking to Vattel's
work for guidance, from Miller v. The Resohtion, 2 U.S. 1, 15 (178 1) (inquiring as
to whether "the articles of capitulation bind" the U.S. with respect to seizures of'
cargo), to New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 788-89 (1998) (resolving a
boundary dispute between New Jersey and New York).
79. See GEORGE A. FINCH, THE SOURCES OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
40-41 (1937) (providing a brief biography of Frederic de Martens).
80. GEORG FREDERICK VON MARTENS, THE LAW OF NATIONS 56 (William
Cobbett trans., Thomas Bradford, 1795) (discussing the duration of treaties).
81. See FINCH, sup-a note 79, at 35-36 (providing a brief biography of' Henry
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Wheaton wrote: "ft]reaties, properly so called, orfodera, are those
of friendship and alliance, commerce and navigation, which even if
perpetual in terms, expire of course... in case either of the
contracting parties loses its existence as an independent State. ' 2
In 1889, the State Department stated as a "principle of public law"
that a treaty expires when one of the parties "loses its existence."" In
support, the State Department quoted from General Henry W.
Halleck's INTERNATIONAL LAW, written in 1861:
The principle of public law which causes Treaties under such
circumstance [i.e., the cessation of a state's existence as an independent
state] to be regarded as abrogated is thus stated: "[t]he obligations of
Treaties, even where some of their stipulations are in their terms
perpetual, expire in case either of the contracting parties loses its
existence as an independent state ....
In 1897, U.S. Secretary of State John Sherman invoked scholarly
works 5 to explain to the Government of Japan why the treaties made
by the Kingdom of Hawaii would not survive the U.S. annexation of
the Kingdom's territory, i.e., "[t]he treaty of annexation does not
Wheaton).
82. HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 191 (8th ed. 1866)
(discussing the cases in which treaties cease); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
770 (4th ed. 1968) (defining "foedus," from which "foedera" is derived, as a treaty,
a league, or compact).
83. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS
CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER POWERS
SINCE JULY 4, 1776, 1236 (1899) (quoting HENRY W. HALLECK, HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 899) (discussing the status of treaties in instances where the
contracting parties cease to exist).
84. Id. Halleck, the adopted son of Baron Frederic von Steuben, was a career
soldier and lawyer. See Scott R. Morris, The Laws of War: Rules by Warriors for
Warriors, 1997 ARMY LAW. 4 (1997). He was General-in-Chief of the U.S. Army
in the Civil War until his replacement by General Ulysses S. Grant. See id. at 10
(providing background information on Halleck). In 1861 Halleck wrote his first
book on international law, which was later updated and republished. See id.
(discussing Halleck's early foray into legal writing and scholarship).
85. See JOHN BASSET MOORE, V DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 349 (1906)
(quoting HENRY W. HALLECK, HALLECK'S, INTERNATIONAL LAW, ch. 18, sec. 35)
(discussing the impact of expired states on the survival of treaties); see also .
(citing HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW sec. 275) (offering
a similar position).
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abrogate [the Kingdom's treaties], it is the fact of Hawaii's ceasing
to exist as an independent contractant that extinguishes those
contracts. 86
Likewise, in 1902 Charles E. Magoon, Law Officer in the Office
of the Secretary of the War Department, submitted a report to
Secretary of War Elihu Root, which Secretary Root ordered to be
published. On the subject of the treaty obligations of extinct states,
the report states: "[b]ut where there is a complete change, not only of'
sovereigns but of sovereignty, of necessity the agreement ends, for
each sovereignty must exercise its grace in accordance with its own
constitution, laws, and customs."8 "
In addition, in 1895 Captain Edwin F. Glenn, Acting Judge
Advocate General of the United States Army wrote:
When some of the stipulations of a treaty imply perpetuity, even though
the act mentioned to be performed has been accomplished according to
the letter of the agreement-as, for instance, in the recognition of a new
state-the act of recognition is complete when accorded; but the state of
things contemplated implies permanency, and a state is not authorized to
disregard the obligation imposed. If, however, one of the contracting
parties loses its existence, or its interior constitution undergoes a change
of such a nature as to render the treaty inapplicable to the new state of
things, the contract expires.
88
William Edward Hall (1895) and Max Huber (1899) also
published treatises expressing the view that upon a State's extinction,
its personal treaties lapse.8 9 Furthermore, British scholar Arthur
86. See MOORE, supra note 85, at 350 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State John
Sherman's missive to Mr. Toni Hoshi, Japanese Minister, on June 25, 1897,
regarding the U.S. annexation of Hawaii).
87. CHARLES E. MAGOON, REPORT ON THE LAW OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN
TERRITORY SUBJECT TO MILITARY OCCUPATION BY THE MILITARY FORCES 01F TIlE
UNITED STATES 304 (2d ed. 1902) (discussing the effects on treaties held by a
sovereign who ceases to exist).
88. EDWIN F. GLENN, HAND-BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1895)
(noting the events that would cause the extinction of treaties).
89. See WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 97
(4th ed. 1909) (noting that new states do not share in the obligations of old states);
see also MAX HUBER, THE SUCCESSION OF THE STATES, INTERNATIONAL AND
NATIONAL PRACTICE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 191-92 (W. Clayton Carpenter
trans., 1899) (discussing dismemberment and treaty succession).
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Berridale Keith assessed the evidence of State practice in 1907. Soon
after the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy of Norway and Sweden,
he stated: "[t]he evidence, from the practice of nations, is all in
favour of the lack of continuity in treaty obligations."
Similar observations include the following: "there is no legal
resurrection in international law. Once a State has become extinct, it
cannot resume a continued existence." Professor Krystyna Marek,
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, 1968.2"
When a state is dismembered into new independent states, its treaties as a
rule become null and void without descending to the new states. Treaties
are generally personal in so far as they presuppose, in addition to the
territory, also the existence of a certain sovereign over the territory. To
the succeeding states the treaties concluded by the former state are res
inter allos acta.
92
"It is clear that political (including personal and dynastic) treaties
of the extinguished state fall to the ground." Professor Amos H.
Hershey, University of Indiana, 1911.13
"The extinction of the personality of a state results traditionally in
an abrogation of all political and military treaties concluded between
the now extinct entity and other states." Professor Gerhard von
Glahn, University of Minnesota - Duluth, 1962.'
Many other scholars have expressed the similar opinions.9"
90. KEITH, supra note 22, at 19 (exploring state succession regarding treaties).
91. MAREK, supra note 6, at 6 (addressing the inseparability of the notions of
identity and continuity).
92. Erik Castren, Obligations of States Arising front the Dismembernent of
Another State, XIII ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICIIES RECIIT UND
VOLKERRECHT 753, 754 (1951) (describing the obligations of states arising from
the dismemberment of another state); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra
note 82, at 1470 (defining Res inter alios acta as "a thing done between others");
see also EUGENE EHRLICH, AMO. AMAS, AMAT AND MORE 249 (1987) (noting that
the phrase is used figuratively to mean "it's no concern of ours").
93. Hershey, supra note 7. at 287 (explaining the right and obligations of
successor states).
94. GERHARD VON GLAHN, LAw AMONG NATIONS; AN INTRODUCTION TO
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 117 (7th ed. 1992) (discussing the rights and
obligations of successor states).
95. See, e.g., UN GAOR, 1st Comm., 2d Sess., Annex 14g at 582-83, U.N.
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E. No CONTROLLING DECISION OF AN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
TRIBUNAL, QUASIJUDICIAL TRIBUNAL, OR A COURT OF TIlE
UNITED STATES HOLDS THAT AN EXTINCT STATE'S TREATY
AUTOMATICALLY BECOMES A TREATY BETWEEN THE EXTINCT
STATE'S SUCCESSOR AND THE EXTINCT STATE'S TREATY PARTNER
1. Courts of the United States
In Ter/inden v. Ames,96 the Supreme Court had to decide whether
the extradition treaty of 1853 between the United States and the
Kingdom of Prussia remained in force after 1871, when a number of'
Germanic States, including Prussia, formed the German Empire. The
Court held that the treaty remained in force because the German
Doc. A/C.1/212 (1947) (Letter of October 11, 1947 from the Chairman of Sixth
Comm. to the Chairman of the First Comm.); RESTATEMENT FOREIGN RELATIONS,
supra note 66, at § 210(3); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 153 (6th ed.
1963); JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 408
(1979); Albert J. Esgain, Military Servitudes and the New Nations, in TIlE NEW
NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND DIPLOMACY 71, 77 (William V. O'Brien
ed. 1965); I GREEN HAYWOOD HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 297
(1940); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 382-87 (2d ed. 1966);
NOYES E. LEECH ET. AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
SYSTEM 980 (1973): WERNER LEVI, CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
CONCISE INTRODUCTION 125 (1979); JOHN BASSETT MOORE, I DIGIST O1'
INTERNATIONAL LAW 248 (1906): 1 L. OPPENIIIEM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A
TREATISE 553 (1905), PAUL REUTER, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF TREATI-S
186 (Jose Mico & Peter Haggenmacher trans., 1995); GEORG
SCHWARNZENBERGER & E. D. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 169
(6th ed. 1976); MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 694 (4th ed. 1997),
OSCAR SVARLIEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF NATIONS 111-112 (1955);
OKON UDOKANG, SUCCESSION OF NEW STATES TO INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 404
(1972); Blum, supra note 71, at 833; P. J. Fitzgerald, State Succession and
Personal Treaties, II INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 843 (1962); Charles Cheney Hyde, The
Termination of the Treaties of a State in Consequence of its Absorption by' Another
- The Position of tie United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 133 (1932); J. Mervyn
Jones, State Succession in the Matter of Treaties, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 360, 373
(1947); Dieter Papenfu, The Fate of the International Treaties of the GDR Within
the F-amework Qf German Unification, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 469, 470-71 n.16
(1998); Edwin Williamson & John Osborn, A U.S. Peiwspective on Treatyv
Succession and Related Issues in the Wake oJ the Breakup of the USSR and
Yugoslavia, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 261, 270-71 (1993); Richard Young, The State of
Syria: Old or New?, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 482, 487 (1962).
96. 184 U.S. 270 (1902) (involving the extradition of an individual accused of'
forgery).
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Empire's Constitution did not extinguish Prussia's sovereignty.'- The
Court described the adoption of the Empire's Constitution, as
follows: "[t]hen came the adoption of the Constitution of the German
Empire. It found the King of Prussia, the chief executive of the North
German Union, endowed with power to carry into effect its
international obligations, and those of the Kingdom, and it
perpetuated and confirmed that situation.""
The Court carefully distinguished cases in which a State loses its
international identity upon joining a union of States: "Undoubtedly
treaties may be terminated by the absorption of powers into other
nationalities and the loss of separate existence, as in the case of
Hanover and Nassau, which became by conquest incorporated into
the Kingdom of Prussia in 1866. Cessation of independent existence
rendered the execution of treaties impossible.""
The Court cited as a source an 1889 State Department study of
treaty succession, i.e., "[w]here a state has lost its separate existence,
as in the case of Hanover and Nassau, no questions [of treaty
succession] can arise." 1"
In 1954 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the question
of whether a state becomes extinct in Ivancevic v. Artukovic."'0 The
court held that the Kingdom of Serbia did not become extinct when
the inhabitants of adjacent and smaller south Slavic states joined with
Serbia to form what was successively called the Kingdom of the
Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes; the Kingdom of Yugoslavia; and the
97. See id. at 285 (stating that nothing in the Constitution of the German
Empire removed the Kingdom of Prussia's identity or prevented performance of
treaties entered into by the Kingdom of Prussia).
98. Id. at 284 (describing the constitutional powers granted to the King of
Prussia).
99. Id. at 283 (noting the difference between a State in which independent
existence no longer exists and a State in which sovereignty has not been
extinguished).
100. See id. at 287 (quoting U.S. Dep't of State. Treaties and Conventions
Concluded Between the United States of America and Other Powers Since July 4,
1776, S. Exec. Doc. No. 47, at 1234) (addressing the issue of treaty succession).
101. 211 F.2d. 565 (9th Cir. 1954) (addressing the survival of an extradition
treaty between the U.S. and the Kingdom of Serbia, following a change in
government structure by the Kingdom of Serbia. to the Federal Peoples' Republic
of Yugoslavia).
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Socialist Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia." 2 lvancevic,
therefore does not address the consequences of extinction.
Therefore, to the extent that U.S. courts addressed the question of'
State extinction, the Supreme Court's dictum in Terlinden v. Ames is
consistent with the scholarly reasonings that a State's treaties lapse
upon the State's extinction.
2. International Judicial Tribunals
Neither the International Court of Justice ("ICJ"), nor its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice, handed
down a decision that turned on the status of personal bilateral treaties
of an extinct state. In 1996, in the case Concerning Application ofthe
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia),'"I the ICJ
Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry observed that the Genocide
Convention survived the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, because the
Convention, in embodying universal principles of civilized behavior,
transcended the concept of state sovereignty.'0 4 Judge Weeramantry
distinguished the Genocide Convention from treaties that are
"confined within the ambit of a state's sovereignty." 5 As to such
treaties, "[a]n important conceptual basis denying continuity ... is
that the recognition of the continuity of the predecessor state's
treaties would be an intrusion upon the sovereignty of the successor
state." 06 Hence, Judge Weeramantry appears to have concluded that
treaties, other than those of universal humanitarian concern, do not as
a matter of law remain in existence upon a state's dissolution.
102. See id. at 573-75 (upholding the validity of the extradition treaty originally
entered into by the Kingdom of Serbia).
103. 1996 I.C.J. 595 (July 11) (concerning allegations that Yugoslavia violated
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide).
104. See id. at 646-47 (separate opinion of Judge Weeramantry) (stating that
continuation of a treaty governing human rights and humanitarian interests is
beyond the scope of state sovereignty).
105. See id. (noting the different treatment afforded to human rights and
humanitarian treaties); see also Thomas D. Grant, Territorial Status. Recognition.
and Statehood: Some Aspects of the Genocide Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v.
Yugoslavia), 33 Stan. J. Int'l L. 305, 307-08 (1997) (addressing, briefly, Judge
Weeramantry's analysis).
106. See id. at 646 (noting the effect of continuity upon sovereignty).
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3. International Arbitration Panel
A Tripartite Claims Commission between the United States,
Austria, and Hungary was created in 1927 to fix the amounts of
financial obligations due Americans that were assumed by Austria in
its World War I Peace Treaty (Vienna, 1921) with the United States,
and the amount assumed by Hungary in its World War I Peace
Treaty (Budapest, 1921) with the United States.'0 7 The Panel found it
unnecessary to resolve any question of obligations imposed by
customary international law.108 In passing, however, the Panel
compared the U.S.-Austria and U.S.-Hungary Peace Treaties to the
U.S.-Germany Peace Treaty (Berlin, 1921) as follows: "[u]nlike the
Treaty of Berlin 'restoring friendly relations' between the United
States and Germany, these Treaties in terms 'establish' for the first
time such relations between Austria and the United States and
between Hungary and the United States.""
Thus, the Tripartite Claims Commission believed that the treaties
of the Austro-Hungarian Empire did not, upon its extinction at or
near the end of World War I, automatically pass to Austria and
Hungary, which were two of the states that succeeded to parts of the
Empire's territory.
F. THE UNITED STATES' CONDUCT DESCRIBED BY ASSISTANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL DELLINGER DOES NOT CONSTITUTE STATE
PRACTICE FOR PURPOSES OF ESTABLISHING CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Background
A state's loss of sovereignty over all its territory was relatively
common in the Nineteenth Century and in the early Twentieth
Century. France annexed Madagascar and Algiers; Great Britain
annexed the Southern African Republic; Japan annexed Korea; Italy
107. See Tripartite Claims Commission (U.S.-Aus.-Hung.), Admin. Decision
No. I, 5 (May 25, 1927) (defining the purpose of the Commission).
108. See id. at 6 (explaining that the Commission was only concerned with
determining whether Austria and Hungary had assumed the obligations and
accepted financial responsibility for the damages).
109. Id. at 11 (noting the emergence of the new nations of Austria and Hungary).
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annexed various Italian States; Prussia annexed Hanover, Frankfurt,
and Nassau; the United States annexed the Republic of Texas and the
Kingdom of Hawaii. In all of those annexations, the United States
expressed a view that the treaties of the annexed states ended
automatically with respect to the territory annexed.""
A state's loss of sovereignty over all its territory from a cause
other than annexation was less common. A vast number of states
combined to form "composite" states or "confederations" or
"unions," but the combining states in many cases retained substantial
powers to conduct their own foreign relations, including the power to
make treaties. An example was the Dual Monarchy of Norway and
Sweden, which ultimately dissolved in 1905. When such a hybrid
state dissolved and its members resumed full sovereignty, each was
expected to continue in effect the treaties it had made when it was
part of a union."' The USSR was different. Before dissolution, its
sub-states did not make bilateral treaties with nation-states. 2
AAG Dellinger cited four examples of state dissolution to support
his contention that the ABM Treaty of 1972 survived the USSR's
extinction: (a) the breakup of the Greater Columbian Union in 1829-
1831 into what became Columbia, Venezuela, and Ecuador; (b) the
dissolution of the Dual Monarchy of Norway and Sweden in 1905,
(c) the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire at or near the end
of World War I; and (d) the dissolution of the United Arab Republic
in 1961." 3 According to Dellinger, those events support the
110. See Jones, supra note 95, at 362-63 (noting the view to be customary, and
one that "raise[s] an irresistible presumption of law").
Ill. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCMIINI
438 (2d ed. 1916) (stating that both Norway and Sweden considered joint treaties
to be binding on each country separately); see also R. W. G. DEi MURALT, THIl
PROBLEM OF STATE SUCCESSION WITH REGARD TO TRFIATIES 87-88 (1954)
(describing the communication between Norway, Sweden, and the United States
concerning what responsibilities each country retained regarding joint treaties); see
also HERBERT A. WILKINSON, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF STATE SUCCESSION
108-109 (1934) (discussing the continued recognition of the treaties by Sweden
and the U.S.).
112. Before dissolution, Ukraine was a member, in its own name, of the U.N. by
special arrangement to induce the USSR to join. It may be said to have entered into
a "multilateral" treaty on its own, but it did so by an irregularity of U.N. conduct,
not out of a principle of international law.
113. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14, at 5 n.5 (citing examples listed in
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proposition that "where a state divides into its constituent parts, the
[diplomatic] practice supports the continuity of existing treaty rights
and obligations."' 14
Dellinger did not mention Yugoslavia's 1992 dissolution, a
curious omission inasmuch as it is a more recent example of a state
that dissolved, leaving no sovereignty in the extinct predecessor
state. The Yugoslavian dissolution, therefore is more closely
analogous to the USSR case than the foregoing four examples of
State dissolution. Regarding Yugoslavia's dissolution, the United
States took the position in U.S. courts and in the U.S. State
Department's publication Treaties in Force that none of the
Yugoslav successor states is a continuation of Yugoslavia."3
Additionally, in dealing with the successors of extinct Yugoslavia,
the United States "abandoned any assertions of automatic treaty
obligations and relied entirely on... assurances provided by the
successor states."" 16
As recently as June 23, 2000, Richard Holbrooke, United States
Williamson & Osbom, supra note 95. at 263).
114. See id. (quoting Williamson & Osborn. supra note 95. at 263).
115. See Declaration of Christopher R. Hill. Director, Office of South Central
European Affairs, United States Department of State at paras. 3, 5, Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia v. Park-71st Corp., 913 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No.
95 Civ. 3659 (AGS)) (discussing the U.S. position that at the dissolution of SFRY,
it ceased to exist and left no successor state). The United Nations also concluded
that no State is the continuation of the SFRY. S.C. Res. 777, U.N. SCOR, 47th
Sess., 3113 mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/777 (1992) (reaffirming U.N. Security
Council Resolution 713 that discussed the status of the SFRY). The Security
Council noted that "the State formerly known as the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia has ceased to exist," and consequently urged that the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia [hereinafter "FRY"] "cannot continue automatically [the SFRY's
U.N.] membership." See id. The Security Council thereupon asked the General
Assembly to rule that the FRY "'apply for membership in the United Nations
and... not participate in the work of the General Assembly." See i1; see also
Blum, supra note 71, at 833 (describing the events of the U.N. Security Council
with respect to Resolution 777, and the subsequent endorsement by the General
Assembly); see also USIA: U.S. Statement on Yugoslav State Succession, M2
PRESSWtRE, Sept. 30, 1997, available at 1997 \VL 14464578 (noting the remarks
of James B. Foley, Deputy State Department Spokesman, reiterating the U.S.
position that there is no successor State to the SFRY).
116. See Williams, supra note 40. at 31-32 (discussing the United States'
treatment of the treaty obligations of several states, including Yugoslavia,
following their dissolutions).
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Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made a statement to
the Security Council reminding "everyone" that the Security Council
decided in 1992 that the SFRY "had ceased to exist" and that the
FRY (one of its successors) should apply for membership as the four
other Yugoslav successor-states did. He also stated: "[t]herefore, I
don't understand ... how this situation exists. Tito's old flag is still
flying on First Avenue .... I consider that a travesty of the United
Nations spirit. A flag that represents a nation that the U.N. itself'
decided didn't exist." See U.S.U.N. Press Release # 79 (00),
Ambassador Richard C. Holbrooke, United States Permanent
Representative to the United Nations Statement in the Security
Council on the Situation in the Balkans I (June 26, 2000) (discussing
the state of the FRY and its relationship with the U.N.) at
http://www.un.int/usa/00_079.htm (visited Oct. 19, 2001).
Also, Dellinger did not mention the U.S. practice of regarding as
lapsed the treaties of states made extinct by the annexation of their
entire territories. Dellinger gave no reason why those extinctions
should be treated differently from extinctions caused by
dismemberment. Indeed, with respect to the question of treaty
survival, the scholarly literature treats all extinctions in the same
way. For example, Professor Amos S. Hershey, after explaining that
"[s]tates are extinguished through voluntary incorporation, forcible
annexation, division into several states, or union with other states,"
says: "[i]t is clear that political (including personal and dynastic)
treaties and alliances of the extinguished state fall to the ground."'1 5
2. A State Practice Does Not Contribute to the Development of
Customary International Law Unless the Practice is Conducted Out
of a Sense of Necessity to Comply with International Law
International law, like the common law in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, can grow out of long-practiced conduct.'" In
117. See HERSHEY, supra note 69, at 215 (emphasis added) (defining when the
total extinction of a state occurs).
118. See id. at 218 (distinguishing between the continuation of the obligations of
successor and absorbing states and the obligations of extinguished states).
119. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 72, at *73-74 (noting that custom is the
cornerstone of the common law of England); see also O'CONNELL, supra note 72.
at 2-37 (detailing what must be done to create international law out of custom and
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international law, it is the conduct of states that is relevant. But not
all conduct of states contributes to the growth of international law
because states, like other persons, sometimes engage in lawful
conduct for reasons that have nothing to do with their legal
obligations. For example, states admit aliens for residence, borrow
money from other states, make treaties with other States, assert
claims to property located in other states, grant diplomatic asylum,
settle disputes they have with other states, and do other things
"merely for reasons of political expediency." ' - Indeed, in dealing
with questions of treaty survival, states appear to act in the way they
act when dealing with questions as to whether they should enter new
treaties, i.e., they identify their political, economic, security, and
other interests and seek the greatest benefits they might achieve,
using any arguments they can muster, while giving up as little as
they have to.'2  Therefore, to separate state conduct that can
contribute to the growth of international law from state conduct that
does not contribute, courts have established a rule that is called
opinio juris sive necessitatis, which loosely translates as "a
conviction that a rule is obligatory."'122 For short, it is opinio juris.
According to this rule, only state conduct done out of a sense that the
act is required by international law can contribute to the growth of
international law.
123
the tendency to reduce the customary law to codes to increase precision and
definition); see also MARK E. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
TREATIES 3-62 (rev. 2d ed. 1997) (describing what constitutes a state's practice
and the requirements for customary law); see also Bedernan, supra note 72, at
1451 (noting that custom, done out of moral duty, creates law).
120. See Asylum Case (Colum. v. Peru), 150 I.C.J. 266, 277 (Nov. 20) (stating
that because the practice of granting diplomatic asylum is heavily influenced by
concerns for political expediency, it is not possible to determine a customary law);
see generally Jo Lynn Slama, Opinio Juris in Customary. International Law, 15
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 603, 608-16 (1990) (discussing the distinction between a
social usage, which is practiced without a feeling of compulsion, and legal custom,
which requires a perception that the practice is required by a rule of law).
121. See VILLIGER, supra note 119, at 48 (noting that opinio juris seems to
exclude state conduct engaged in solely for convenience).
122. See Slama, supra note 120, at 605 n.13 (citing H. STEINER & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 290 (3d ed. 1986) for the definition of opinio
juris sive necessitatis).
123. See generally, J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE. 60-61 (5th ed. 1955) (exploring the creation
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Moreover, a promise in a treaty "would not count toward the
practice element necessary to establish the existence of a customary
rule because.., usage not informed by opiniojuris is not relevant to
a demonstration of state practice," Arthur M. Weisburd, Customary
International Law: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 25 (1988).
According to Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, to cite state practice as
evidence of "binding customary international law," one must
establish "the [state's] conviction that the conduct in question is
followed as a matter of legal obligation .... ,,24
of international law and discussing the value of obligations and the fear of
sanctions); see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 69 n. 197
(1990) (describing opiniojuris and stating that it is a requirement for customary
international law); O'CONNELL, supra note 72, at 16 (expressing that it is general
"deference to a common conscience, by which the state admits its subjection to a
rule not exclusively of its own manufacture."); CLIVE PARRY, THE SOURCES AND
EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61-62 (1965) (setting forth the elements
necessary for an act to become international customary law); VILLIGER, supra note
119, at 52 (noting that the concept of instant customary law, developed through
acts of international bodies, lacks the requirement that states feel bound to the
action outside of the international body's resolution); Herbert W. Briggs, The
Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case and Proof of Customary International Law. 45
AM. J. INT'L L. 728, 730 (1951) (noting that the requirement of opinio juris
appears circular, but merely requires that a pattern of behavior that was previously
discretionary has become obligatory because it has gained acceptance); Bin Cheng,
United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary
Law, 5 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 23, 36 (1965) (clarifying that the psychological element
of opinio juris is the state's acceptance or recognition of the act, not the mental
process of the act); John A. Perkins, The Changing Foundations of International
Law: Front State Consent to State Responsibility, 15 B.U. INT'L L.J. 433, 440
(1997) (reiterating that a state must feel bound to conform to the international legal
obligation); Helen Silving, "Customary Law: Continuity in lunicipal and
International Law, 31 IOWA L. REV. 615, 622 (1946) (examining the two essential
elements of customary law, the second of which is opinio juris); The Scotia, 81
U.S. 170, 187-188 (1871) (discussing the process by which the laws of the sea of'
individual nations became generally accepted obligations by other states,
transforming the laws into international maritime obligations by other states, in
turn transforming the laws into international maritime law); Buell v. Mitchell,
2001 U.S. App., LEXIS 25916, at *87-*106 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that many
states' practice of renouncing the imposition of capital punishment has not passed
the test of opiniojuris sive necessitatis so as to become part of the common law of
the United States).
124. See SIR HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAl.
LAW BY THE INTERNATIONAL COURT 368 (1958) (discussing the difficulty of
balancing between customary international law and state sovereignty).
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The American Law Institute states the rule of opinio juris as
follows:
For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it
must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation (opinio juris sire necessitatis): a practice that is generally
followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not contribute
to customary law.
12 5
In three leading cases, the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases
(1969),126 the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case (1951), -'7 and the
Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case (1950),2s all involving claims
based on state practice, the International Court of Justice ruled that a
failure to establish that the state practice at issue met the opiniojuris
test, required a conclusion that the practice had not passed into
customary international law.' 29 Also, in the 1927 Lotus Case,'0 the
Permanent Court of International Justice likewise rejected a claim
because of a failure to meet the opinio juris test.' 31
The Anglo-Norvw'egian Fisheries Case typifies the application of
the opiniojuris rule. The ICJ held that the evidence did not establish
125. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21. § 102(l)(c)(3) cmt. c (discussing the sources
of international law).
126. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den.: F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4
(Feb. 20) (involving issues of continental shelf delineation).
127. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 4 (Dec. 18) (concerning the definition
of Norwegian fishing areas).
128. 1950 I.C.J. 4 (Nov. 20) (pertaining to issues of diplomatic asylum
following a rebellion in Peru).
129. See 1969 I.C.J. 4, 43-45 (finding that the principle of equidistance for shelf
was not followed because of a sense of legal obligation, but because the countries
were motivated by other factors, such as the Geneva Convention); see also 1951
I.C.J. 116, 131 (rejecting the United Kingdom assertion of the ten-mile rule
regarding territorial waters because the rule had only been adopted by a few States
and therefore had not become a general rule of international law); 1950 I.C.J. 266,
276 (rejecting Colombia's assertion that a modification in the law of any signatory
state to an agreement would be binding on other signatory states because Colombia
failed to prove that international customary law requires such a rule).
130. S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7) (involving
competing claims of criminal jurisdiction over a boat collision).
131. See id. at 358 (finding that France had failed to prove any principal of
international law prohibiting Turkey from the institution of criminal action).
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the existence of a purported customary rule of international law
limiting the base line of territorial waters to ten miles in the case of a
bay. The evidence was to the effect that some states adopted the ten-
mile limit by statute or by treaty, and some arbitral proceedings had
adhered to the ten-mile limit. Nonetheless, the ICJ ruled that,
however broadly the limit was respected, the state practice failed as
evidence of the existence of customary international law because it
was not a practice that responded to a command of law.2
Hence, if the acts of diplomacy cited by AAG Dellinger are to
serve as evidence of customary international law, they must pass the
opinio juris test.
3. The Record Does Not Show That, in Any of the Four Episodes
Cited by Dellinger, the United States Accepted a Treaty as Binding
on It Out of a Sense That International Law So Required
a. The Dissolution of the Greater Colombian Union, 1829-1831
In 1819, the Spanish Kingdom of New Granada, the Captain-
Generalship of Venezuela and Quito (also called Ecuador) formed
the Greater Colombian Union. The Union dissolved in 1829-1831.
The extent to which the three states submerged their separate
identities in the Union is a matter of dispute. According to one
scholar, the Union consisted of three states. Hence, the dissolution
did not manifest a unitary state's loss of sovereignty over territory.'
Later, Colombia and the United States signed a new treaty, which
contained language that can be read to imply each party considered
the pre-dissolution treaties to have continued in effect in the period
between the Union's dissolution and the making of the new treaty. "
The episode was described by the U.S. Secretary of State in 1832,
132. See 1951 I.C.J. at 131 (rejecting the ten-mile rule advocated by the United
Kingdom).
133. See MCNAIR, supra note 70, at 412-18 (describing the discussions that
followed the dissolution of the Greater Colombian Union among the three
separated states and Great Britain concerning the continuation of a Treaty formed
between Great Britain and Colombia).
134. See DE MURALT, supra note I11, at 86-87 (relating the formation and
meaning of treaties signed after the dissolution of the Greater Colombian Union).
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and more recently in books, articles, and reports on State succession,
including a report by a Committee of the U.N.'s International Law
Commission.135 If the United States manifested an understanding that
it acted out of a compulsion of international law, that would have
been a noteworthy event to students of the law of state succession as
well as to AAG Dellinger, i.e., a bona fide manifestation of action
opiniojuris in a field of few, if any, such manifestations. Yet, neither
Dellinger nor any other scholar, identifies any such manifestation.
There is, in short, nothing to suggest that the United States acted out
of opinio Juris in conducting treaty relations with the successors of
the Greater Colombian Union.
b. The Dissolution of the Dual Monarchy of Norway and
Sweden, 1905
In 1814, the Kingdom of Norway and the Kingdom of Sweden
formed a "Dual Monarchy" by which one person became King of
both states. 3 6 In a 1910 letter to the Minister of Japan in Washington,
the U.S. Secretary of State described the treaty operations of the
Dual Monarchy from the time it was formed until it dissolved in
1905: "[iun point of fact the Government of Norway and the
Government of Sweden have hitherto acted independently in
execution of their treaty engagements, each within its sovereign
jurisdiction. In the matter of extradition the United States has
135. See PRESIDENr ANDREW JACKSON. MESSAGE TO Tilt: HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, TRANSMITTING REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE EDWARD
LIVINGSTON, ON GOVERNMENT OF COLOMBIA, H.R. Doc. No. 33-173 (1832)
(containing the correspondence between the United States and Colombia); see also
United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, U.N.
GAOR, 1977 Sess. & 1978 Res. Sess.. Vol. II1, at 89 U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.80/16/Add.2 (1979) [hereinafter "'United Nations Conference on
Succession"] (discussing the relations between Colombia and other countries with
regard to their treaties following Colombia's dissolution); DE MURALT, supra note
111, at 86-87 (discussing the dissolution and subsequent treaties); Jones, supra
note 95, at 367-68 (stating Great Britain's position on the dissolution of Greater
Colombia and its impact on the continuation of Greater Colombia's obligations);
D. P. O'CONNELL, V THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION, 43-44 (1956) (detailing
Great Britain's view that treaties formed prior to the dissolution of Greater
Colombia were still binding).
136. See FRIDTJOF NANSEN, NORWAY AND THE UNION WITH SWEDEN 26 (1905)
(stating that although the two countries claimed to have separate sovereignty, they
were united).
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concluded separate treaties with the Governments of Norway and
Sweden."' 37
The U.S. practice of concluding separate extradition treaties with
Norway and Sweden has been interpreted by the U.N.'s International
Law Commission as recognition that the two states had "separate
international personalities."' 38 In 1905, when Sweden and Norway
separated from their Union, each notified the United States and other
states of its position on treaties made during the period of the Union,
i.e., a treaty that had been made specifically with reference to one
member of the Union would continue in effect between that member
and its treaty partner, and would not continue in effect otherwise; a
treaty made for the Union as a whole would continue in effect to the
extent that it related to one of the members of the Union, and would
not otherwise continue in effect. The United States and France
acquiesced. Great Britain did not acquiesce as to the continuance of
any treaty with Norway, and as to Sweden, reserved the right to
examine the treaties one-by-one. 39
Like the episode of the Greater Colombian Union, no public
account of that episode states or implies that the U.S. acquiescence
was driven by a sense of necessity to comply with international law.
In one respect, however, the episodes differ, in that in the period
between the dissolution of the Greater Colombian Union (1829-3 1)
and the dissolution of the Dual Monarchy of Norway and Sweden
(1905), additional government officials and scholarly writers
expressed opinions on the status of treaties of extinct States. None of
them suggested that the dissolution of Greater Columbia was a
precedent relevant to the dissolution of the Norway/Sweden Dual
Monarchy.
137. Letter from Elihu Root, Secretary of State, to Minister of Japan Takahira
(Nov. 10, 1905), reprinted in HACKWORTH, supra note 95, at 362 (responding to
the Japanese minister's inquiries about the dissolution and its effect on the
continuation of treaties).
138. See United Nations Conference on Succession, supra note 135, at 89
(discussing the status of Norway and Sweden during their Union).
139. See KEITH, supra note 22, at 101 (noting the intentions of Norway and
Sweden, though recognizing that both countries and the United Kingdom reserved
the right to reconsider the treaties); see also Baty, supra note 22, at 123-24
(discussing the dissolution and the perspective of the United Kingdom).
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Thus, to the extent that views of law had been expressed after the
Greater Colombian Union's dissolution, those views suggested that
the United States was not bound by law to acquiesce in Norway's
and Sweden's proposal that any of their treaties with the United
States remained in effect after their Dual Monarchy's dissolution.
Indeed, to the scholars, the law appeared to be to the contrary.
Hence, there is no evidence to support Dellinger's implied claim that
the U.S. practice vis-d-vis the dissolved Dual Monarchy of Norway
and Sweden was arrived at by opinio juris. Therefore, that episode
does not support the existence of a rule of customary international
law.
c. The Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 1918
The Austro-Hungarian Empire dissolved at or about the end of
World War I. The Empire had fought as an ally of the German and
Ottoman Empires, against a group of States (the "Allies"), the
principals of which were Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (until
its withdrawal in 1917), and the United States (which entered in 1917
against the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires).
After the War, the Allies jointly negotiated with Germany the
Peace Treaty of Versailles (1919),"4° to which the U.S. Senate denied
consent. Therefore, the Treaty was not ratified by the United
States. 14' Consequently, the Allies jointly negotiated other peace
treaties, which the United States did not ratify, including treaties with
Hungary (Trianon, 1920),142 and with Austria (St. Germain-en-Laye,
1919). 141 Instead, the United States made peace by separate treaties,
140. Treaty of Versailles, June 28. 1919, 225 Consol. T.S. 188, reprinted in 11
MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1265 (F. L. Israel, ed., 1967)
(negotiating peace between Germany and the Allies following World War 1).
141. See Edwin Borchard, Shall the Erecutive Agreement Replace the Treaty?,
53 YALE L.J. 664, 665-66 (1943-1944) (discussing Congress' failure to ratify the
Treaty of Versailles).
142. See Treaty of Trianon, June 4, 1920, 6 UNPERFECTED TREATIES OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 171 (terminating World War I and establishing
official relations amongst the adversaries).
143. See Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, Sept. 10, 1919, 5 UNPERFECTED
TREATIES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 237 (terminating the war with
Austria).
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i.e., with Germany (Berlin, 1921),141 Austria (Vienna, 1921),115 and
Hungary (Budapest, 1921). 146
In the recitals at the beginning of the treaty with Germany, the
parties state, "[b]eing desirous of restoring the friendly relations
existing between the two nations prior to the outbreak of war: [h]ave
for that purpose appointed their plenipotentiaries ...."I" The recitals
introducing the Treaty with Austria are different in that the language
states: "Considering that the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
ceased to exist and was replaced in Austria by a republican
Government... [and] [b]eing desirous of establishing securely
friendly relations between the two Nations: [h]ave for that purpose
appointed their plenipotentiaries ..... "' The recitals in the treaty
with Hungary are substantially the same as in the treaty with Austria,
i.e., "[c]onsidering that the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
ceased to exist and was replaced in Hungary by a national Hungarian
Government... [and] [b]eing desirous of establishing securely
friendly relations between the two Nations: [h]ave for that purpose
appointed their plenipotentiaries .... ,,49
Austria insisted that it was not the continuation of the Empire.""
144. See Treaty of Peace with Germany, Aug. 25, 1921, U.S.-F.R.G., 42 Stat.
1939 (restoring friendly relations between the U.S. and Germany).
145. See Treaty of Peace with Austria, Aug. 24, 1921, U.S.-Aus., 42 Stat. 1946
(ending the war with Austria).
146. See Treaty of Peace with Hungary, Aug. 29, 1921, U.S.-Hung., 42 Stat.
1951 (establishing relations with the government of Hungary).
147. See Treaty of Peace with Germany, supra note 144, at 1942 (emphasis
added) (noting the intention to resume relations between the two countries).
148. See Treaty of Peace with Austria, supra note 145, at 1946-47 (emphasis
added) (indicating the intention to establish relations).
149. See Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra note 146, at 1951-52 (emphasis
added) (indicating the establishment of a new government in Hungary and the
desire to formally establish relations between the two nations).
150. See KELSEN, supra note 95, at 384-85 n.85 (citing to Austria Pensions.
[11925-1926] Ann Dig. 3 (No. 25) (holding at the behest of the Austrian Supreme
Court that the "Austrian Republic was not the same state as the Austrian
Empire")); see also MAREK, supra note 6, at 230-32 (noting that the government of
the Republic of Austria, as well as the courts, considered the Austrian Republic
and the Austrian Empire to be separate states); Thomas Baty, The Obligations ?/
Extinct States, 35 YALE L.J. 434, 435-37 (1925-1926) (stating that a new state is
not bound by the obligations of its predecessor); Oskar Lehner. The Identity of
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Austria's position was supported by its national courts and by a
tripartite commission that included the United States.7'5 The
commission cited the above-described differences in the wording of
the U.S. treaties with Germany, Austria, and Hungary as evidence
that neither Austria nor Hungary was a continuation of the Empire.
Moreover, in Article II (1) of the 1921 U.S.-Austria Peace Treaty,
Austria confers on the United States "the rights, benefits and
advantages" conferred by Austria on the other Allied and Associated
Powers by designated Parts of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye
(1919), including Part X. IS? Part X of the Treaty of St. Germain-en-
Laye, Section II, Articles 234-247, provides a regimen for dealing
with the treaties of the dissolved Austro-Hungarian Empire."' 3
Article 234 designates particular treaties of the dissolved Austro-
Hungarian Empire, and provides that these treaties alone "shall...
be applied as between Austria and those of the Allied and Associated
powers party thereto. . ."'- Some examples are the Convention of
October 11, 1909, regarding the international circulation of motor-
cars, and the Convention of June 12, 1902, regarding the
guardianship of minors.155 Article 241 provides that each of the
Allied or Associate Powers "shall notify to Austria the bilateral
agreements of all kinds which were in force between her and the
former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and which she wishes should
be in force as between her and Austria."' 1:e Article 241 further
Austria 1918/19 as a Problem of State Succession, 44 Aus. J. PUB. INT'L L. 63
(1992). For a history of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, see RENE
ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE TiUE CONGRESS OF
VIENNA 360-371 (1958); see also ROBERT A. KANN. A HISTORY OF TilE
HABSBURG EMPIRE 468-520 (1974).
151. See Tripartite Claims Commission (U.S.-Aus.-Hung.), Admin. Decision
No. 1, 4-6, 11-14 (May 25, 1927).
152. See Treaty of Peace with Austria, supra note 145, at art. (ll)(1), 42 Stat.
1946, at 1948 (incorporating various articles of the Treaty of St. Germain-En-
Laye).
153. See Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye. supra note 143, at 319-24 (concerning
the question of agreements signed by the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy).
154. See id. at 319 (citing specific agreements signed by the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy that still applied to the Allied and Associated Powers).
155. See id. at 319-20 (enumerating conventions still in force).
156. See id. at 322 (establishing a notification system by which the Allied and
Associated Powers communicated to Austria which bilateral agreements they
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provides that "[t]he date of the coming into force shall be that of the
notification."' 57 In addition, "[o]nly those bilateral agreements which
have been the subject of such a notification shall be put into force
between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria."' 5' 8
Article 11 (1) of the 1921 U.S.-Hungary Peace Treaty, by reference
to the Treaty of Trianon (1920), adopts Article X of the Treaty of'
Trianon, 5 9 which is, in material respects, identical to Article X of the
Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye. 61 The treaties between the United
States and Hungary, and the United States and Austria were
submitted to and approved by a two-thirds vote in the U.S. Senate."
In 1923, the State Department Solicitor explained that Article i1
(1) of the 1921 treaty with Austria, by incorporating section 241 of
the Treaty of St. Germain-en-Laye, had the effect of terminating the
U.S.-Austria Naturalization Treaty of 1870.162 In 1927, the State
Department Solicitor explained that Article 241 gave the United
States a "right ... to revive, by giving notice to Austria within a
specified period, any treaty or convention which it may be desired to
continue in effect." The Solicitor explained further that the United
States did not, within the period specified in Article 241, give notice
of "its intention to revive the Consular Convention concluded
between this country and Austria-Hungary on July 11, 1870," adding
that the State Department "therefore does not consider that this
Consular Convention is now in force."' 63
wished to remain in force).
157. See id. (formulating procedures for treaty notification).
158. See id. (reinforcing the seriousness of the treaty notification process).
159. See Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra note 146, at 1953 (adopting
relevant portions of the Treaty of Trianon).
160. Compare Treaty of Trianon, supra note 144, at 177 (containing language
that called for the preservation of "territorial integrity" and existing political
independence" from aggression), with Treaty of St. Germain-cn-Laye, supra note
143, at 242 (containing similar language to the same effect).
161. See Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra note 146, at 1954 (noting
ratification by two-thirds of the Senate); see also Treaty of Peace with Austria,
supra note 145, at 1949 (noting ratification by two-thirds of the Senate).
162. See Memorandum from the Solicitor, United States Dep't of State, to Mr.
Vallance, 1-2 (Apr. 6, 1923) (on file with author) (explaining the effect of the
Treaty of Peace with Austria, on the Naturalization Treaty of 1870).
163. See Letter from Green H. Hackworth, Solicitor, United States Department
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Given that the United States and Austria agreed to an elaborate
regimen by which the United States would select the U.S.-Austro-
Hungarian Empire treaties that it wanted to remain in force with
Austria, and the Senate consented to this regimen, there is no support
for Dellinger's implied claim that the U.S.-Austro-Hungarian treaties
continued automatically by operation of law," or Dellinger's
implied claim that the Executive Branch revived those treaties
without the Senate's consent.
65
In short, the United States did not regard itself as bound by
international law to the treaties of the extinct Austro-Hungarian
Empire.
d. The Secession of Syria from the United Arab Republic, 1961
In 1958, Syria and Egypt formed a union called the United Arab
Republic (the "UAR"). In 1961, Syria seceded and was once again
recognized as a separate state. In the view of the United States, the
UAR continued to exist, notwithstanding Syria's secession, a view
shared by the UAR itself. Under the circumstances, as a matter of
international law, treaties would remain in place absent some reason
why a particular treaty could no longer fulfill its object and purpose.
Moreover, a scholarly work expresses the opinion that Syria's
treaties that were in force when it joined the UAR never went out of
force. 166 Therefore, in 1961, when Syria seceded, its pre-UAR
treaties were in force. The United States did not object to continuing
with Syria the treaties that the United States had made with the UAR,
but the United States did not maintain that it continued those treaties
out of a legal duty.
of State, to Jean Dube, 1-2 (May 25, 1927) (on file with author) (reasserting the
implications of the Treaty of Peace with Austria).
164. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14. at 3 n.5 (noting that treaty obligations
were not affected by dissolution).
165. See id. at 2-5 (expressing concern about Congress overstepping its powers
with respect to the ABM treaty and usurping the role of the Executive Branch).
166. See L. C. Green, The Dissolution of States and Menbership of the United
Nations, in LAW, JUSTICE AND EQUITY 162-166 (R. H. Code Holland & G.
Schwarzenberger, eds., 1967) (discussing the consequences of the establishment of
the UAR); see also J. H. W. VERZIJL, INTrERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORIC
PERSPECTIVE 126 (1969) (noting that the Syrian decision to leave the UAR left the
UAR no juridical reality).
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4. United States' Practice Regarding Yugoslavia's 1992 Dissolution
Shows That the United States Does Not Consider Itself Bound by
International Law to Maintain in Force the Non-Dispositive Treaties
of Extinct States
In 1992, SFRY dissolved and five states emerged on its territory:
Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the
FRY. When the dissolution occurred, FRY claimed it was not a new
state, rather merely a reduced-in-size SFRY, and therefore was a
continuation of SFRY.
The United States rejected the FRY claim. In a Declaration filed
with a Statement of Interest of the United States in U.S. District
Court in New York in 1995, Christopher R. Hill, Director of the
State Department Office of South European Affairs, stated:
In the early part of this decade, the SFRY suffered increasing political
crisis that ultimately led to dissolution. Since 1992 the United States has
taken the position that the SFRY has ceased to exist and that no state
represents the continuation of the SFRY .... The United States' position
that the SFRY has ceased to exist and that no state represents the
continuation of the SFRY is consistent with the position of the
international community generally.1
6 7
5. AAG Dellinger's Account of the Practice ofthe United States
Omits the Man, Occasions in Which the United States Took the
Position that Treaties Did Not Survive the Dissolution of'a State.
The practice of the United States, and some other states, was put
into context and summarized by Arthur Berriedale Keith:
The evidence, fiom the practice of nations, is all in ftivour of the lack of
continuitv in treat, obligations. The exceptions are mostly of a special
nature .... On the other hand, the evidence against the succession to
treaties is copious and distinct. The United States never regarded
themselves as in an way bound by, or entitled to, the bene~fts of the
treaties of the United Kingdom.... Thus also, the United States
167. Declaration of Christopher R. Hill, Director, Office of South Central
European Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, at paras. 3, 5, Federal Republic of'
Yugoslavia v. Park-71st Corp., 913 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (No. 95 Civ.
3659 (AGS)) (stating the United States' position that no state represents the
continuation of the SFRY).
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considered its treaties with Algiers as abrogated by the French conquest of
1831; its treaties with Central America as abrogated by the dissolution of
the Federation in 1839; its treaties with Hanover by its conquest by
Prussia in 1867; its treaties with Nassau by the same event ... ; with the
Two Sicilies: by their absorption in Italy in 1860. Similarly, Lord
Clarendon, on behalf of Great Britain. in the dispute with the United
States over the Mosquito Protectorate, maintained that Mexico did not
succeed to the Conventions of Spain with Great Britain. ipso jure. but
only by express agreement .... So in 1860. Sardinia issued a declaration
to the effect that the treaties of the annexed States were, ipso jure.
dissolved. The Netherlands formally declared, in unison with Prussia in a
treaty of 14th October, 1867, that the extradition treaty with Hanover had
passed away through the conquest, and had been superseded by the
treaties of the Netherlands and Prussia .... In the case of the annexation
of Madagascar by the French in 1896, although the British Government
vehemently protested that the annexation was an act of bad faith, and that
their Customs Treaty with the Madagascar Government should be
maintained, a view abandoned only in the treaty with France of April
1904, yet they never denied and the United States also admitted, that they
could not claim that the Customs Treaty remained in force despite the
annexation. Similarly, on the separation of Cuba fromn Spain. and the
annexation of Puerto Rico and the Philippines b' the United States, the
Spanish treaties ceased to bind either territory- and the United States
fiamed a tarifffor Puerto Rico and the Philippines. while the Governm,,ent
of Cuba has negotiated commercial treaties between itself and the great
powers. As Sardinia in 1860, as Prussia in 1866, so Great Britain in the
case of the Orange River Colony in 1900.
All the treaties of the Transvaal and of the Orange River Colony were
regarded as having fallen to the ground so far as they remained executory.
Of course, treaties that have had their effect remained in force in so far as
their results were concerned. Thus the boundary delimitations made under
the Portuguese-Transvaal Treaty of 1869 were accepted, so far as they
had been carried out, but all treaties which remained contracts fell to the
ground. For example, the arrangement with Mozambique for railway
traffic and recruiting of native labor passed away at once, and had to be
replaced by a formal convention in 1901. Similarly the customs and
railway treaties with the Cape of Good Hope and Natal fell to the ground,
and required renewal between the parties. Of course, in these cases the
fact that the places concerned were all colonies of one power rendered the
renewal possible with -very little friction, the principle was exactly the
same as in the case of the Portuguese mnodus vivendi.168
168. KEITH, supra note 22, at 19-20 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
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6. The U.N. Security Council Decision Not to Oppose Giving the
Russian Federation Veto Power Does Not Evidence Customarv
International Law Because the Decision Was Not Required by
International Law
Within days after the USSR dissolution in December, 1991, the
Russian Federation asked the United Nations Security Council for
the USSR's Permanent Seat, with veto power, on the Security
Council. The United States could have exercised its veto to preclude
a Security Council decision to grant the Russian Federation's
request. Instead, the United States, at a non-public meeting with
other members of the Security Council, granted the Russian
Federation's request. The Security Council made no official
announcement at the time, other than removing the USSR's
nameplate and replacing it with a Russian Federation nameplate in
the Security Council chamber. 69 The Russian Federation's request
was handled quietly and quickly to avoid precipitating consideration
of proposals to restructure the Security Council to abolish the veto
power, to merge the veto powers of France and Great Britain, and to
give veto powers to Germany or Japan, or both. 7 " According to one
news account, "[w]estern diplomats are said to be lobbying hard to
avoid a messy debate on the reform of the Security Council.'
' 7'
(providing evidence supporting the theory that succession to treaties is a distinct,
not automatic process).
169. Yehuda Z. Blum, Russia Takes Over the Soviet Union s Seat at the United
Nations, 3 EUR. J. INT'L L. 354, 354-59 (1992) (asserting that Russia should have
been admitted as a U.N. member by the same process as the other newly-
independent republics); see also Michael P. Scharf, Musical Chairs: The
Dissolution of States and Membership in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 29, 46-52 (1995) (describing the circumstances surrounding Russia's entrance
into the United Nations); Carolyn L. Willson, Current Development: Changing the
Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 115, 117-19 (1996) (discussing Russia's assumption of the USSR seat).
170. See Sam Jameson, Japan to Seek Seat on U.N. Security Council. L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 29, 1992, at A9(discussing Japanese interest in obtaining veto power in
the U.N.); see also Paul Lewis, West Acts to Deftr Issue of New U.N. Council
Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1992, at A6 (discussing the pressure to alter the veto
power); Paul Lewis, 3 Western Powers for Russian Takeover of Soviet U.N. Seat,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 1991, at A8 (discussing the issue of changing the veto power
in the U.N.).
171. See Trevor Rowe, Switch of Soviet Security Council Seat Could Sptr
Reform Ideas, WASH. POST., Dec. 26, 1991, at A25 (reporting on Russia's
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Similarly, former U.S. Ambassador to Italy Richard N. Gardner
explained: "[t]he one thing the United States, Britain and France
wanted to avoid at all costs is anything that would open up the
Pandora's box of a Charter amendment altering the present
membership of the Security Council and possibly ending the right of
a veto."'
17 2
Carolyn L. Willson, U.S. Department of State. called the decision
to give the USSR seat to the Russian Federation a "de facto
amendment" of the U.N. Charter, a locution that implies that without
amendment the U.N. Charter would not have permitted the Russian
Federation to take the USSR's seat, an implicit statement that the
Russian Federation was not the same state as the USSR.' 3 An
amendment to the U.N. Charter requires a vote of two-thirds of the
members of the United Nations, and ratification by two-thirds of the
General Assembly (including all permanent members of the Security
Council), in accordance with their respective constitutional
process.'74
Professor Michael P. Scharf, who at the time served as the State
Department lawyer with responsibility for legal issues concerning
succession to membership at the United Nations, goes no further than
to say, "what is significant is that the members of the United Nations
have found it in their interests to act (or at least to depict their
actions) concerning membership succession in conformity with legal
principles and precedent."' 75 The precedent to which Professor
Scharf refers is a 1947 U.N. decision when British Colonial India (a
member of the U.N. even before Indian independence) became
independent, automatically acquiring U.N. membership, while
Pakistan, which concurrently emerged as a new State, was required
assumption of the USSR's seat on the Security Council and worries over its effect
on other countries' interests).
172. See Lewis, West Acts to Defer Issue of New LU.. Council Seats, supra note
170, at A8 (discussing the Russian assumption of the U.N. seat and quoting
Columbia University professor Richard N. Gardner).
173. See Wilson, supra note 169, at 117 (discussing the amendment practice in
the United Nations).
174. See U.N. CHARTER art. 108 (specifying the amendment process).
175. See Scharf, supra note 169, at 67-69 (explaining the process by which
Russia was allowed to take over the Soviet seat as the "'continuation" of the Soviet
Union).
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to apply for membership. 1 76
The USSR episode and the India-Pakistan episode, however, differ
in a material respect. Treating India as though it were an incumbent
U.N. member, rather than as a new applicant, could not change the
regimen for governing the U.N., whereas allowing the Russian
Federation to occupy (as an incumbent) the USSR's seat on the
Security Council would vastly change the governing regimen. As an
incumbent, the Russian Federation would have veto power. As just
another U.N. member, it would not. Therefore, when the Security
Council gave the Russian Federation a veto power, it was not bound
to do so on the basis of the 1947 decision on India and Pakistan. The
Security Council, and the U.N. generally, acted on the basis of
expediency, not a legal requirement. Indeed, one commentator,
concluding that the India/Pakistan episode of 1947 was not
analogous to the dissolution of the USSR, stated that, "with the
demise of the Soviet Union itself its membership in the U.N. should
have automatically lapsed and Russia should have been admitted to
membership in the same way as the other newly-independent
republics.'
' 77
Therefore, the USSR-Russian Federation decision does not
constitute opiniojuris as to the survival of treaties of the USSR, let
alone the survival of bilateral treaties of the USSR, or the survival of
bilateral treaties generally. In sum, U.S. diplomatic practice has not
contributed to the development of a rule of law that a non-dispositive
treaty of an extinct state automatically becomes a treaty between a
successor state and the extinct state's treaty partner.
176. See id. at 40-43, 68-69 (outlining the legal and political reasons behind the
U.N.'s decision to accept India but not Pakistan, as a successor to British India [or
the purposes of U.N. membership).
177. See Blum, supra note 169, at 359 (arguing that from a legal standpoint, the
USSR's rights and obligations of membership ceased to exist with its extinction,
and that Russia was not its automatic successor for membership purposes).
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G. THE 1978 VIENNA CONVENTION ON SUCCESSION OF STATES IN
RESPECT OF TREATIES DOES NOT RESOLVE ANY ABM TREATY
QUESTION BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT A PARTY TO THE
VIENNA CONVENTION AND CONVENTIONS Do NOT BIND NON-
PARTIES
The United States did not sign the 1978 Vienna Convention at the
time it was opened for signature in 1978, or thereafter. A convention
or does not bind a state that is not a party.''
H. ARTICLE 34 (1) OF THE 1978 VIENNA CONVENTION DOES NOT
REFLECT A RULE THAT HAS PASSED INTO CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Article 34 (1) of the 1978 Vienna Convention provides:
Succession of the States in cases of separation of parts of a State
1. When a part or parts of the territory of a State separate to form one or
more States, whether or not the predecessor State continues to exist:
(a) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect of
the entire territory of the predecessor State continues in force in respect of
each successor State so formed:
(b) any treaty in force at the date of the succession of States in respect
only of that part of the territory of the predecessor State which has
become a successor State continues in force in respect of that successor
State alone. 
79
178. See Jet Traders Iv. Corp. v. Tekair; 89 F.R.D. 560, 567 (D. Del. 1981)
(stating that a treaty only applies to the states that ratified the agreement); see also
RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 324(3) (noting that treaty obligations and rights
arise to non-parties if the parties intend it to bind non-parties and the non-party
acknowledges its rights and obligations); see also GEORG SCHItWARZENBERGER, A
MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 160-61 (5th ed. 1967) (noting that treaties are
not binding on third parties); see also UDOKANG, supra note 95, at 403 (discussing
the sources of the rule that only contracting parties are bound by treaties).
179. See Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, U.
N. GAOR, 33rd Sess., Res. Sess., United Nations Conference on Succession of
States in Respect of the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, at 26 U.N. Doc. A/Conf.80/31 (1978) (emphasis added) (codifying a
framework to deal with treaties in cases of State succession).
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In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,80 a U.S. Court of Appeals held that an
act of torture committed by a foreign state official against a person
held in detention in that state's territory violated a customary rule of*
international law.' The court inferred the existence of the rule from
evidence that states universally condemned the use of torture.
According to the court, foreign states manifested their "universal
abhorrence" by way of treaties on human, political, and civil rights,
by declarations of the United Nations General Assembly, and by
domestic laws.8 2 The court, however, issued this caution: "[t]he
requirement that a rule command the "general assent of civilized
nations" to become binding upon them all is a stringent one. Were
this not so, the courts of one nation might feel free to impose
idiosyncratic legal rules upon others, in the name of applying
international law."'
' 83
In counseling caution, the court could have cited the North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases,'8 4 decided by the ICJ in 1969. The ICJ
rejected the contention of Denmark and the Netherlands (in a dispute
with Germany) that, by reason of the adoption of the Convention on
the Continental Shelf ("the Shelf Convention") (a principle for
determining continental-shelf boundaries between adjacent coastal
States), the principle of "equidistance" became a rule of customary
international law.'85 The Shelf Convention was opened for signature
in 1958. Between 1958 and 1969, thirty-nine states became parties.'"
By 1969, approximately seventy states were exploring or exploiting
180. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (determining the viability of jurisdiction of
torture claims in federal court arising from actions in Paraguay between parties of
Paraguayan citizenship).
181. See id. at 883-84 (noting that torture is a universally condemned practice).
182. See id. at 884 (accepting the argument that torture is universally
renounced).
183. See id. at 881 (recognizing the high threshold for a norm to be accepted as
binding on all nations).
184. North Sea Continental Shelf(F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4
(Feb. 20) (discussing the formulation of accepted principles of international law).
185. See id. at 44-45 (stating that the principles fell short of customary
international law).
186. See id. at 25 (citing the number of parties to the relevant provisions of the
Shelf Convention that Denmark and the Netherlands claimed represented a general
rule of international law.
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continental shelf areas. 187
Denmark and the Netherlands argued that the participation of
thirty-nine states in the Convention was sufficient to establish the
equidistance principle as a rule of customary international law
binding on every coastal state, not just the thirty-nine states that were
parties to the Convention. 8 The ICJ rejected this argument, holding
that the participation of thirty-nine states was not sufficiently
"widespread and representative" to show that the equidistance
principle had passed into a rule binding on states that were not
parties to the Convention. 9 That number of participants "though
respectable," was "hardly sufficient," even when compared to the
total number of states "whose interests were specially affected," i.e.,
were eligible to join and had continental shelves.'"
The evidence as to states' acceptance of the 1978 Vienna
Convention does not approach the level of proportional participation
that the ICJ found insufficiently widespread in the North Sea
Continental Shelf case, i.e., thirty-nine out of seventy interested
States in the Continental Shelf case, as compared with twenty out of
at least one hundred eighty-five states in the case of the 1978 Vienna
Convention. All states have an interest in the making of treaties.
Moreover, the 1978 Vienna Convention's participants do not include
any developed state other than the Holy See, or any Western
European state, or any North American State, or any of the five states
that has a Permanent Seat (and veto power) on the U.N. Security
Council (France, Great Britain, the Russian Federation, and the
United States). The line is pushed even farther from the regimen of
customary international law if weight is given to proportion of
population, because the 1978 Vienna Convention's participants
187. See id. at 227 (Lachs, J., dissenting) (noting the correlation between the
number of states who were parties to the Shelf Convention and the number of
States actually effected by its provisions).
188. See id. at 25, 41 (noting that thirty-nine countries ratified the Shelf
Convention, and the court's consideration as to whether this resulted in the
creation of international law).
189. See id. at 42 (rejecting the argument of the Netherlands and Denmark).
190. See 1969 I.C.J. at 42 (cautioning that states who are not party to the Shelf
Convention may not wish to be bound by it or have no need to be party to it due, in
part, to their geographic location).
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collectively represent about fifteen percent of the World's
population.'' Moreover, in the North Sea Continental ShelfC'ase, the
ICJ ruled the passage of eleven years between the Convention's
signing and the Court's decision was adequate to judge how well the
Convention was becoming accepted by states.""2 One commentator
explained:
However, when time passes and states neglect to become parties to a
multilateral instrument, the abstention constitutes a silent rejection of the
treaty. Early in the history of the treaty, it is impossible to determine what
position states will ultimately take, but 20 years after the treaty was
drafted, one can gain a fairly clear idea of how much acceptance the treaty
will probably ever secure.'
93
If time available for participation is given weight, there is even
less to commend the 1978 Vienna Convention as a maker of
customary international law, because nineteen years have elapsed
since the 1978 Convention was signed.' 94
191. See UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TIHE SUCCESSION OF STA'TIS IN
RESPECT OF TREATIES U.N. Sales No. F.79.V. 10 (1978) (listing participants in the
1978 Vienna Convention as Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Chile, Cote
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica,
Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Holy See, Iraq, Madagascar, Morocco, Niger, Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Poland, Senegal, Seychelles, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sudan, the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Uruguay); see also
POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, 1998 WORLD POPULATION DATA SIlFIT (1998)
(listing the population figures of countries). Each of the parties other than the I loly
See is a "developing" State according to the classification used by the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See The World Bank Group, The
World Bank's Role (explaining the classifications of States as developing) it
http://www.worldbank.org/html (last visited Dec. 29, 1998); see also The World
Bank, Countries and Regions Listings, at http://www.worldbank.org/htil (last
visited Dec. 29, 1998).
192. See 1969 I.C.J. at 43 (examining the element of time with relation to
acceptance as a rule of law).
193. See R. R. Baxter, Treaties and Custom, in RECUIL DES COURS 99-101
(1970) (citations omitted) (illustrating the influence of reliance on treaties as
evidence of international law); see also Briggs, supra note 123, at 728 (explaining
the basis for a rule of customary international law).
194. See Koskenniemi, supra note 40, at 93-94 (noting "[i]t took nineteen years
for the 1978 Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties
to enter into force with the deposit of the fifteenth instrument of ratification by the
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) on 7 October, 1996.")
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Moreover, Article 34 (1) of the 1978 Vienna Convention does not
meet the "stringent" requirement suggested by Filartiga or the
"widespread and representative" requirement of the North Sea
Continental Shelf Case. "Certainly, Article 34 is not consistent with
State practice." SHARON A. WILLIAMS, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
EFFECTS OF SUCCESSION BY QUEBEC 3 (1992). Hence, Quebec
[should it secede] "would not be bound under customary
international law by the treaty obligations entered into by Canada."
Id. at 34. To like effect is Diba B. Majzub, Does Secession Mean
Succession? The hternational Law of Treaty Succession and an
Independent Quebec, 24 QUEEN'S L. J. 411, 428-30 (1999) (arguing
that Article 34 did not codify customary international law). When the
International Law Commission proposed the adoption of the
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, it
explained with elaborate supporting documentation that existing
practice "does not seem to support the existence of a unilateral right
in a newly-independent state to consider a bilateral treaty as
continuing in force with respect to its territory after independence,
regardless of the wishes of the other part' to the treat ,.' III
United Nations Conference on Succession of States in Respect of
Treaties, Official Records, at 67 U.N. Doc. A/Conf/16/Add.2, U.N.
Sales No. E.79.V10 (1979). Similarly:
[T]he Commission concludes that succession in respect of bilateral
treaties has an essentially voluntary character. Voluntary, that is, on the
part not only of the newly independent state but also of the other
interested state. On this basis, the fundamental rule to be laid down for
bilateral treaties appears to be that their continuance in force after
independence is a matter of agreement. express or tacit, between the
newly independent state and the other state party to the predecessor state's
treaty.
195
The USSR also knew that:
[U]niversal succession is out of the question ... ,when a new State appears
as the result of separation from another ... when a State emerges from the
status of dependency by secession from a metropolitan country...
(footnotes omitted).
195. Id. at 68 (expressing the view that the fundamental rule for bilateral treaties
should be that their continuance following independence should be a matter of
bilateral agreement between the new state and the other state party).
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and ... when a new type of State appears as the result of social
revolution. I mean of course, not a political coup, but such a deep
revolution as change the very foundation of the State its social, economic
and political foundations.1
9 6
The 1978 Vienna Convention has not passed into customary
international law and therefore binds no state other than a party to
that Convention.
I. THE CONTINUATION PRINCIPLE OF THE 1978 VIENNA
CONVENTION WOULD NOT APPLY TO THE ABM TREATY VIS-A-
VIS THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BECAUSE THE CONTINUATION OF
THE TREATY WOULD CONFLICT WITH THE TREATY'S OBJECT AND
PURPOSE
The clause in the 1978 Vienna Convention that would require the
continuation in force vis-ci-vis successor states of the treaties of their
extinct predecessors does not apply if continuation would be
incompatible with the treaty's object and purpose, or would radically
change the conditions for its operation.
Article 34(2) of the 1978 Vienna Convention provides:
Paragraph 1197 does not apply if:
(a) the States concerned otherwise agree; or
(b) it appears from the treaty or is otherwise established that the
application of the treaty in respect of the successor [s]tate would be
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically
change the condition for its operation. 98
In the November 1997 letter to Representative Gilman, President
Clinton stated that the ABM Treaty of 1972 cannot fully achieve its
purpose with the Russian Federation as the only partner of the United
196. INTERNATIONAL LAW Ass'N, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-SECOND CONFERENCF
HELD AT HELSINKI, 562 (1967) (quoting I. I. Lukashuk asserting that a newly
formed state is not obligated to assume its predecessor's treaty obligation).
197. See Vienna Convention, supra note 179 (providing the Convention
language for Paragraph 1).
198. See id. (excepting the application of particular cases of State succession
which would frustrate the aim of the treaty).
258 [17:189
ABM TREATY
States because the Treaty refers specifically to territory outside the
boundaries of the Russian Federation and within the boundaries of
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine:
Neither a simple recognition of Russia as the sole ABM successor (which
would have ignored several former Soviet states with significant ABM
interests) nor a simple recognition of all NIS states as full ABM
successors would have preserved fully the original purpose and substance
of the Treaty, as approved by the Senate in 1972.'99
Therefore, according to President Clinton, to achieve the Treaty's
purposes, the area of its application must include the territories of
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, in addition to the Russian
Federation. To include those territories, they would have to be made
parties. This would require a substantial amendment to the Treaty's
provisions on decision-making. Moreover, the alteration in the ABM
Treaty's territorial scope would have a material affect on the ability
of parties to defend their national territories by means of the one
permitted ABM site.
Were Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine simply added as parties
(assuming President Clinton's view that the Treaty remains in force
between the United States and the Russian Federation), the veto
power that the United States had in regard to the ABM Treaty of
1972 in treaty governance would be destroyed. Also, the other three
states together could outvote the United States and the Russian
Federation. Such a critical change in the powers of governance
would not be compatible with the ABM Treaty as adopted by the
United States and the USSR.
Likewise, the dynamics of amending the Treaty would change
drastically. It would no longer be sufficient for the United States to
convince the other major party to agree to an amendment. The other
three could block an amendment, requiring the major parties to
withdraw and start anew if they desired an amended treaty.
199. See November Clinton Letter. supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the question
of ABM Treaty succession).
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J. THE ABM TREATY DID NOT BECOME A TREATY BETWEEN TIl-
UNITED STATES AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION BY DEVOLUTION
In anticipation of dissolving, a state may want to impose its
treaties on both its treaty partners and its successors. To that end, it
may proclaim that a treaty will become a treaty between its successor
and its (the dissolving state's) treaty partner. That proclamation is
called a "devolution proclamation." Similarly, the dissolving State
and its about-to-become successor may agree to such a devolution. In
either case, the devolution does not bind a treaty partner.""' It follows
that neither a devolution proclamation by the USSR, nor a devolution
agreement between the USSR and any one or more of its to-be-
successor states, could bind the United States to accept one or more
of the successor states as a party to the ABM Treaty.
K. THE ABM TREATY WAS NOT A DISPOSITIVE TREATY
1. The ABM Treaty Did Not Create a Legally Recognizable Interest
in Any State Other Than the Treaty Partners
Some treaties, like some contracts, are thought to create permanent
rights in third parties. Thus:
It is equally clear that transitory or dispositive treaties remain in force. Of
such a character are stipulations respecting boundary lines, servitudes or
easements resting on the land relating to the use and repair of roads
(including railways) or the navigation of rivers, etc. In these cases the
rights of third parties, which it would be illegal to ignore or destroy, are
200. See United Nations Conference on Succession, sutpra note 135, at 18-25
(noting that unilateral treaty declarations by the predecessor states do not generally
bind the successor state); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 210 cmt. f
([S]ubsection (3) adopts the 'clean slate' theory .... Under that theory, a new state
starts afresh, with neither rights nor obligations under the agreements of its
predecessor state, unless the new state indicates a desire to adopt a particular
agreement and the other party or parties agree. Even a devolution agreement
between the predecessor state and the successor state, whereby the latter assumes
all or some of the agreements of the predecessor state, is binding only as between
those states; the other party (or parties) to an agreement must agree to the
substitution of the new state. This principle applies both to newly independent





The ABM Treaty did not purport to transfer any legally
enforceable right to any third party, and that alone raises a strong
presumption that no third party had such right. ' "2 In addition, Article
XV.2 of the ABM Treaty allows each party to withdraw on specified
grounds, without the consent of anyone else, upon six months'
advance notice. 203 Finally, a party is allowed to withdraw "if it
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests." 201 Hence, the decision
as to whether to withdraw is vested exclusively in each party.
Therefore, the ABM Treaty cannot reasonably be read as having
transferred a legally recognizable interest to any third party.
2. The ABM Treaty Did Not Evidence an Intent to Restrict Either
Treaty Party's Use of Particular Territory Beyond the Time That the
Treaty Was to Be in Force
Some scholars suggest that a treaty may create a "servitude," that
is, a restriction on a particular use of territory for the benefit of the
other party that survives the first party's extinction, even if no third-
party right is created. Such obligations "are said to be in the nature of
covenants running with the land."2 Whether, in international law,
201. See HERSHEY, supra note 93, at 287 (noting an exception to the rule that
treaties with third parties are absorbed by the incorporating state).
202. See A. P. Lester, State Succession to Treaties in the Commonwealth, 12
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 475, 501 (1963) (citation omitted) (stating that -[t]he standard
of proof of the existence of rights in rein in customary international law is strict,
and it is believed, although it cannot be demonstrated here, that there is no general
rule accepted ex opinio juris sire necessitatis that 'real' or 'localized' treaties
automatically bind successor [s]tates.").
203. See ABM Treaty, supra note 1, at art. XV.2 (stating requirements for
withdrawal).
204. See id. (emphasis added) (noting that the availability of withdrawal is a
question for that specific party).
205. See James Wilford Garner, Questions of State Succession Raised by the
Gei-man Annexation of Austria, 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 421, 432 (1938) (noting the
belief that certain treaties are thought to be "'connected" to the territories); see also
DE MURALT, supra note Ill. at 86-88 (discussing instances that affirm the
doctrine that after the dismemberment of a State, all resulting States are bound by
the treaties concluded prior to dismemberment): see also Malcolm N. Shaw, State
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such a device as a servitude actually exists, is hotly contested.
According to F.A. Vdli:
The "servitude" of international law is the traditional scapegoat of
international jurisprudence. There is hardly any other concept or doctrine
of international law which has suffered such contemptuous criticism and
blunt rejection, and at the same time enjoyed such unsubstantiated
approval and wanton praise. It has been accused of being the obsolete
vestige of medieval, patrimonial, feudal and-last, but not least-Roman
law. It has been attacked as being the hybrid product of a servile
adaptation of private law concepts, it has been indicted as being a
superfluous and artificial construction, apt to deform international law and
to introduce the utmost confusion therein. It has been dealt even the
deadliest blow which can be given to any scientific conception .. its
existence has been denied.20 6
But assuming, for the sake of argument, that some restraints on
land use can survive extinction even though they do not vest rights in
third parties, there is good reason to assume that the rule would be
limited to restraints on particularly-described territory. The servitude
is based on the presumption that a state that granted the restriction
intended to transfer a permanent property right to another state, just
as any landowner might transfer to another person a permanent right
in designated property. This view was expressed by Vattel:
But it is here to be observed, that treaties or alliances which impose a
mutual obligation to perform certain acts, and whose existence
consequently depends on that of the contracting powers, are not to he
confounded wiith those contracts by which a perfect right is once for all
acquired, independent of any mutual performance of subsequent acts. If,
for instance, a nation has forever ceded to a neighboring prince the right
of fishing in a certain river, or that of keeping a garrison in a particular
Succession Revisited, 1994 FINNISH Y.B. INT'L L. 34, 77 (noting that following the
termination of a state and its replacement by several new states, "it is accepted that
political treaties will not continue but that territorially grounded treaties will
continue.").
206. F. A. VALI, SERVITUDES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 42 (2d. ed. 1958)
(citation omitted) (arguing that the concept of international servitudes represents a
"rather undefined and unshapely mass" as a result of scholars' tendency to
"indiscriminately throw almost every obligation imposed upon a State into the
limbo of something which they call international servitudes."); see also Esgain,
supra note 95, at 43-44 (providing arguments for and against the existence of
international servitudes, and the identities of the advocates of each position).
262 [17:189
2002] ABM TREA TY 263
fortress, that prince does not lose his rights, even though the nation from
whom he has received them happens to be subdued, or in any other
manner subjected to a foreign dominion. His rights do not depend on the
preservation of that nation; she had alienated them; and the conqueror by
whom she has been subjected can only take what belonged to her.
-20 7
Similarly, Samuel B. Crandall stated:
Rights in or over the territory, or real rights, which have been created or
transferred by treaty, do not expire with the extinguishment of the state
conveying such rights, but survive as against the succeeding territorial
sovereign. The instruments under which such rights have passed out of
the one state into the other remain unchanged as documents of title.
-20 s
Likewise, "there is an incapacity in the successor [s]tate to assert
rights of sovereignty greater than those which inhere in respect of the
territory. 2 °9
Also, D. P. O'Connell writes:
A distinction is drawn in traditional international law between "personal"
and "impersonal" or "dispositive" treaties. The former are those which are
essentially contractual and presuppose reciprocity between the parties
with a view to an agreed end. The latter are those which impress upon a
territory with some special legal status, and so limit the incidence of
sovereignty upon it.
2 10
The ABM Treaty fell within D. P. O'Connell's description of a
207. VATTEL, supra note 78, at 312. quoted in Crandall, supra note I 1, at 430-
31 (emphasis added) (explaining Vattel's argument that rights in territories are not
void by the destruction of one of the contracting powers); see also Jones, supra
note 95, at 375 (noting Vattel's argument regarding obligations created by
treaties).
208. See CRANDALL, supra note I 1l, at 430 (analyzing the relationship between
treaty termination and changes in state entities).
209. See INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, COMMITTI-I- ON STATE
SUCCESSION TO TREATIES AND OTHER GOVERNMENTAL OBLIGATIONS, TIlE
EFFECT OF INDEPENDENCE ON TREATIES 352 (1965) (discussing "dispositive"
treaties which "survive changes of sovereignty because they are less contractual
than in the nature of territorial settlements.").
210. See O'CONNELL, supra note 72, at 368 (drawing distinctions between types
of treaties and noting the effect changes of sovereignty have on dispositive
treaties).
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"personal treaty," i.e., it presupposed "reciprocity between the parties
with a view to an agreed end."' 1 ' If the ABM Treaty had ended by a
party's withdrawal under Article XV(2), neither party would have
been further obliged to forego deploying ABM systems anywhere on
its territory. The end of the Treaty as a result of the USSR's
extinction could not give the Treaty any greater power to burden
particular territory. The ABM Treaty therefore was the antithesis of
what O'Connell describes as treaties that "impress" upon a territory a
"special legal status" that "limit[s] the incidence of sovereignty" on
that territory. 1 2 Similarly, the ABM Treaty was the opposite of'
Vattel's example of a right acquired by contract that is "once for all
acquired, independent of any mutual performance of subsequent
acts. ' '2 3 Finally, it cannot be assumed that the United States has,
outside any treaty, granted any third state a legal right to require the
United States to forego deployment of a national missile defense.
Accordingly, the ABM Treaty was not a dispositive treaty.
V. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE
PRESIDENT'S IMPLIED POWER TO MAKE SOME
KINDS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
WITHOUT A CONSENTING VOTE OF TWO-
THIRDS OF THE SENATE DOES NOT EXTEND TO
THE MAKING OF A LEGALLY BINDING ANTI-
BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY.
The Dellinger Paper asserted that, regardless of whether under
international law the ABM Treaty of 1972 became a treaty with the
Russian Federation, an ABM treaty was brought into existence by
agreement of the Russian Federation and the President of the United
States, notwithstanding the absence of U.S. Senate advice and
consent. Dellinger contended that the terms of what he argued is an
ABM treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation
211. See id. (defining personal treaties and noting that personal treaties bind
successor States only in limited instances where sovereignty changes by evolution
do).
212. See id. (defining "impersonal" or "dispositive" treaties).




are not so different from those of the ABM Treaty of 1972 as to
constitute a substantive amendment of the latter. Dellinger did not
argue that an amendment to the ABM Treaty could have been
Constitutionally accomplished by an "Executive Agreement"-that
is, by an agreement that would not require Senate action. Rather, he
cited powers-to interpret treaties, to implement treaties, and to
recognize the existence of foreign States-that he asserted rest
"exclusively" with the President. Dellinger also seemed to argue that
the Senate is imputed with knowledge of the breadth (as Dellinger
understands it) of Presidential power vis-i-vis treaty-making, and
therefore, when the Senate consents to a treaty, it implicitly
authorizes later Presidents to decide without further Senate consent
whether the treaty should become a treaty with a successor to the
extinct state with which the treaty had been made. "
The Dellinger interpretation of the Constitution is flawed, as are
the interpretations of the other works taking similar positions. The
following discusses the principle errors of the interpretation.
A. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO
INTERPRET TREATIES, BUT MUST YIELD TO INTERPRETATIONS BY
THE COURTS, WHICH ARE DEFINITIVE
Treaties, like statutes, are the supreme law of the land-under the
United States Constitution 2 s-and, as a consequence, "the courts
214. See Dellinger Paper, supra note 14 (outlining Dellinger's view on the
viability of the ABM Treaty and the scope of the President's power). Dellinger
does not espouse the thesis stated in Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799 (1995) (contending that in the 1940s,
Congress and the President, without following a process for amendment specified
in Article V, in effect expunged from the Constitution the requirement of Article II
that treaties require the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators present). For a
skeptical view of the Ackerman/Golove thesis. see Lawrence H. Tribe, Taking Text
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108
HARV. L. REV. 1221 (1995) (questioning Ackerman and Golove's thesis and
arguing instead for a more textual approach to the Constitution).
215. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, (stating "[this Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof: and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every, State shall be bound thereby,
and Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to Contrary notwithstanding.");
see also Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829) (echoing the Constitution, noting
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have authority to construe treaties."' 1 6 Accordingly, the Constitution
vests in U.S. courts the authority to interpret treaties definitively. In
exercising that authority, courts give great weight to interpretations
suggested by the Executive Branch, 27 but the courts are not bound by
those suggestions and have on occasion rejected them.218
that treaties are considered to be the "law of the land"); United States v. Schooner
Peggy, 5 U.S. 103 (1801); see also Kenneth C. Randall, The Treaty' Power, 51
OHIO ST. L.J. 1089, 1110-12 (1990) (discussing the executive and legislative
arguments concerning the meaning of the supremacy clause). The Supreme Court
has also held that a Treaty nullifies an inconsistent law of a state of the Union. See
Hopkirk v. Bell, 8 U.S. 454 (1806) (holding that the Jay Treaty of 1783 had
nullified the running of the Virginia Statue of Limitations on breach-of-contract
claims for the period of the war between the United States and Great Britain).
216. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230
(1986), (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, (1969) (holding that "courts have
authority to construe treaties and executive agreements"); Valentine v. United
States, 299 U.S. 5, 10-11 (1936); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. 635, 657 (1853), Xerox
Corp. v. United States, 41 F.3d 647, 652 (Fed. Cir. 1995); British Caledonian
Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Alcan Aluminum
Corp. v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1997); Snap-On
Tools, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1045, 1064 (Cl. Ct. 1997); United States v.
Busby, 1996 WL 927938, at *3 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.) (1996); see also James C.
Wolf, The Jurisprudence of Treaty Interpretation, 21 U.C. DAvis L. RIV. 1023,
1026 n.14 (1988) (discussing the principles courts use in interpreting treaties and
providing a list of sixty-five Supreme Court decisions interpreting treaties from
1795-1988).
217. See United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (noting the weight
paid to the interpretation and "practice of treaty signatories ... since their conduct
generally evinces their understanding of the agreement they signed."); Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180-85 (1982); Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194-95 (1961); Air Canada v. United States Dept. of
Transp., 843 F.2d 1483, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Sullivan v. Kidd. 254 U.S. 433,
442 (1920); see also Military Payment Orders and Certificates Issued to Prisoners
of War-Treaty Interpretation Claims Before and Subsequent to Treat, 38 COM I'.
GEN. 7, 8 (1958) (noting that weight is given to the interpretation of treaty
provisions "by the political department of the government").
218. See Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 133-34 (1989) (reJecting
the Executive Branch's interpretation of the Article of the Warsaw Convention for
the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation By Air);
see also Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 515-16 (1947); Perkins v. Elg. 307 U.S. 325,
334-41 (1939); Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1361-65
(2nd Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 506 U.S. 814 (1992), vacated as moot 509 U.S. 918
(1993); British Caledonian Airways Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1160-61(1981 ):
Galanis v. Pallanck, 568 F.2d 234, 239 (2d. Cir. 1977); Greci v. Birknes. 527 F.2d
956, 960 (1st Cir. 1976); Cannon v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, United States Parole
Comm'n, 973 F.2d 1190, 1192 (5th Cir. 1992); In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, 132-
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Perhaps the most celebrated case of judicial rejection of an
Executive Branch treaty interpretation is United States v. Libellants
and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad," ' the subject of the motion
picture "Amistad." In that case, inhabitants of Africa who had been
kidnapped by Spaniards in violation of the laws of Spain mutinied on
the high seas and were later apprehended in Connecticut by
American officials. The Attorney General asked the court to order
that the detainees be delivered to persons claiming to be the
detainees' owners. The Attorney General argued that the Treaty of
1795 between the United States and Spain should be construed to
deny a person held in custody a right to assert that he is not anyone's
property. The Court, per Justice Story, rejected the Attorney
General's interpretation of the Treaty: "[tlhe Treaty with Spain never
could have intended to take away the equal rights of all foreigners,
who should contest their claims before any of our Courts, to equal
justice.
2 0
Moreover, it is often impossible to measure the "weight" a court
gives to an Executive Branch view, because, at the same time that the
court announces that it is giving the Executive Branch view great
weight, the court has independently satisfied itself of the correctness
of that view. Thus, one court said it concurred in the State
Department's view because that view was coupled with the court's
conclusion that the view was "based on supporting facts." ' - Another
court accepted the Executive Branch's interpretation of a treaty after
"finding it well-founded and supported by the weight of legal
37 (2d Cir. 1981); Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F. 2d 504. 517-18 (7th Cir. 1981);
Caltagirone v. Grant, 629 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1980); see also David J.
Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation. 41 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 953,
962 (1994) (explaining the grounds upon which courts depart from executive treaty
construction). Judicial treaty interpretation that accepted as accurate the views of
the Executive Branch include Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 192-93 (1961);
Bacardi Corp. ofAnerica v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150, 157-64 (1940).
219. 40 U.S. 518 (1841) (adjudicating the claims of ownership by foreign
citizens over slaves onboard a ship that was captured in U.S. waters following a
mutiny on board).
220. See id. at 596 (rejecting the claims of ownership by the foreign citizens).
221. See Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 573 (9th Cir.) (1954), (holding a
1902 extradition treaty between the U.S. and Serbia continued between the United
States and Yugoslavia), cert denied, 348 U.S. 818 (1954).
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authority. '222 One commentator observed:
A typical passage from a court opinion interpreting a treaty will begin
with the acknowledgment that "the views of the State Department are
ordinarily entitled to great weight," but then will go on to say in words or
substance that "we find them wholly unpersuasive in the present
case .... .' The judicial adjectives to describe the State Department's
various communications on the meaning and application of the treaty




Yet it is clear that the President's interpretive power is limited. Il-e cannot
make an altogether new treaty and dispense with the requirement of
Senate advice and consent by calling that treaty an "interpretation" o" an
earlier one .... The President's semantic denomination of his act cannot
by itself control the procedure constitutionally required.224
The Judiciary's power to interpret treaties includes the power to
determine whether a treaty continues to exist. One court stated that in
exercising the power to decide whether a treaty exists, the court gives
weight to the Executive Branch's view when the court is satisfied
that view "is based on supporting facts. 225
222. See In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 562-63 (N.D. Ohio
1985) (agreeing with the Executive Branch's interpretation and therefore finding
Demjanjuk's crimes to be covered by the extradition treaty).
223. James Crawford, John Dugard, Lori Fisler Darosh, John Claydon & Paul
Hoffman, Application of Custoinaty International Law by National Tribunals, 76
AM. SOC'Y INT'L PRoc. 231, 252 (Apr. 22-24, 1984) (citation omitted) (discussing
"judicial skepticism about Executive Branch submissions on the meaning of
treaties").
224. GLENNON, supra note 123, at 134 (1990) (discussing the ability of the
President to interpret treaties).
225. See Ivancevic, 211 F.2d at 573 (describing when it is appropriate to afford
weight to the Executive Branch's interpretation). In articulating the rule that courts
should give great weight to the Executive Branch view, courts place varying
degrees of emphasis on the weight they say they are giving to the view of the
Executive Branch. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285 (1902)
(reviewing the history of the creation of the German Empire in the Nineteenth
Century, and finding that in the creation of the Empire, the Kingdom of Prussia
had not lost its identity, and therefore that the Treaty of extradition between the
United States and the Kingdom of Prussia remained in effect unless it had later
268 [17:189
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The preceding description of judicial paramountcy in treaty
interpretation is not intended to imply that every separation-of-power
dispute can be resolved by a court. Some cannot be so resolved,
because they are "political" questions, and therefore non-justiciable.
For example, whether a particular state measure fulfills the
Constitution's guaranty of a "republican form of government" is a
non-justiciable political question. -6 But the fact that a particular
action of the Executive Branch cannot be tested in court does not
give that branch carte blanche to encroach on another branch. The
been terminated by one of the parties). On the issue of whether the Treaty had been
terminated, the court found no evidence of "governmental action" to terminate. See
id. at 490. The Court's inquiry into the German Empire's constitution and the
international law of treaties and state succession in order to determine whether the
treaty with Prussia survived the formation of the German Empire has been
characterized as "an ordinary adjudication in which the Court plays its usual role,
albeit with some deference to the evidence adduced by government experts." See
THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS: DOI-S TilE RULE
OF LAW APPLY TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS? 23-25 (1992); see also Then v. Melendez, 92
F.3d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1996) (examining the history of extradition treaties
between the United States and the United Kingdom to satisfy itself that none of the
changes that occurred when the British colony of Singapore emerged as an
independent State nullified, as to territory within Singapore, the 1931 U.S.-U.K.
extradition treaty). In reaching that conclusion, the court said it had given great
weight to the views of the Executive Branch as to the historical facts, because
"federal courts are not as well equipped as the Executive Branch to determine
when the emergence of a new country brings changes that terminate old treaty
obligations." See id.; see also Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d
679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983) (concluding that an extradition treaty existed between the
United States and Iceland after giving "'deference" to the Executive Branch on
extradition matters, and after having made "an independent review" of Iceland's
"historical continuity"). One Court of Appeals decision, Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.
3d 165 (3rd Cir. 1997), contains language to the effect that whether a treaty exists
between the United States and another state is a "political question" that no
American court has capacity to decide. See 109 F. 3d at 171. That language was
not necessary to resolve the case. because the court held that in any event, on the
question before it, the court would, as a matter of "comity." defer to a decision of
the highest court of Trinidad and Tobago. See id. at 173. In any event, the
Executive Branch is expected to stay within its zone of Constitutional authority,
even when a case challenging its encroachment cannot be presented to a court in a
justiciable form. See infra notes 229-230 and accompanying text (addressing the
political question doctrine).
226. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (dismissing an action brought
by Illinois voters as non-justiciable); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209
(1962) (examining the doctrine of political question and finding it inapplicable
because the plaintiffs had a justiciable claim under the equal protection clause).
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Supreme Court made the point in 1992 in United States Dept. of
Commerce v. Montana-22 7: "[i]n invoking the political question
doctrine, a court acknowledges the possibility that a constitutional
provision may not be judicially enforceable. Such a decision is of
course veiy different from determining that specific congressional
action does not violate the Constitution."
2 8
As AAG Dellinger stated in a May 1996 opinion, the Executive
Branch has an "independent constitutional obligation to interpret and
apply the Constitution. 2 29 Dellinger also stated that the Congress as
well as the President has a duty to resist unconstitutional
encroachment by the other branch. Dellinger invoked a 1933 opinion
of then Attorney General Mitchell: "[s]ince the organization of the
Government, Presidents have felt bound to insist upon the
maintenance of the Executive functions unimpaired [sic] by
legislative encroachment, just as the legislative branch has felt bound
to resist interferences with its power by the Executive. '21 (1
In short, the absence of an opportunity for judicial review for a
particular treaty interpretation would not give the President authority
to encroach on the Senate's power of advice and consent, or to
arrogate to himself the Congressional power to nullify a treaty by
means of a statute that came into law without the President's
signature, i.e., by an override of a Presidential veto.
The rule that the Judiciary has the last word on treaty
interpretation was not impaired by the announcement in the United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,23' in 1936, that the President
227. 503 U.S. 442 (1992) (involving a claim by the state of Montana that a
federal apportionment statute violated the Constitution).
228. Id. at 457-58 (citation omitted) (emphasis added) (noting the difference
between non-justiciable and justiciable issues).
229. See Walter Dellinger, Assistant Att'y Gen., Memorandum for the General
Counsels of the Federal Government, The Constitutional Separation q Powers
Between the President and Congress (May 7, 1996), 1996 WL 876050 (discussing
the duties of the Executive Branch).
230. See Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Affecting Tax Refunds, 37
Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 63 (1933) (discussing the relationship between the legislative
and executive branches of the government).
231. 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (reversing a grant of the defendant's demurrer on the
grounds that the President had the power to make decisions concerning
international affairs involving security issues).
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is the "sole organ" of the federal government in the field of
international relations. 232 After Curtiss-Wright, as well as before, the
Judiciary, not the President, interpreted treaties definitively. That is
not surprising, given the narrowness of the issue resolved in Curtiss-
Wright, i.e., whether the Congress, by Joint Resolution, could validly
authorize the President to issue regulations prohibiting a violation of
a Joint Resolution, when the President issued the proclamation the
same day as the Joint Resolution was adopted by both Houses and
the Resolution became a statute.
In the sixty-two years that followed the decision in Curtiss- Wright,
the Supreme Court has not invoked the "sole organ" doctrine to
deprive the Judiciary of ultimate authority to interpret treaties.
Indeed, soon after Curtiss-Wright, the Court decided Guaranti Trust
Co. v. United States. 33 The Court construed an executive agreement
between the United States and the Soviet Union (an agreement as to
232. See id. at 319-22 (defining the role of the President in international affairs
and describing why such a role is necessary). A chart attached to this
Memorandum displays the foreign policy powers allocated to each Branch of
government by the Constitution. See infra Appendix A. For critical analyses of the
"sole organ" dictum, see DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 37-38 (1996);
RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTHl, 133-35
(1974); HAROLD HONJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTIONAL,
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 40-45, 138-141 (1990);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES, PART I, THE POWERS OF GOVERNMENT 142-158 (1963); PETER Ni. SIIANE
& HAROLD H. BRUFF, THE LAW OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASES AND MATERIALS
541-544 (1988); Raoul Berger, The Presidential Monopoly of Foreign Relations.
71 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1972); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and
President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original Intent of the
Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASII. L. REV. 4, 73-106
(1979); H. Jefferson Powell, The President's Authority over Foreign Affihir: An
Executive Branch Perspective, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 527, 559-561 (1999);
Randall, supra note 215, at 1106-10; Stefan A. Reisenfeld, The Power of Congress
and the President in International Relations: Three Recent Decisions, 87 CAL. L.
REV. 86, 810-816 (1999); Anthony Simones. The Realit " of Curtiss- Wright. 16 N.
ILL. U.L. REV. 411, 416-420 (1996); William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress
in Determining Incidental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A
Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause, 36 01110 ST. L.J. 788
(1975).
233. 304 U.S. 126 (1938) (involving an action by the U.S. Government to
recover funds from Guaranty Trust that assigned to the United States as a result of
a executive agreement between the United States and the USSR).
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which Senate advice and consent had not been obtained).2 34 In United
States v. Pink,235 the Court referred to Guaranty Trust as supporting
the proposition that "even treaties with foreign nations will be
carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and
jurisdiction of the States. 236 To the same purpose, the Court cited
Todok v. Union Bank of Harvard, Nebraska,237 construing a treaty
between the United States and Norway on testamentary disposition,
where "[t]he only question before us is the construction of the
treaty.
235
In short, whatever the sole organ doctrine may mean in other
contexts, it does not mean that the Executive Branch has exclusive
authority to interpret treaties. Indeed, it does not override the judicial
primacy in the interpretation of treaties. Moreover, in light of the rule
that a treaty, like a statute, is the supreme law of the land, 3' if the
President had the final power to interpret a treaty, he would have the
deJicto power to nullify or "dispense with" or "suspend" a treaty-
that is, he would have a power to suspend or dispense with a law. But
the President has no power to "dispense with" or to "suspend" a
law-a principle announced in United States v. Stnith24" in 1806. As
234. See id. at 142-144 (noting the interpretation by the Court of the executive
agreement transferring the interest in the account in question from the USSR to the
U.S.).
235. 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (involving an action by the United States to retrieve
the assets of a Russian insurance company in New York).
236. See id. at 230 (citing Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126,
143 (1938)) (noting the scrutiny with which the Court examines international
agreements).
237. 281 U.S. 449 (1930) (involving a suit brought by the son of a non-U.S.
citizen claiming certain conveyances of land made by his father before his death,
were fraudulently obtained), cited with approval in 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
238. See id. at 452 (noting that the case revolved around a treaty between the
United States and Sweden that provided for testamentary dispositions).
239. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 n.34 (1957) (citing [lead Money, 112
U.S. 580 (1884)) (stating that treaties are the "supreme law of the land")- see a/so
Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (explaining that treaties are
equivalent to laws); supra note 215 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supremacy Clause).
240. 27 F. Cas. 1192 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (holding that President James Madison
was bound by an Act of Congress that prohibited citizens from carrying on war
against a nation with which the United States was at peace).
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the Court explained, "because the President does not possess a
dispensing power," he cannot authorize anyone to disregard a
statute.241
In 1972, in United States v. Monongahela Connecting R.R. Co.," '
District Judge Dumbauld stated: "[o]f course there is no 'dispensing
power' in an executive or administrative agency unless Congress has
specifically granted it.' 243 Judge Dumbauld cited his own work,
EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7,
12 (1964), which describes the struggle between James 11 and the
Parliament that led to James II's abdication and exile, and the
acceptance by William and Mary in 1689 of the Bill of Rights, the
first article of which recites, "[t]hat the pretended power of
suspending laws, of the execution of laws, by regal authority,
without consent of parliament is illegal." Id. at 12. That event
established that the King had no dispensing or suspending power,
and therefore made it unnecessary for the Framers of the Constitution
to make express that they were not allocating to the office of the
President a power to dispense with law. "[N]ot even the most ardent
Antifederalists feared that the Constitution of 1787 had given the
President a power to suspend the laws." 2
241. See id. at 1229-31 (noting that the power to declare war lies with
Congress); see also Kendall v. United States ex rel Stokes. 37 U.S. 524 (1838)
(declaring invalid the refusal of President Andrew Jackson's Postmaster-General to
execute a statute requiring payments to postmasters). The Court stated that,
allowing the Postmaster-General. on the President's authority, to refuse to execute
a statute:
[W]ould be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no
countenance for its support in any part of the constitution. and is asserting a
principle, which, if carried out in its results, to all cases falling within it,
would be clothing the President with a power entirely to control the
legislation of Congress, and paralyze the administration ofjustice.
Id. at 613.
242. 351 F. Supp. 696. 698 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (involving an action by the United
States against the defendant for violations of a federal law and federal regulation
on the movement of railroad cars).
243. See id. at 698 (citation omitted) (denying the authority of the
Transportation Department to grant exemptions from requirements of Congress).
244. Christopher N. May. Presidential Defiance of 'Unconstitutional Laws:'
Reviving the Royal Prerogative. 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 865, 885 (1994)
(discussing the perceived limitations on Presidential power); see also Nat'l
Treasury Employees Union v. Nixon, 492 F.2d 587, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing
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Kendall, 37 U.S. at 613) (concerning the lack of dispensing power in explanation
of why the Court had jurisdiction to declare that the President had not obeyed the
Federal Pay Comparability Act); Michigan Head Start Dir. Ass'n Tri-County
Cmty. Action v. Butz, 397 F. Supp. 1124, 1134-35 (W.D. Mich. 1975) (noting the
absence of a Presidential power to suspend legislation, "a power not enjoyed by the
English Monarch since the Glorious Revolution of 1688."); Ameron, Inc. v. United
States Army Corps of Eng'r, 610 F. Supp. 750, (D.N.J. 1985), (describing James
II's forced exile, and the acceptance of England's Bill of Rights by William and
Mary as the foundation for "[t]he rule that no executive official can decide for
himself what laws he is bound to obey, but must await the decisions of the
Judiciary and until then must obey the laws, [a rule that] has deep roots in our
constitutional history."), modified, 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986), aff'd 809 F.2d 979
(3d Cir. 1986), cert. granted, 485 U.S. 958 (1988), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918
(1988). Also, the duty to execute the law faithfully is viewed as a sign of the non-
existence of Presidential suspending power. See The Executive Branchs"
Declaration That the Competition in Contracting Act Is Unconstitutional:
Hearings Before House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong., I st Sess.
264 (1985) (statement of Steven R. Ross, General Counsel, Office of Clerk, House
of Representatives) (citations omitted) (stating that "[s]cholars have concluded that
the 'faithful execution' clause of our Constitution is a mirror of the English Bill of
Rights' 'abolition of the suspending power,' that is, the abolition of what the
English Bill of Rights has called "the pretended [Royal] power of Suspending...
the Execution of Laws."); see also Hearings on the Constitutionality of GAO 's Bid
Protest Function Before a House Comm. on Government Operations, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 486, 490 (1985) (statement of William S. Cohen, Senator, and Carl Levin,
Senator) ("[A]bsent a court ruling, we strongly believe that a unilateral decision by
the Executive Branch to refuse to enforce a statute constitutes a usurpation of the
proper role of the judiciary and a failure of the President to meet his constitutional
responsibility to 'take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."'). Moreover, a
Presidential defiance of a statutory command to spend funds for a designated
defense project may be an impeachable offense. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 294 (2d ed. 1988) (postulating that a President's
intentional decision to render national defense impotent would not necessarily
violate criminal law, but would nonetheless likely provide grounds for
impeachment); see also JOHN R. LABOVITZ, PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHIMENT 122-23
(1978) (discussing impeachable offenses); see also Abner J. Mikva, Congress: The
Purse, the Purpose and the Power, 21 GA. L. REV. 1,12-13 (1986), (recounting
that the President's impoundment policies were at one time considered as possible
grounds for Nixon's impeachment); RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: Till
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 67-69 (1973) (outlining a list of British impeachment
cases, cases that were likely known to the framers when they drafted the
Impeachment Clause, that included impeachment for intentional or negligent
failure to expend appropriated funds for the purposes appropriated, including the
defenses of the realm). For example, in 1386, Chancellor Michael de la Pole, Earl
of Suffolk, was impeached for applying "appropriated funds to purposes other than
those specified." Id. at 67 (citing I Howell 89, 93, Art. 3). In 1624 Lord Treasurer
Middlesex was impeached for allowing "the office of Ordinance to go unrepaired
though money had been appropriated for that purpose." Id. at 67-68 (citing 2
Howell 1183, 1239). For the latest judicial word on the possibility of Presidential
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The most recent decision on the question of whether the President
has dispensing power is Spence v. Clinton, 25 a District Court
decision in 1996. It explains why the President had no authority to
"defy" the Ballistic Missile Defense Act of 1995, stating: "[s]uch an
outcome would... [give] the President the ability to nullify duly
authorized congressional actions. The Founding Fathers strongly
believed that such a power would be dangerous and unwarranted.
Constitutional scholars speak with one voice in concurring with this
assessment. '2 46 In support of that observation, the court quoted James
Madison: "To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious
to the temper of this country. 241
Nothing in Goldwater v. Carte-41 is to the contrary. Goldwater
involves President Carter's undoing a treaty with one set of officials
claiming to govern China, and recognizing a different set of officials
claiming to be the government of China. Neither regime nor the
United States claimed that China had ceased to exist. The case arose
out of the following events: in 1954 the United States entered into a
Mutual Defense Treaty that on its face was a treaty between the
United States and China. The treaty was signed by a person who was
part of a government situated on Taiwan known as the Republic of
China (the "ROC"), and claimed authority over the entire territory of
China, including the Chinese mainland. At that time, and ever since,
impeachment for defiance of a statute cutting off funds to support a military action
abroad, see Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (involving a
claim that the President's use of armed forces in Yugoslavia was unconstitutional
and noting "there always remains the possibility of impeachment should a
President act in disregard of Congress' authority on these matters."); see also
STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Congress, CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 4-7 (Comm. Print 1973) of the
Impeachment Inquiry.
245. 942 F. Supp. 32 (D.D.C. 1996) (involving action by members of Congress
against President Clinton claiming the President, through the Secretary of Defense,
violated federal law and the Constitution through failing to spend or provide funds
for missile defense systems).
246. See id. at 38 (footnotes omitted) (noting the restrained powers of the
executive in this instance).
247. See id. (citing M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF TilE FEDERAL CONVENTION
OF 1787 100 (1966)).
248. 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (involving a claim by members of Congress that
President Carter unconstitutionally altered legislation by terminating a treaty with
Taiwan).
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a government situated on the mainland, and calling itself the
"People's Republic of China" ("PRC"), claimed authority over the
entire territory of China including Taiwan. In 1978, President Jimmy
Carter announced that the United States would terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty that had been made with the Taiwan-based
government.
Senator Barry Goldwater brought suit in a District Court, asking
the Court to declare that without the consent of the Senate, President
Carter lacked authority to terminate the Treaty. Senator Goldwater
asserted that termination without Senate deliberation would deprive
him of an opportunity to vote on the question of whether the Treaty
should be terminated. 49 A majority of Justices of the Supreme Court
concluded that Senator Goldwater's case should be sent to the
District Court to be dismissed, but no majority could agree on the
reasons for that result. Four Justices (Rehnquist, Burger, Stewart, and
Stevens) said that to decide whether the Senate had authority to
participate in a treaty-termination decision would be to decide a non-
justiciable "political question," i.e., not the kind of controversy that
the Constitution vested authority in the Judiciary to decide. Justice
Marshall gave no reason for his decision in favor of dismissal.
Justice Powell considered the question to be justiciable, but
supported dismissal on the ground that it was not ripe for decision
because the Congress had not yet challenged the President's
authority by "appropriate formal action." 444 U.S. at 536. Two of the
Justices who voted to hear the case (Blackmun and White) said the
case was ripe, and therefore should be heard on the merits. Id. at
1006. Justice Brennan expressed the view that the case was
justiciable and that the lower court had correctly decided the case to
the extent that it rested on the principle that the President had
exclusive authority "to recognize, and withdraw recognition from,
foreign governments." Id.
Goldwater v. Carter has little value for predictive jurisprudence
with respect to treaties with a state that has not lost its existence but
only changed its government, let alone with respect to treaties of a
state that has ceased to exist, given the absence of a majority
explanation of the reason for the result. In any event, even the
249. See id. at 997-98 (describing the claims of the plaintiffs).
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Judiciary's power to interpret treaties definitively must be exercised
so as to avoid making a significant amendment, because that, too,
would encroach upon the Senate's power to give advice and consent
to the making of the treaty. One court explained: "[A] significant
amendment to a treaty must follow the mandate of the Treaty Clause,
and therefore must be proposed by the President, and be ratified
following the advice and consent of the Senate.
25 1
Similarly, "[c]ourts are not authorized to annul or disregard
provisions of a treaty ... since an annulment or disregard would
constitute a modification of the treaty, and treaty modifications are
solely within the province of the Senate.'
B. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT TREATIES
Dellinger argued that the President has exclusive authority to
implement treaties, but he neglected to mention that the Constitution
vests in the Congress the authority to make all laws "necessary and
proper" to implement, i.e., to "carry into execution," not only all the
law-making powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8, but also "all
other[] [powers] vested [by this Constitution] in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or the officers thereof."2"
250. See New York Chinese TV Programs. Inc. v. U.E. Enters, Inc., 954 F.2d
847, 853 (2d Cir. 1991) (involving an action for copyright infringement of
Taiwanese television programs).
251. In re Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F.
Supp. 833, 843 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). affd, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1983) (citations
omitted) (noting the limitations on the power of the courts where treaties are
involved); see also The ABM Treaty and the Constitution: Joint Hearings Beibre
the Conn. on Foreign Relations and the Colmm. on the Judiciary, 1 00th Cong. 81
(1987) (statement of Louis Henkin, Professor, Columbia Law School) (stating that
in making a treaty, the President cannot change the text of the treaty or the
meaning to which the Senate consented).
252. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109. 121 (1901) (noting that the necessary
and proper clause of U.S. Constitution, Article 1. Section 8 "includes the power to
enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it
is competent for the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to
insert in a treaty with a foreign power."); see also Missouri v. Holland. 252 U.S.
416, 432-33 (1920) (asserting that Congress has power under the necessary and
proper clause, to make laws to implement treaties): United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d
79, 82 (2d Cir. 1998) (noting that the necessary and proper clause broadens
Congress's power beyond Article I. Section 8); Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697,
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"The recognized powers of Congress to implement (or fail to
implement) a treaty by an appropriation or other law essential to its
effectuation... are legislative powers, not treaty-making or treaty-
termination powers.
Hence, Congress has the authority to make laws implementing
treaties. It follows that the President can no more create a treaty by
calling its creation an implementation than he can create a statute by
calling its creation an implementation of another statute.
C. PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF
A FOREIGN STATE DOES NOT IMPLY AUTHORITY TO MAKE
TREATIES WITH THAT STATE WITHOUT SENATE CONCURRENCE
As a matter of international law, when the President of the United
States recognizes the existence of a foreign state, the President
imposes no obligation on the United States that the United States
would not in any event be obliged to discharge. In contrast, when an
the President brings a treaty into force, its terms must be fulfilled
(unless there is a valid ground under international law, such as
coercion or fraud, for not fulfilling them).254
The Constitution requires the President to "receive Ambassadors
717 (D.C. Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (MacKinnon, J.
dissenting) (arguing that under the necessary and proper clause, Congress has the
power to pass laws terminating a treaty).
253. PETER M. SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 621 (1996) (discussing the power of Congress with respect
to treaties).
254. See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 298 (1933) (stating that "[u]ntil
a treaty has been denounced, it is the duty of both the government and the courts to
sanction the performance of the obligations reciprocal to the rights which the treaty
declares and the government asserts even though the other party to it holds a
different view of its meaning"); see also United States v. Kirby, 106 F.3d 855, 859
(9th Cir. 1997) (concluding that the U.S. has a legal obligation to abide by its
extradition treaties); United States v. A.L. Burbank & Co., 525 F.2d 9, 15-17 (2d
Cir. 1975) (concluding that the U.S. should fulfill its obligation under tax
cooperation treaty with Canada despite Canada's inconsistent interpretation of'
treaty negating the IRS's obligation to provide Canadian authorities with tax
information); J.H.H. Weiler & Ulrich R. Haltern, The Autonomy of the Community
of Legal Order-Through the Looking Glass, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 411, 441 (1996)
(noting the general rule of international law proscribing a State's use of its
domestic law to avoid performance of a treaty).
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and other public Ministers ,' 255 a provision that implies authority to
determine whether a particular person is a bona fide representative of
a particular foreign state. In turn, that implies that the President has
authority to decide for purposes of domestic law whether such a
foreign state exists. An entity exists as a state if it meets the test of
statehood, i.e., has a defined territory and a permanent population,
controls its own governance, and has the capacity to conduct formal
relations with States. 6 International law requires that states treat
255. See U.S. CONST. art. 11. § 3 (describing the powers of the President).
256. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21. § 201 (defining statehood tinder
international law). The law pertaining to the recognition of a state's existence is
distinct from international law pertinent to the recognition of the government of a
state in that under international law. a change in the government of a recognized
state, without more, does not impair the state's existence as a state. See Edwin L.
Fountain, Out fi-om the Precarious Orbit of Politics: Reconsidering Recognition
and the Standing of Foreign Governnents to Sue in Aerican ('ourts, 29 VA. J.
INT'L L. 473, 474-76 (1989) (discussing the recognition of the government of a
state under international law and the practice of American courts concerning the
legal effects of recognition); see also D.P. O'CONNI:LL. I INTI-RNATIONAL LA\
127-28 (2d ed. 1970) (explaining that foreign states can either recognize or refuse
governments claiming authority over certain territory, and that acknowledgement
of a government's authority over territory alone is not recognition); RI:S'IATt-MI:\">r,
supra note 21, § 202-203 (discussing the recognition or acceptance of states and
governments); see generall'y G. Edward White, The Transbrmation of the
Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REV. I (1999) (discussing
the development of foreign relations law in the context of the Constitution). In
Keith v. Clark, 97 U.S. 454 (1878), the Court used two examples to illustrate the
legal significance of the difference between change of government and changes of
State: (i) the fact that England remained England during the reign of Charles I,
during the reign of the Commonwealth under Cromwell, and after the restoration
of the Monarchy; and (ii) the fact that France remained France during the Bourbon
Monarchy and during the revolutionary governments that followed. See id. at 460;
see also Lehigh Valley R.R. v. State of Russia, 21 F.2d 396, 401 (2d Cir. 1923)
("[T]he granting or refusal of recognition [of governments] has nothing to do with
the recognition of the [S]tate itself."): see also TI-CIiANG CHIEN, TIIE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 99 (L.C. Green ed. 1951) ("[Slince the
continuity of [s]tates is not interrupted by a change of government, the recognition
of governments must be considered as an entirely different matter from the
recognition of [s]tates."). The United States regards itself as duty-bound to
recognize the existence of a new state that has maintained and established its
independence. See HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION OF INTi-RNATIONAL LAW
65 (1947) (quoting Charles Cheney Hyde's statement that when a country both
functions and looks like a state, it is reasonable for it to demand recognition); P.K.
MENON, THE LAW OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASIC PRINCIPLES
45-46 (1994) (observing that in the 19th century. the United States took seriously
its obligation to recognize independent states that had established and maintained
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each other entity as a state, irrespective of whether such other state
has "formally" recognized that entity as a state.2 57
Recognition, as a public act of state, is an optional and political act and
there is no legal duty in this regard. However, in a deeper sense, if an
entity bears the marks of statehood other states put themselves at risk
legally if they ignore the basic obligations of state relations ... [i]n this
context of state conduct there is a legal duty to accept and apply certain
their independence, and this attitude may be attributed to the revolutionary history
of the United States and its opposition to "monarchic legitimacy"). But the United
States' attitude toward recognition of a state's existence does not carry over to
recognition of a particular government of a state. See id. at 46 nn.69-70 (asserting
that the United States takes the position that its recognition of a particular
government represents the grant of a privilege, not the discharge of a duty).
257. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, § 202 cmt. c (enumerating the duties
that other states owe to qualified entities); see also Mark L. Movscsian, The
Decline of the Nation State and its Effect on Constitutional and international
Economic Law: Contribution: The President Nation State and the Foreign
Sovereign hnmunities Act, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1083 (1983) (describing judicial
decisions and scholarly works on recognition and non-recognition); Leonard
Meeker, Recognition and Restatement, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (1966) (discussing
recognition under the Restatement). "In recent years, U.S. practice has been to ic-
emphasize and avoid the use of recognition in cases of changes of governments
and to concern ourselves with the question of whether we wish to have diplomatic
relations with the new governments." U.S. Dep't. St., Diplomatic Recognition, 78
DEP'T ST. BULL. 463 (1977) (noting the recent change in U.S. policy): see also
Mary Beth West & Sean D. Murphy, The Impact on U.S. Litigation of Non-
Recognition of Foreign Governments, 26 STANFORD J. INT'L L. 435 (1989)
(exploring the Executive Branch's non-recognition of foreign governments and the
implications or consequences). The United States Department of State, Bureau of'
Public Affairs, Establishing Diplomatic Relations: U.S. Policy1, Gist, (August,
1977) describes recognition of governments. No mention is made of recognition of
the existence of a State separate and independent of recognition of its government.
The document at paragraph 2, states: "[t]he Administration's policy is that
establishment of relations does not involve approval or disapproval but merely
demonstrates a willingness on our part to conduct affairs with other governments
directly. In today's interdependent world effective contacts with other governments
are of ever-increasing importance." The necessary negative implication of that
explanation is that, at international law, a state's existence does not depend on
whether the United States has diplomatic relations with that state's government,
with or without recognition of that government. The document next lists eleven
states with which at that time existed by the well-understood test of existence but
which did not have diplomatic relations with the United States, e.g., Albania, Iraq,
and the Peoples Republic of China. See id. at paras. 3; see also Chen, supra note
256 ("[S]ince the continuity of [s]tates is not interrupted by a change of
government, the recognition of governments must be considered as an entirely
different matter from the recognition of [s]tates.").
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fundamental rules of international law: there is a legal duty to "'recognize"
for certain purposes at least, but no duty to make an express, public, and
political determination of the question or to declare readiness to enter into
diplomatic relations by means of recognition. This latter type of
recognition remains political and discretionary.
-25 8
The President would put the United States under a legal obligation
to other states without Senate advice and consent if he used the
recognition function to make a treaty that would not otherwise exist.
Using the recognition power to make a treaty with a successor-state
would remove a large part of foreign-policy making from the
bipartite mechanism for treaty-making constructed by the Framers-
a mechanism that was adopted for the purpose of safeguarding
against excessive control of foreign-policy making by the Executive.
See infra, Part V.G. (explaining that the Framers did not intend to
give the President unlimited discretion to disregard the two-thirds
concurrence requirement in making a treaty). One scholarly work
describes the Constitutional Convention's attitude toward the
recognition power as the "Madisonian-Jeffersonian-Hamiltonian
doctrine that the recognition power is merely ceremonial, a clerk-like
administrative function devoid of discretion and consequence." THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
147 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996). That doctrine
"is quite clearly a product of the international law tradition as
explained by Grotius, Bynkershoek, Wolff and Vattel." Id. Adler and
George also state:
Given the restrictive scope of the recognition clause, as comprehended by
Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson, it is virtually inconceivable that a
unilateral presidential power to make and conduct foreign policy could be
squeezed from such a narrow, clerklike administrative function.
Moreover, there are at least two other policy factors that militate strongly
against the expansive construction of the recognition power. The Framers'
deep-seated fear of the executive prerogative and their decision to vest in
258. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (2d ed.
1973) (citation omitted). "[Riecognition of [S]tate is the affirmation, usually by the
government of another state, that a new nation has come into existence which, at
least as far as the recognizer is concerned, is subject to all the rights and duties of a
state in international law." THOMAS M. FRANCK & MICIIAEL J. GLENNON,
FOREIGN RELATIONS AND NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND
SIMULATIONS 1021 (2d ed. 1993).
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the treaty making authority the exclusive power to make and conduct U.S.
foreign affairs. If the recognition clause truly were intended to confer
upon the president a unilateral power to make foreign policy, such
authority would have been contrary to both the constitutional design br
collective decision making in the formulation of foreign policy and the
Framers' determination to place the primary responsibility for the conduct
of foreign relations in the hands of the treaty making power-the president
and the senate. Id.
Moreover, the process of deciding whether a state should be
recognized consists of ascertaining the pertinent facts.2 ' Once the
facts show the existence of statehood, it is the duty of other states to
grant recognition. 261 "The emphasis-and that emphasis is a constant
feature of diplomatic correspondence-on the principle that the
existence of a state is a question of fact signifies that, whenever the
necessary factual requirements exist, the granting of recognition is a
matter of legal duty."'26' By necessary negative implication,
Lauterpacht opines that if the facts do not support the existence of
statehood (e.g., the state has become extinct), by the operation of
international law, the recognition of that state's existence has become
a nullity. Thus, Professor Lauterpacht's analysis independently
supports the general scholarly conclusion that treaties of a state lapse
upon that state's extinction. Hence, the international law of state
recognition independently refutes Dellinger's assertion that the
United States could, by "recognizing" Russia, bring into existence a
treaty between the United States and Russia solely because a treaty
on the same subject had been in existence with the USSR.
Moreover, if recognition were the magic wand Dellinger
suggested it is, the United States would have an absolute right under
international law by "recognition" to impose an ABM treaty on
Armenia or Turkmenistan, or on all of the fifteen States that
succeeded to territory of the USSR. Also, by contending that a state's
recognition of another state brings a treaty into force, Dellinger
confounded cause and effect. Making a treaty with an otherwise
unrecognized State is one of the ways that a state manifests its
259. See HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 23
(1947) (explaining that the recognition of new states is a question of fact).




recognition of the existence of the other state..2 62 But no scholar
argues that the act of recognition, without more, creates a treaty.
In short, there was no merit to Dellinger's suggestion that the
exclusive power to recognize states allows the President to make
treaties without Senate advice and consent. The President's
recognition authority cannot be exercised in a manner that would
nullify the U.S. Senate's authority to advise and consent on the
making of a treaty.
Hence, if a foreign state ceases to exist under international law
and, consequently, a bilateral treaty between the extinct state and the
United States lapses, the President cannot use the "receive
Ambassadors" clause to bring a new treaty into force between the
United States and a successor to the extinct state without Senate
advice and consent. In other words, the President cannot, without
Senate approval, bring a lapsed treaty back to life by declaring that a
given foreign state is the successor or continuation of an extinct state.
Principles of international law govern the issue of the extinction of
states. However broad the President's authority may be to recognize
states and governments of states under the "receive Ambassadors"
clause, it is necessarily limited by the specific Constitutional
requirement for Senate advice and consent to the making of treaties.
D. THE SENATE'S CONCURRENCE IN THE MAKING OF A TREATY
WITH ONE STATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE CONSENT TO THE
MAKING OF A TREATY WITH A SUCCESSOR-STATE
When the Senate consents to a treaty with a given foreign state,
262. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 259, at 375-79 (stating that in the case of
bilateral treaties, recognition is presumed, and acknowledging the uncertainty that
the conclusion of a bilateral treaty with a new state necessarily constitutes
recognition); see also AMOS S. HERSHEY, THE ESSENTIALS OF INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC LAW AND ORGANIZATION 200 (rev. ed. 1935) (listing the conclusion of a
treaty and the sending of diplomatic agents as some of the ways an existing state
can recognize a new state); CHARLES CHENEY HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES 150 (2d rev. ed.
1945) (asserting that recognition of unrecognized states can be accomplished
through conventions or through a formal diplomatic relationship, and explaining
how the United States recognized new states in the pasl), P.K. MENON, THE LAW
OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW. BASIC PRINCIPLES 144-45 (1994)
(stating that the conclusion of comprehensive, permanent, or highly political
treaties is usually considered recognition).
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does it implicitly authorize future Presidents to make a treaty on the
same subject with a new state that is a successor to that given foreign
state? An affirmative answer would violate the rule against tile
President's creating law unilaterally. In The Amiable Isabella,rB tile
Supreme Court stated that a treaty cannot be interpreted "[t]o alter,
amend, or add to [the] treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small
or great, important or trivial.1 264 In 1989, in Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd.,265 the Supreme Court invoked its 1821 decision in The
Amiable Isabella, to explain that an interpretation that makes a
change in a treaty "whether small or great, important or trivial"
would constitute a "usurpation of power, and not an exercise of
judicial functions," adding that, "[i]t would be to make, and not to
construe, a treaty. ' 266 Though the caution in that case was aimed at
judges, it applies equally to interpretations by the Executive Branch
because it states that any change would be "to make, not construe, a
treaty," a clear reference to the treaty-making process, of which
Senate advice and consent is an essential part. In light of that rule,
there is no room for an inference that Senate advice and consent
implicitly authorizes later changes by a President.
In that regard, Dellinger appeared to argue otherwise, conjecturing
that in 1972, the Senate must have known of what Dellinger argued
was past U.S. diplomatic practice with regard to state succession, i.e.,
when a state dissolves, its treaties with the United States bind the
United States vis-ci-vis the extinct state's successor or successors.
Dellinger's assertion disregarded the U.S. policy and practice of
regarding as lapsed an extinct state's bilateral treaties, a practice that
began at least as early as the annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii in
1898,267 and was recently manifested in dealing with all five states
263. 19 U.S. I (1821) (adjudicating a ship and cargo claimed as prizes of war).
264. See id. at 71; Chan v. Korean Air Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122, 135-36 (1989);
Kass v. Reno, 83 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1996); see also The Society for the
Propagation of the Gospel in Foreign Parts v. New-Haven, 21 U.S. 464, 490 (1823)
(concluding that a treaty cannot be changed or modified where the language of the
treaty is unambiguous and the parties to the treaty have made no changes).
265. 490 U.S. 122 (1989) (involving wrongful death claims stemming from the
shooting down of an airliner by the USSR).
266. See id. at 134-135 (quoting Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. I, 71 (1821)).
267. See MOORE, supra note 85, at 350 (quoting U.S. Secretary of State John
Sherman, noting that Hawaii's pre-existing treaties had been terminated); see also
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that succeeded the extinct Yugoslavia. 68 Thus, if any conjecture
about the Senate's 1972 understanding is warranted, the reasonable
conjecture is that it knew of the practice of regarding extinct states'
treaties as lapsed. In any event, Dellinger did not claim that, after the
USSR's dissolution, the Senate consented to the making of an ABM
treaty with the Russian Federation. Presumably, Dellinger
understood that "Congress' silence is just that-silence, 269 and does
not constitute the exercise of its power to make or to repeal laws,2 1
including treaties. 7
Also, there is no evidence that after the USSR's dissolution, the
Senate, by voting on various ABM Treaty matters, consented to
bringing an ABM treaty into force between the United States and the
Russian Federation. None of the laws passed since the USSR's
extinction that relate to the ABM Treaty contains words that can be
fairly construed as giving consent to the bringing into force of an
ABM treaty that is not already in force. In construing a statute, its
words are to be given their plain meanings. -2 72 Moreover, legislative
history, an aid to the construction of ambiguous words,2 I contains no
evidence that either house of Congress, in voting on bills relating to
ABM Treaty matters, was voting to bring into force an ABM treaty
Hawaii v. Manckichi, 190 U.S. 197, 211 (1903) (noting the treaties of the
Kingdom of Hawaii ceased when Hawaii was annexed by the U.S. Government).
268. See supra Part IV.F.4. (discussing that the U.S.'s refusal to be bound by
treaties concluded with the SFRY after its dissolution).
269. See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686 (1987) (noting the
implication of Congressional silence).
270. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175 n.l (1989)
(noting that Congressional failure to overturn statutory precedent is insufficient
reason for the Court to follow it); see also United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482,
495-96 (1997) (cautioning that is dangerous to adopt a rule of law solely on the
basis of congressional silence); see also NLRB v. Plasterers' Local Union No. 79,
404 U.S. 116, 129-30 (1971) (affirming that a controlling rule of law should not be
created out of congressional silence).
271. See Trans World Airlines. Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252
(1984) (emphasizing that a treaty should not be repealed or modified unless
Congress' will has been clearly expressed).
272. See United States v. Gonzales. 520 U.S. 1 (1997) (holding that words of
criminal statutes should be given their plain meaning).
273. See Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 401 (1992) (citing Toibb v. Radloff,
501 U.S. 157, 162 (1991)) (noting that legislative history should only be consulted
to resolve "statutory ambiguity").
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that was not otherwise in force.
Finally, Congressional consent to an ABM treaty with Russia is
only one of the inferences that might be drawn from Congressional
silence as to whether the Treaty was in force. Another possible
inference is that Congress decided to defer making a decision until
the critical geo-political, technological, and economic issues were
better defined, an inference in harmony with the practice of' the
Department of State to study the implications of a State's extinction
before forming an opinion as to how to deal with the treaties of the
extinct state. See supra Part III.C. (discussing the State Department's
study of the effect of the USSR's extinction before deciding how to
deal with treaties such as the ABM Treaty). In that context,
Congressional silence is ambiguous silence, and ambiguous silence
is a notoriously poor guide to Congressional intent.274
Hence, Congressional failure to declare that the ABM Treaty
lapsed cannot be construed as concurrence in the creation of a legally
binding agreement between the United States and Russia on the
subject of anti-ballistic missile defense systems.
E. EXCEPT FOR CASES OF MONETARY-CLAIMS SETTLEMENTS,
THE SUPREME COURT HAS NEVER RULED THAT A PRESIDENT
ACTING WITHOUT SENATE CONCURRENCE CAN MAKE AN
AGREEMENT WITH A FOREIGN STATE THAT LEGALLY BINDS TilE
UNITED STATES.
The U.S. Constitution, Article II, section 2, clause 2 ("the Treaty
Clause"), provides that: "[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur. .. ." U.S. CONST.
art. 2, §2, cl. 2. From the early days of the Republic, it was
understood that not every agreement between two nations was a
274. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88
(2000) (concluding that a state's inference of congressional intent is unnecessary
because the silence of Congress is ambiguous); see also Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 185 n.21 (1969) (quoting Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946))
("[I]t is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a
controlling rule of law."); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235,
241 (1970) (stating that the Congress' failure to respond to a court decision should
not be interpreted as acceptance of that decision).
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"treaty" for purposes of the Treaty Clause, i.e., a President had the
power without the concurrence of two-thirds of the Senate to make
some agreements on behalf of the United States. 7 ' The Framers did
not provide an explicit test to determine which international
agreements would require a two-thirds Senate vote and which would
not. Nor in the ensuing two hundred fourteen years has the Supreme
Court provided such a test.
The Supreme Court's entire jurisprudence on the question of what
international agreements would require a two-thirds Senate vote
consists of three cases, each of which involved the settlement of
claims. In United States v. Behnont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937) and United
States v. Pink 315 U.S. 203 (1942), the Court held that a claims-
settlement agreement had the effect of nullifying inconsistent state
law. Another claims-settlement case, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), is sometimes referred to as ruling that the President
acting alone has power to conclude a legally binding agreement with
another nation. The Court's opinion does not support this argument,
however, because the Court made clear that it upheld the validity of
the settlement agreement only because statutes authorized the
agreement. See 453 U.S. at 654. Thus, as to the legal effect of a
claims settlement under the law of the United States, as distinguished
from the law of a State of the United States, the Supreme Court has
gone no further than to hold that a Senate two-thirds concurrence is
not needed if the settlement is made pursuant to federal statutory
authorization.
275. Some statutes use the term "treaty" to include international agreements that
touch upon United States foreign policy, but that are not treaties within the two-
thirds Senate concurrence meaning of the requirement in the Constitution. See,
e.g., Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 31 (1982) (noting Congress' failure to
distinguish between Article II treaties and other international agreements). The
Supreme Court, however, has not addressed the question of whether such an
agreement is legally enforceable as between the United States and another State. In
Weinberger, for example, "the question is solely one of statutory construction," id.
at 26. The purpose of the statute was not to limit the President's authority to enter
into executive agreements with other states, but to control "ad hoc decision-making
of military commanders overseas." Id. at 33. Moreover, the Court made plain that
some agreements cannot be made without a concurring vote of two-thirds of the
Senate, i.e., submission of Art. I1 treaties to the Senate is already required by the
Constitution. See id. at 30 (discussing the meaning of "treaty" under Article 11 of
the Constitution).
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Another Supreme Court decision, United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. 230 (D.C.N.Y. 1936), rev'd 299 U.S. 304
(1936), which does not involve an international agreement, is
sometimes invoked to support the argument that the Senate
concurrence process of the Treaty Clause is not a requirement but
only an option that the President can exercise or not in his absolute
discretion. The question in Curtiss-Wright was whether the
Constitution had conferred on the Congress power to enact a law that
brought a criminal prohibition into effect upon a subsequent
Presidential determination that such a prohibition would lessen
conflict between Paraguay and Bolivia over their claims to disputed
territory in a region known as the Chaco. In deciding to uphold the
statute, the Court did not decide the legal significance of any
international agreement, made with or without two-thirds Senate
concurrence. Nevertheless, the case is cited by advocates for the
view that the President has unlimited power to impose legally
binding obligations on the United States. In particular, advocates cite
the language the Court used to describe generally the powers of the
national government to conduct external relations and the role the
President was intended to play in that conduct. As regards
communicating with other nations, the Court said, "the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation. 276
Regarding the treaty-making process, the Court in Curtiss-Wright
said, "[the President] makes treaties with the advice and consent of'
the Senate. 2 -77 The Court summarized its observations by borrowing
a phrase from a speech made by John Marshall when he was a
member of the House of Representatives: "[tihe President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative
with foreign nations. -72 Advocates have invoked this phrase in a
variety of contexts: in an attempt to justify the existence of executive
power independent of statutory authorization to revoke a passport on
national security grounds, see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 289 n. 17
(1981); in an attempt to justify a President's seizure of the nation's
steel mills without statutory authorization, see Youngstown Sheet &
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Tube Co. v. Sawye, 343 U.S. 579, 661 (1952); and in an attempt to
defer a lawsuit against a President until he was no longer in office,
see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). In any event, the Supreme
Court has never used the "sole organ doctrine" to support a rule that
the President may dispense with the Treaty Clause in his unfettered
discretion. Hence, if a Presidential right to bypass the Senate exists,
it must originate in a source other than Curtiss- 11Sright.
Wallace McClure made the first elaborate advocacy of the Senate
bypass theory, see WALLACE MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE
AGREEMENTS: DEMOCRATIC PROCEDURE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 332 (Columbia Univ. Press 1941). According
to McClure, "the making of agreements with other countries is an
executive function and hence, under the Constitution, vested wholly
in the President." Id.; see also Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans,
Treaties and Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable hstruments qf National Policy, 54 YALE L.J. 534-
615 (1945) (comparing the implications of using treaties and
executive agreements in completing international arrangements).
The notion that a bypass of the Senate is fully interchangeable
with a Senate two-thirds concurrence has not overwhelmed the
scholarly community. For example, the American Law Institute
states that "[s]ome agreements, such as the United Nations Charter or
the North Atlantic Treaty, are of sufficient formality, dignity and
importance that, in the unlikely event that the President attempted to
make such an agreement on his own authority, his lack of authority
might be regarded as 'manifest,"' a conclusion that under
international law renders the agreement, if a "fundamental" one, non-
effective.
27 9
Likewise, according to Louis Henkin,
There have indeed been suggestions, claiming support in Belmont that the
President is constitutionally free to make any agreement on any matter
involving our relations with another country, although for political
reasons... he will often seek Senate consent. As a matter of
constitutional construction, however, that view is unacceptable, for it
would wholly remove the "check" of Senate consent which the Framers
struggled and compromised to write into the Constitution. One is
279. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 311(3) cmt. c (1987).
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compelled to conclude that there are agreements which the President can
make on his sole authority and others which he can make only with the
consent of the Senate, but neither Justice Sutherland nor any one else has
told us which are which. 2s
Other scholarly works reject the notion that a President can make
legally binding treaties acting without approval of either the House
or Congress (let alone, without Senate two-thirds concurrence). See 5
Hackworth DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 426 (stating an
executive agreement does not become the "law of the land" because
two-thirds of the Senators voting have not concurred); CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 103-6, at
507 (1st Sess. 1996) ("Certainly, executive agreements entered into
solely on the authority of the President's constitutional powers are
not the law of the land because of the language of the Supremacy
Clause, and the absence of any congressional participation denies
them the political requirements they may well need to attain this
position").
The point that the Treaty Clause means what it says was made in
Philip B. Kurland, The Importance of Reticence, Vol. 1968 DUKI,
L.J. 619, 626 (1968):
Let me put aside the argument that action by a majority of both Houses of
Congress is equivalent to approval by two-thirds of the Senate. That is not
what the Constitution says, but for some reason or other we are always
280. See Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 179 (1972):
see also MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 183 (1990) (stating
that a two-thirds Senate vote is required for international agreements of "unusual
importance"); Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections
on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 122 1,
1268 (1995) (explaining that Senate two-thirds concurrence is required for
international agreements that constrain federal or state sovereignty). In response to
Mr. Tribe, Assistant Attorney General Dellinger stated: "[w]e do not dispute
Professor Tribe's view that some such agreements [with foreign nations] may have
to be ratified as treaties.... Whatever may be true of other international
agreements such as the United Nations Charter. . .our contention is only that trade
agreements such as the Uruguay Round Agreements do not require ratification as
'treaties."' Whether Uruguay Round Agreements Required Ratification as a
Treaty, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 232 (1994), 1994 OLC Lexis 20, at 6 n. 13.
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reminded that because it is a Constitution we are expounding we need not
be concerned with what it says.
Likewise, George A. Finch, who had attended the Versailles
Conferences as Assistant Legal Adviser to the United States
Commission to the Peace Negotiations, found it necessary to remind
President Woodrow Wilson that the United States' Constitution
constrained Wilson's exercise of treaty-making power: "Woodrow
Wilson, realizing he was going to have trouble with the Senate,
suggested to Lloyd George he would handle it by executive
agreement. Mr. Lloyd George in substance said, 'Well, I don't think,
Mr. President, you have that constitutional power. I have read your
Constitution."' 28'
In addition, the State Department guidance issued on December
13, 1955 for all its diplomats states: "[e]xecutive agreements shall
not be used when the subject matter should be covered by a treaty," a
statement that would have made no sense if the State Department
believed that any commitment could just as lawfully be made by a
sole-executive agreement as by a treaty concurred in by a two-thirds
vote in the Senate. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CIRCULAR No. 175,
reprinted in 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 784, 785 (1956).
To like effect is Secretary of State Henry Clay's instruction to
American Commissioner Porter regarding the allowable scope of an
agreement to fix the U.S.-Canada Border:
Your powers are to be found in the Treaty of Ghent, and they do not
authorize your contracting any new engagements on behalf of the United
States. The President is incompetent to vest you with authority to enter
any such new engagements, except in the mode in which the Constitution
of the United States prescribes. According to that mode it would be
necessary that you should possess a diplomatic character and that any
compact you might form in concurrence with a representative of Great
Britain having a similar character should be submitted to the Senate of the
United States for their advice and consent.- 
281. Hearings Before a Subcomna. of the Comnmn. on the Judiciar' on S.J. Res. I
and S.J. Res. 43, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. 80, (1953) (statement of Frank E. Holman).
282. Letter from Henry Clay. Secretary of State, to Mr. Porter, American
Commissioner, 21 MS Dom. Let. 422 (Nov. 13. 1826), reported in JOHN BASSETT
MOORE, A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 195 (Gov't Printing Office 1906)
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Moreover, the Executive Branch has by its conduct conceded that
after the USSR's dissolution, the fundamental purpose of the 1972
ABM Treaty could not be served simply with only Russia as the
other party, but would have to be recast as a multi-lateral treaty
having as its parties the four successor states that had the most
significant ABM defense assets, i.e., Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. See infra Part V (H) (4) (enumerating USSR
dissolution-caused uncertainties that U.S. Executive Branch faced).
Those assets included Ukraine's nuclear arsenal of 176 ICBM's with
1,240 nuclear-tipped warheads and 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons.
See ROMAN POPADIUK, AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR RELATIONS
279 (1996). The Executive Branch concession that the 1972 Treaty
could not accomplish its purpose with only Russia as a U.S. partner
is manifested by the adoption of a memorandum of understanding
("MOU") among the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to "multi-lateralize" the ABM Treaty. See Memorandum
of Understanding Relating to the Treaty Between the United States
of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972, Sept.
26, 1997, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm_mou
.html. Yet, as two scholars have observed, a treaty with a dissolved
predecessor state as a result of the dissolution requires an amendment
that "will require the ... advice and consent of two-thirds of the
Senate. , 8'
Also, the ALI Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law
suggests that an international agreement manifestly requires a Senate
two-thirds concurrence if it is of "sufficient fonrinality, dignity, and
importance. '24 The Restatement also states that the President has
authority to make many international agreements pursuant to treaty
or Congressional authorization (§ 303(2)), or on his own authorit' (§
303(4)), "and since the circumstances in which Senate consent is
(footnote omitted).
283. Charles N. Brower & Abby Cohen Smutny, The qEJ/kct oqfIndependence ol
Quebec Upon Treaties and Agreements with the United States. 27 AM. RI.v.
CANADIAN STUDIES 51, 54 (1997).
284. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF rHii UNITEI)
STATES § 311(3) cmt. c (1987).
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essential are uncertain, improper use of an executive agreement in
lieu of a treaty would ordinarily not be a "manifest " violation "2'3
Section 311(3) comment C, however, calls attention to the
uncertainty as to the scope of a President's power to make legally
binding sole-executive agreements, and for that reason predicts that a
sole-Executive agreement, even if beyond the scope of Presidential
authority, would not "ordinarily" be a "manifest" violation. Through
cross-reference to Section 303(4), the authors, by necessary negative
implication, manifest their view as to the limit of the President's
authority to make a sole-executive agreement, i.e., the President has
that authority with respect to "any matter that falls within his
independent power under the constitution."2"' Hence, it follows that
the Restatement's authors believe that the President may not make
such an agreement if it deals with a matter falling outside his
independent powers under the Constitution.
With that understanding, Section 311 comment C can be
understood to mean that a manifest violation would include an
attempt by sole-executive agreement to impose on the United States
a binding legal obligation that the President acting alone would not
have Constitutional authority to impose. The authors illustrate the
rule by reference to examples: "[s]ome agreements, such as the
United Nations Charter or the North Atlantic Treaty, are of sufficient
formality, dignity, and importance that, in the unlikely event that the
President attempted to make such an agreement on his own authority,
his lack of authority might be regarded as manifest." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
311(3) cmt. c (1987).
Case law does not suggest a different rule except for claims
settlements. United States v. Behnont, 85 F.2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1936),
rev'd 301 U.S. 324 (1937), involved a claim of the United States to a
deposit at the Belmont Bank in New York. In 1918, Petrograd Metal
Works, a Russian Corporation, deposited funds in Belmont Bank, a
private bank in New York. Shortly thereafter, the Bolsheviks, in the
name of the Soviet Union, seized control of the Czarist government
and issued a decree dissolving Petrograd Metal Works and
285. Id. (emphasis added).
286. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 01: TIlE UNITED
STATES § 303(4) (1987).
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appropriating all its property, including the deposit at Belmont Bank.
The Soviet government did not thereafter acquire the deposited funds
and the lower court refused to enter a judgment for the United States.
In 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt, representing the United States, and
Maxim Litvinov, representing the government of the USSR,
exchanged letters in which the United States promised to recognize
the USSR government as the de jure government of a territory that
had been the territory of Imperial Russia. In return the USSR
promised to, and did, assign to the government of the United States
all the USSR's rights in and title to property located in the United
States that the USSR government had purported to acquire by its
seizure decrees. The Assignment has since been called the "Litvinov
Assignment," see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210-13 (1942)
(displaying full text of the Litvinov Assignment).
The Petrograd Metal Works' deposit at Belmont Bank was one of'
the properties within the scope of the Litvinov Assignment. The
State of New York took the position that the deposit (and others
located in New York to which the USSR laid claim) should be
allocated by the courts of New York in accordance with New York
law. Allegedly, one feature of New York law was a rule that an
attempt to transfer an asset located in New York, if contrary to New
York public policy or New York law, would not be given effect in
New York courts. Another alleged feature of New York law was that
a foreign government's forcible transfer of title to property was
contrary to public policy if made without just compensation. Hence,
applying New York policy and laws to the property within the scope
of the Litvinov Assignment would deprive the United States of the
benefit of the Assignment. In addition, the full value of all the
properties involved (including the Petrograd Metal Works deposit)
would be available to satisfy creditors of the USSR. Those creditors
did not include citizens of the United States-their claims had
already been satisfied by other means.
The lower court ruled in Belmont that a judgment in favor of
enforcing the Litvinov Assignment would have the effect of
confiscating property located in New York, a process that "would be
contrary to the public policy of the state of New York." Belmont, 85
F.2d at 543. In addition, the court held that the result would infringe
the public policy of the United States. Id. at 544. The Supreme Court
rejected the New York public policy argument, explaining: "[w]e do
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not pause to inquire whether in fact there was any policy of the State
of New York to be infringed since we are of [the] opinion that no
state policy can prevail against the international compact here
involved." Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327. The Court further asserted,
"Plainly, the external powers of the United States are to be exercised
without regard to state laws or policies." M. at 33 1. Similarly,
And while this rule in respect of treaties is established by the express
language of clause 2, article 6. of the Constitution. the same rule would
result in the case of all international compacts and agreements from the
very fact that complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or
interference on the part of the several states... (i]n respect of all
international negotiations and compacts. and in respect of our foreign
relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of
New York does not exist. Within the field of its power, whatever the
United States rightfully undertakes, it necessarily has warrant to
consummate. And when judicial authority is invoked in aid of such
consummation [i.e. to enforce an assignment to the United States], state
[c]onstitutions, state laws, and state policies are irrelevant to the inquiry
and the decision. It is inconceivable that any of them can be interposed as
an obstacle to the effective operation of a federal constitutional power.
Having disposed of New York's policy argument, the Court
addressed the defendant's assertion that a federal policy precluded
enforcement of the Assignment, i.e., the policy expressed in the
Constitution that private property shall not be taken without just
compensation. 218 The Court responded,
But the answer is that our Constitution. laws, and policies have no
extraterritorial operation, unless in respect of our own citizens.... What
another country has done in the way of taking over property of its
nationals, and especially of its corporations, is not a matter for judicial
consideration here ... [i]t does not appear that respondents have any
interest in the matter beyond that of a custodian. Thus far no question
under the Fifth Amendment is invohed.289
287. United States v. Belmont. 85 F.2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 1936), rev'd 301 U.S.
324, at 331-32 (1937).
288. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
289. Belmont, 301 U.S. at 332.
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Thus, Behnont: (i) held that the United States could not be denied
the benefit of the Litvinov Assignment by reason of any policy of'
New York; (ii) uttered a dictum that the United States could not be
denied the benefit of the Assignment by reason of a New York
statute or New York's constitution; and (iii) expressed no opinion as
to how the Assignment might affect the claims of third parties.
The Behnont ruling was in material respects reaffirmed in Pink, a
case also involving claims within the Litvinov Assignment that the
courts of New York resisted recognizing. First, Pink, like Belmont,
involved the question of whether New York law may deny to the
United States a benefit that it assumed would flow from the Litvinov
Assignment, i.e., a right to share with other claimants the Russian
property located in the United States that was claimed by the USSR
government. The USSR government's claim was based on title it
obtained by confiscation from the owners without just compensation.
The Supreme Court held, as it had in Belmont, that New York's law
and policy must yield to the Litvinov Assignment, to the extent that
New York law might impair rights obtained by the United States in
the Assignment. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 234. Second, like Belnont,
Pink dealt only with the validity of the rights obtained by the United
States and involved no conflict between the powers of the Presidency
and the powers of the Congress. Pink, like Belmont, invoked as the
basis for its ruling a conclusion that the recognition of the Bolshevik
regime as the de jure government of the USSR was an essential
element of the Litvinov Agreement. A state's law must yield if it
would impede the United States in conducting its power to recognize
the legitimacy of a particular regime as the government of a foreign
State. Id. at 230-31. Thus, Pink, like Behnont, contains no ruling as to
the federal law effect of a sole-Executive agreement on federal
statutes or on treaties made with two-thirds Senate concurrence.
Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), arose out of an
agreement (the "Algiers Declarations") made on January 19, 198 1,
whereby Iran promised to free the United States citizens it was
holding as hostages in exchange for a promise by the United States to
free all of Iran's property in the United States from claims made and
encumbrances obtained in American courts. One day after the
agreement was entered into force, Iran released the hostages. In the
months that followed, Americans holding claims against Iran brought
suits attacking the Algiers Declarations on the grounds that the
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actions of Presidents Carter and Reagan pursuant to the declarations,
i.e., to protect Iran's property from judgment execution and to
protect Iran from having to defend against the creditors' claims,
exceeded their authority. The Supreme Court rejected the claimants'
argument and held that the Executive Orders blocking execution on
judgments were authorized by the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act ('IEEPA"), 50 U.S.C. § 1702 (West 1991). See
Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 670. As to the suspending of claims not
yet reduced to judgment, the Court held that the Executive Orders,
though not "directly" authorized by statute, were authorized by a
combination of statutes and an implied Presidential power to settle
claims. Id. at 675. In reaching this conclusion the Court emphasized
that the President's implied foreign-policy powers standing alone
would not have authorized the suspension of the claims:
Crucial to our decision today is the conclusion that Congress has
implicitly approved the practice of claim settlement by executive
agreement. This is best demonstrated by Congress' enactment of the
International Claims Settlement Act of 1949. The Act had two purposes:
(1) to allocate to United States nationals funds received in the course of an
executive claims settlements with Yugoslavia. and (2) to provide a
procedure whereby funds resulting from future settlements could be
distributed. To achieve these ends Congress created the International
Claims Commission, now the Foreign Claims Settlement Commission,
and gave it jurisdiction to make final and binding decisions with respect
to claims by United States nationals against settlement funds. By creating
a procedure to implement future settlement agreements, Congress placed
its stamp of approval on such agreements. Indeed, the legislative history
of the Act observed that the United States was seeking settlements with
countries other than Yugoslavia and that the bill contemplated settlements
of a similar nature in the future.:
The court further concluded:
Finally, we re-emphasize the narrowness of our decision. We do not
decide that the President possesses plenary power to settle claims, even as
against foreign governmental entities. As the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit stressed, [t]he sheer magnitude of such a power, considered
against the background of the diversity and complexity of modem
international trade, cautions against any broader construction of authority
290. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 680-81 (1981) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
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than is necessary." But where, as here, the settlement ofclaims has been
determined to be a necessary incident to the resohtion of a major.1breign
policy dispute between our country, and another, and where, as here, we
can conchde that Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are
not prepared to say that the President lacks the power to settle such
clains.
2 91
To complete the explanation of its combined-source analysis, the
Court referred to judicial decisions upholding claims settlements
where a settlement was "integrally connected with normalizing the
United States relations with a foreign state. ' 291 In addition, the
Court's allusion to the law of public necessity is noteworthy:
But where, as here, the settlement of claims has been determined to be a
necessarv incident to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute
between our country and another, and where as here, we can conclude that
Congress acquiesced in the President's action, we are not prepared to say
that the President lacks the power to settle such claims.
2 9 3
By the law of public necessity, a government has implied power to
take immediate action to prevent a significant harm to its citizens
that would likely occur before express authority to take the action
can be obtained. The doctrine of public necessity is sometimes
manifested in a statute, as in Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879),
in which Massachusetts statutes and a Boston ordinance authorized
public officers, in the event of fire, to demolish a building if they
judged the demolition necessary to prevent the fire from spreading.
According to the Court, "[t]he rights of necessity are a part of the
law." Id. at 18-19 (quoting Respublica v. Sparhawk, 1 U.S. (Dall.)
357, 362 (1788)).
The law of necessity is summarized in PROSSER & KEETON, Till..
LAW OF TORTS 146 (5" ed. 1984) (footnote omitted):
Where the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that
the public interest is involved, that interest serves as a complete
justification to the defendant who acts to avert the peril to all. Thus, one
291. Id. at 688 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 683 (citing Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-230 and Ozanic v. United States.
188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)).
293. Id. at 688 (emphasis added).
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who dynamites a house to stop the spread of a conflagration that threatens
a town, or shoots a mad dog in the street, or bums clothing infected with
smallpox germs, or in time of war, destroys property which should not be
allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy. is not liable to the owner, so
long as the emergency is great enough, and he has acted reasonable under
the circumstances. This notion does not require the "'champion of the
public" to pay for the general salvation out of his own pocket. The
number of persons who must be endangered in order to create a public
necessity has not been determined by the courts. It would seem that the
moral obligation upon the group affected to make compensation in such a
case should be recognized by the law, but recovery usually has been
denied.294
Regarding the Court's decision in Dames & Moore, it is
impossible to believe that a United States court would hold that the
Executive Branch of the United States Government had no right to
interfere with the collection of private claims against Iran in the face
of incontrovertible evidence that such interference was necessary to
free the hostages. Nonetheless the Court made it clear in that case
that whether the taxpayers should compensate the claims holders for
their losses was a separate question, which the Court preserved for
future deliberation: "[tihough we conclude that the President has
settled petitioner's claims against Iran, we do not suggest that the
settlement has terminated petitioner's possible taking claim against
the United States. We express no views on petitioner's claims that it
has suffered a taking. -95
Justice Powell, concurring, and dissenting in part, emphasized:
The Government must pay just compensation when it furthers the
Nation's foreign policy goals by using as 'bargaining chips' claims
lawfully held by a relatively few persons and subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts. The extraordinary powers of the President and Congress upon
which our decision rests cannot in the circumstances of this case, displace
the Just Compensation Clause of the Constitution.
2 96
294. See also Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 386, 405-06 (1895) (citing Gravesend
Barge (Mouse's Case), 12 Co. Rep. 63, 77 Eng. Rep. 1341 (1609) for proposition
that in a tempest, in order to save the lives of passengers, a passenger can cast out
valuable goods without incurring liability to the owners).
295. Danes & Moore, 453 U.S. at 689. n. 14.
296. Id. at 690.
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In short, Dames & Moore does not hold that the President has
unlimited discretion without the concurrence of Congress, by
agreement with a foreign state, to impose any kind of legally binding
obligation on the United States. Moreover, even with congressional
concurrence, the President's exercise of power to bind the United
States legally was upheld only with respect to the settlement of'
claims against a foreign state. Hence, nothing in Dames & Moore
justifies a conclusion that a President can impose on the United
States an obligation to forego in perpetuity the creation and
maintenance of a defense against any other state's intercontinental
ballistic missile attack.
Moreover, the President's power to act in an emergency cannot be
extended without limit. In Youngtown Sheet & Tube Co. t'. Sawver,2 " 7
the Court held the powers vested in the President by the Constitution
did not authorize the President, acting without statutory
authorization, to seize and operate the nation's steel mills."' At the
time, the United States was at war with North Korea and a strike
would have shut down the steel mills and impaired production of
armaments to conduct the war. The United States argued (among
other things) that the President's military power as Commander in
Chief of the Armed Forces and the President's power as "executive,"
coupled with his duty to execute the law faithfully, authorized the
President to seize and operate the mills." ' The Supreme Court
rejected the argument. The Court's opinion was written by Justice
Black, joined by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, who also wrote
separate opinions.
As to the military power of the President as Commander in Chief'
of the Armed Forces, the Court in Youngstown distinguished cases
"upholding broad powers in military commanders engaged in day-to-
day fighting in a theater of war." The Court explained:
Even though "theater of war" is an expanding concept, we cannot with
faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander ill
Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate power as such to take
possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from
297. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
298. See id. at 585-86.
299. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582.
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stopping production. This is a job for the Nation's lawmakers, not for its
military authorities.
300
As to implied powers of the Executive and the imposition of a
duty to see to faithfully execute the laws, the Court explained that a
decision to seize and operate the mills without statutory authority
was the making, not the execution, of law and the Constitution had
vested in the Congress "all" power to legislate, including the power
to make laws necessary and proper to carry into execution the
enumerated law-making powers and all the other powers vested by
the Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any
Department or officer thereof."' Accordingly, the Court held that the
Constitution did not confer power on the President, acting without
statutory authority, to seize and operate the nation's steel mills, even
for the purpose of conducting a war in which the nation was
currently engaged.
F. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN CUR TISS- VRIGtlT EXPORT
CORPORA TION DOES NOT AUTHORIZE A PRESIDENT, ACTING
WITHOUT SENATE CONCURRENCE, TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT
WITH A FOREIGN STATE THAT WOULD LEGALLY BIND THE
UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO A SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL-
SECURITY COURSE OF ACTION.
According to some scholars, in Cui-tiss-Wright, discussed in Part
V (E), the Court announced a sweeping rule, the "sole organ"
doctrine, which is a proposition that if the President enters into an
agreement with another nation and does not seek approval of either a
majority of both Houses or two-thirds of the Senate, that agreement
is every bit as legally efficacious as if it had been concurred in by a
vote of two-thirds of the Senate, or approved by a majority vote in
each House of the Congress. See Curtiss-IWright Export Corp., 299
U.S. at 320. Presumably, that conclusion undergirds the Lawyers'
Alliance for World Security's argument that the Baker-Yeltsin
agreement imposed a legally binding obligation on the United States
whereby the Russian Federation, substituting for the USSR, became
300. Id. at 587.
301. See id. at 588.
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in all material respects a party to the ABM Treaty of 1972. See supra
Part II (A).
In Curtiss-Wright., seven justices upheld the conviction of Curtiss-
Wright Export Corp. for conspiring to sell fifteen machine guns in
the United States to Bolivia, which at the time was engaged in
warfare in the Chaco, an area in dispute between Bolivia and
Paraguay. The sale of the guns violated a Joint Resolution that
became the Arms Sale Resolution Act, 48 Stat. 811 (1934), which
imposed a maximum fine of $10,000 or maximum imprisonment for
two years, or both. According to the Joint Resolution,
(i) if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and
munitions of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in
armed conflict in the Chaco may contribute to the establishment of peace
between those countries, (ii) and after consultation with the governments
of other governments the President makes a proclamation to that effect,
then, it "shall be unlawful to sell ... any arms or munitions of war any
place in the United States to the countries now engaged in that armed
conflict, or to any person ... acting in the interest of either country...
The defendants challenged the constitutionality of the Joint
Resolution on the ground that it delegated to the Executive Branch
the power to make law, a power that under the Constitution is vested
exclusively in the Legislative Branch. The defendants based their
argument on two recently decided Supreme Court cases, Schecter
Poultiy Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 551 (1935) and
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), in which the
Court declared unconstitutional parts of the National Industrial
Recovery Act ("NIRA") on the ground that the Act
unconstitutionally delegated law-making power to the Executive
Branch.
30 2
In Panama Refining Co., the Court dealt with Section 9(c) of the
National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, 15 U.S.C. tit 1,
§709(c):
The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and
foreign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced
or withdrawn from storage by any State law or valid regulation or order
302. See Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. at 235.
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prescribed thereunder, by any board, commission, officer, or other duly
authorized agency of a State. Any violation of any order of the President
issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be punishable by fine
of not to exceed S 1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six months, or
both.
The Court observed:
Section 9(c) is assailed upon the ground that it is an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power. The section purports to authorize the
President to pass a prohibitory law. The subject to which this authority
relates is defined. It is the transportation in interstate and foreign
commerce of petroleum and petroleum products which are produced or
withdrawn from storage in excess of the amount permitted by state
authority. Assuming for the present purpose. without deciding, that the
Congress has power to interdict the transportation of that excess in
interstate and foreign commerce, the question whether that transportation
shall be prohibited by law is obviously one of legislative policy.
Accordingly, we look to the statute to see whether the Congress has
declared a policy with respect to that subject: whether the Congress has
set up a standard for the President's action; whether the Congress has
required any finding by the President in the exercise of the authority to
enact the prohibition.
Section 9(c) is brief and unambiguous. It does not attempt to control the
production of petroleum and petroleum products with a State. It does not
seek to lay down ground rules for the guidance of state legislatures or
state officers. It leaves to the States and to their constituted authorities the
determination of what production shall be permitted. It does not qualify
the President's authority by reference to the basis, or extent, of the State's
limitation of production. Section 9(c) does not state whether, or in what
circumstances or under what conditions, the President is to prohibit the
transportation of the amount of petroleum or petroleum products produced
in excess of the State's permission. It establishes no criterion to govern
the President's course. It does not require any finding by the President as
a condition of his action. The Congress in § 9(c) thus declares no policy
as to the transportation of the excess production. So far as this section is
concerned, it gives to the President an unlimited authority to determine
the policy and to lay down the prohibition.., or not to lay it down, as he
may see fit. And disobedience to his order is made a crime punishable by
fine and imprisonment. 0 3
Having ruled that Section 9(c) placed no limit on any state's
303. Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. 388,414-15 (1935).
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decision as to how much oil production it will permit, the Court
examined other sections of the Act, and concluded that none of them
limited or controlled the authority conferred by Section 9(c).314 The
Court also distinguished cases upholding other statutory schemes on
the ground that the authority they gave to the President was bounded
by a declaration of policy, the establishment of a standard, and a
definition of circumstances and conditions under which conduct is to
be allowed or prohibited."' The Court concluded:
We are not dealing with action which, appropriately belonging to the
executive province, is not the subject of judicial review, or with the
presumptions attaching to executive action. To repeat, we are concerned
with the question of the delegation of legislative power. If the citizen is to
be punished for the crime of violating a legislative order of an executive
officer, or of a board or commission, due process of law requires that it
shall appear that the order is within the authority of the officer, board or
commission, and, if that authority depends on determinations of fact,




Accordingly, the Court held that Section 9(c) unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power to the President.
The Joint Resolution considered in Curtiss- Wright bore some
resemblance to Section 9(c) of the NIRA. For example, under each
statute a regimen for punishment by criminal law came into existence
upon the issuance of a Presidential proclamation by reason of' a
decision of another governmental body, i.e., the states in Panama
Refining Co. and the President in Curtiss- Wright. The defendants in
Curtiss- Wright argued that the resemblance was close enough to
support a conclusion that the ruling in Panama Refining Co.
governed the Presidential Proclamation in Curtiss-Wright. See
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 14 F. Supp. at 235. The statutory
regimes, however, differed in a notable respect: in Panama Refining
Co., as to each state's oil output, the President was required to issue
the proclamation if, as and when a state government decreed a
maximum on the amount that could lawfully be produced deriving
from land within the state during a designated period. In contrast, in
304. See id. at 416-20.
305. See id. at 427-28.
306. Id. at 432.
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Curtiss-Wright under the Joint Resolution, the President was
required to make his own decision, on the basis of his own
perception of the facts. The United States argued the difference was
critical, citing a number of rulings upholding regulatory statutes that
declared policy and left it to the President to execute the policy. See
Id. at 234. Thus, in Cu-tiss-Wright, the Supreme Court had a basis to
distinguish Panama Refining Co. Had the Court chosen to limit its
opinion to making that distinction, it would not have had to consider
the scope of the President's constitutional role in the conduct of
foreign relations. The Court, however, explained it decision as
resting on another ground: in the area of foreign relations the
President has more latitude to make rules on his own pertaining to
foreign relations than to execute a statute dealing solely with internal
matters. See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 319-29.
The Court observed that the President has "delicate, plenary, and
exclusive power" as the "sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations," and that such power "does not
require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of
course, like every other government power must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution. ' '
The Court reasoned that the President had been given greater latitude
in conducting foreign affairs than internal affairs because he
President had greater ability than the Congress to obtain pertinent
information about conditions in foreign countries because he could
better avoid premature (and harmful) disclosure of confidentially-
provided information. See id. at 319-22. Moreover, the Congress
could not be expected to maintain confidentiality as well as the
President. Therefore, if the Congress were to conduct external
relations, more confidential information would be imparted by the
government and the conduct of external relations would suffer. Id. at
320-21. In the Court's words:
When the President is to be authorized by legislation to act in respect of a
matter intended to affect a situation in foreign territory, the legislator
properly bears in mind the important consideration that the form of the
President's action- or, indeed, whether he shall act at all- may well
depend, among other things. upon the nature of the confidential
information which he has or may thereafter receive, or upon the effect
307. 299 U.S. at 320.
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which his action may have upon our foreign relations. This consideration,
in connection with what we have already said on the subject, discloses the
unwisdom of requiring Congress in this field of governmental power to
lay down narrowly definite standards by which the President is to be
governed.
30 8
The emphasis on access to information from foreign sources fit the
facts before the Court in Curtiss- Wright. The Joint Resolution
authorized the President to make a proclamation only after he
consulted with the governments of the American Republics other
than the combatants and sought their cooperation, and only then if he
found that the "prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of war
in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict
in the Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between
those countries. . ." See Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at
312. To buttress its reasoning, the Court described a "steady stream
for a century and a half of time" of statutes pertaining to foreign
relations providing that prohibitions of law come into effect upon
determinations made by the President. See id. at 328. The existence
of this stream of statutes "goes a long way in the direction of
providing the presence of unassailable ground for the
constitutionality of the practice. . ." Id.
The Court therefore concluded:
It is enough to summarize by saying that, both upon principle and in
accordance with precedent, we conclude that there is sufficient warrant
for the broad discretion vested in the President to determine whether the
enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the
reestablishment of peace in the affected countries; whether he shall make
proclamation to bring the resolution into operation; whether and when the
resolution shall cease to operate and to make proclamation accordingly;
and to prescribe limitations and exceptions to which the enforcement of
the resolution shall be subject.
30 9
Thus, the Court in Curtiss-Wright upheld the authority of the
Congress to vest in the President a substantial latitude to determine
facts on which to predicate a proclamation that a particular statutory
punishment shall go into effect. The Court's opinion said more,
308. Id. at 321-22.
309. Id. at 329.
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however; it spoke of a "sole organ" doctrine under which the
President has "plenary" or "exclusive" power to conduct the foreign
relations of the United States, and that such power derived from the
external sovereignty that devolved on the government of the United
States from the British Monarchy. See id. at 317.
The notion that the sole organ doctrine has nullified the
Constitutional requirement for two-thirds Senate concurrence in
making treaties has no support in the case law and has not awed the
scholarly community. See, e.g., The World Trade Organization and
the Treaty Clause: The Constitutional Requirement of Submitting the
Uruguay Round of GATT as a Treaty: Hearings beibre the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Sciences and Transportation, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994) (statement of Laurence H. Tribe, Professor, Harvard
Univ. Law School):
The current controversy over the Uruguay Round, then is not the first
occasion in our nation's history when debate over approval of a particular
international agreement overlapping vith debate over the Treaty Clause.
Over half a century ago, prominent scholars crafted boldly revisionist
histories that are often cited as proof that, from the nation's founding,
executive agreements, coupled with bicameral congressional approval,
were available as substitutes for formal treaties ratified by the Senate. But
Professor Ackerman's forthcoming article convincingly debunks the myth
that those scholars had invented-the myth that it was always recognized
that any international agreement negotiated by the president, regardless of
its nature and sweep, could escape the requirement of Senate ratification
as a treaty. Similarly, the Supreme Court cases that are sometimes trotted
out for the proposition that any executive agreement can become "the
supreme Law of the Land" through majority approval of the House and
Senate in fact establish no such thing-as I have elaborated elsewhere and
as Professor Ackerman has established in his forthcoming article. These
cases often deal with the very different issues of unilateral presidential
settlement or suspension of claims against foreign nations, see, e.g.
United States v. Pink, 135 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301
U.S. 324 (1937) ...30
310. See also Memorandum of Law on Constitutionality of the Sinai Accords,
Office of Legislative Counsel, U.S. Senate (Sept. 24, 1975), reprinted in 1 UNITED
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOcUMENTS AND SOURCEs 273. 274 (Michael
Glennon & Thomas Franck eds.. 1980) (noting that the Constitution does not
expressly authorize the President to enter into agreements without Senate consent);
Memorandum of Law: Response to Memorandum of Dept. of State Legal Adviser
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A tabular comparison of foreign policy powers of the three
branches is attached to this Memorandum as Appendix A. It shows
that the "sole" Presidential foreign relations powers are modest when
compared to sole Congressional foreign relations powers, such as to
make law (including the appropriation of funds for the armed forces)
by veto override or to grant letters of marque and reprisal, or to the
sole Judiciary powers such as to declare laws unconstitutional, to
declare that a treaty has superseded a statute, or to declare that a
statute has superseded a treaty. In short, the opinion in Curtiss-
Wright cannot be understood to remove the Constitutional check on
the President's treaty-making power.
G. THE RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION SHOWS
THAT THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION DID NOT INTEND TIlE
SENATE'S TREATY-CONCURRENCE POWER TO BE AN OPTION
GIVING A PRESIDENT UNLIMITED DISCRETION TO DISREGARD TI IE
Regarding Secret Middle East Agreements (Oct. 22, 1975), reprinted in UNITED
STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOCUMENTS AND SOURCES 31 I, 312-13
(Michael Glennon & Thomas Franck eds., 1980) (asserting that, since some
international agreements are regarded as treaties, it is a violation of the
Constitution for the President to enter into an international agreement without the
advice and consent of the Senate); Walter Dellinger, Whether Uruguay Round
Agreements Required Ratification as a Treaty, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 232,
1994 OLC LEXIS 20, at 6 n.13, 15 n.24 (1994) ("[W]e do not dispute Professor
Tribe's view that some such [executive] agreements may have to be ratified as
treaties.... [O]ur contention is only that trade agreements such as the Uruguay
round do not require ratification as treaties."); Arthur Bestor, Respective Roles of
Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties: The Original
Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historicalli Examined. 55 WASI1. L. RI;V.
1 (1979-1980); THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN
POLICY 27-32 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds., 1996) (discussing
presidential use of executive agreements to conduct foreign policy); Jody S. Fink,
Notes on Presidential Foreign Policy Power (Part 11): The Foreign Policy Role of
the President: Origins and Limitations. II HOFSTRA L. RFV. 773, 782-89 (1983)
(explaining theories of executive power in foreign affairs); STAFI: 01: SFNAIT
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 83D CONG., REPORT ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMI':'NDMI;NI
RELATIVE TO TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS, S. REP. No. 83-412 (1953)
(recommending adoption of the "Bricker Amendment". S.J. Res. 1, which
addresses the legal effect of certain treaties and executive agreements); John C'.
Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other ieans: The Original Understanding of
War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 295-96 (1996) (asserting that the intention of




REQUIREMENT FOR A TWO-THIRDS CONCURRENCE.
1. The Framers' Puinpose Was to Prevent a Minoritv of Citizens
fiom Pushing a Treat , Down on the Majoriy'.
Given that every state was to have an equal vote in the Senate,
irrespective of population, the immediate purpose of the requirement
for a concurrence of two-thirds of the Senators was to minimize the
likelihood of a treaty concurrence without the acquiescence of at
least several of the populous states. Hence, the ultimate purpose was
to insure that a vicarious vote of at least a majority of the population
(through its Senators) would be required to make a treaty. It is
therefore fair to infer from the text of the Treaty Clause alone that
the Framers were uneasy about, if not hostile to, the making of
treaties. Such an inference is supported by the context, at least with
respect to "political" (as distinguished from "commercial")
treaties.3"'
A few years later President George Washington expressed a
similar caution in his Farewell Address:
The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in
extending our commercial relations to have with them as little political
connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements let
them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.
Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the
causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore,
it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the
ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and
collisions of her friendship or enmities ....
... Why quit our own to stand to upon foreign ground? Why, by
interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our
peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest,
humor, or caprice?
311. See e.g., 9 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 01: Tilli
CONSTITUTION 1108 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (quoting
James Monroe at the Virginia Convention to consider ratification: 'Our object is
the regulation of commerce and not of treaties... I apprehend no treaty that could
be made, can be of any advantage to us.").
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It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion
of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for
let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing
engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than private
affairs that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat, therefore, let those
engagements be observed in their genuine sense. But in my opinion it is
unnecessary and would be unwise to extend them.
Taking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances
for extraordinary emergencies.
31 2
Thomas Jefferson shared President Washington's view: "[o]n the
subject of treaties, our system is to have none with any nation, as far
as can be avoided."'31 3 Similarly, John Jay said he "would not give a
farthing for any parchment security whatever."
314
Western and southern states were particularly apprehensive that a
treaty power unconstrained by a super-majority requirement for
approval would lead to a treaty that would concede to Spain (whose
territory straddled the Mississippi River) a right to interfere with
navigation on the River. See Letter from Hugh Williamson to James
Madison (June 2, 1788), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 306, 306-07 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). For a
description of the controversy, see Michael D. Ramsey, Executive
Agreements and the (Non) Treaty Power. 77 N.C. L. REV. 134, 192-
93 (1998); Bruce Stein, Note on Presidential Foreign Policy Power
(Part I): The Framers' Intent and the Early Years of the Republic, I I
HOFSTRA L. REV. 413, 436 (1982).
On September 8, 1787, during the final debate on the Treaty
Clause, James Madison observed "that it had been too easy in the
present Congress [of the Confederation of the United States] to make
Treaties. 31 5
312. George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in I MESSA;F.S
AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, 1789-1897 213, 222-23 (1897).
313. Letter From Thomas Jefferson to Philip Mazzei (July 18, 1804), in I I Til[
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38, 38-9 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1904).
314. Report from Richard Oswald to Thomas Townshend (Aug. 7, 1782), in 8
THE COMPLETE WORKS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 141, 143 (John Bigelow ed.,
1888).
315. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
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The Framers' concern about excessive entanglement in the affairs
of other nations has not entirely disappeared, even in academia. For
example, Detlev Vagts, Professor of Law at Harvard University,
wrote in 1997 "[o]ne is right to be troubled about the potential of
international commitments to frustrate American democratic
processes by shifting functions from local representatives-who can
be questioned and persuaded by their constituencies-to distant and
anonymous groups of experts."
316
Requiring the use of a super-majority of states to make a treaty in
order to ensure majority support of the American people was
understood by the Framers. In his speech opposing Oliver Ellsworth
of Connecticut's motion to allow each State an equal vote in "ye 2d
branch," i.e., the Senate, Wilson described the counter-majoritarian
consequence of a rule that would allow a measure to be approved in
the Senate by a simple miajority vote. I THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 482-83 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
Ellsworth had predicted that if his motion failed, "of all the States
North of [Pennsylvania] one only would agree to any [General]
Government," id. at 482, to which Wilson responded:
[N]or lasting, any other principle will be local, confined & temporary. He
entertained more favorable hopes of [Connecticut] and of the other
Northern States. He hoped the alarms exceeded their cause, and that they
would not abandon a Country to which they were bound by so many
strong and endearing ties. But should the deplored event happen, it would
neither stagger his sentiments nor his duty. If the minority of the people of
America refuse to coalesce with the majority on just and proper
principles, if a separation must take place, it could never happen on better
grounds. The votes of yesterday [against the] just principle of
representation, were as 22 to 90 of the people of America. Taking the
opinions to be the same on this point, and he was sure if there was any
room for change it could not be on the side of the majority, the question
will be shall less than [one fourth] of the United States withdraw
themselves from the Union. or shall more than [three fourths] renounce
the inherent, indisputable, and unalienable rights of men, in favor of the
1787 603 (Ohio Univ. Press, 1966) (1840).
316. Detlev V. Vagts, hIternational Agreements. the Senate and the
Constitution, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143. 155 (1997). See also Michael J.
Glennon, There's a Point to Going it Alone: Unilateralism llas Often Served Us
Well, WASH. POST., Aug. 12, 2001, at B2 (explaining why the United States acts
unilaterally, as opposed to multilaterally).
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artificial systems of States. If issue must be joined, it was on this point lie
would chose to join it. The gentleman from Connecticut in supposing that
the preponderancy secured to the majority in the [first] branch had
removed the objections to an equality of votes in the [second] branch for
the security of the minority narrowed the case extremely. Such an equality
will enable the minority to control in all cases whatsoever, the sentiments
and interests of the majority. Seven States will control six: seven States
according to the estimates that had been used, composed 2/9 of the whole
people. It would be in the power then of less than [one-third] to overrule
[two-thirds] whenever a question should happen to divide the States in
that manner. Can we forget for whom we are forming a Government? Is it
for men, or for the imaginary being called States? Will our honest
Constituents be satisfied with metaphysical distinctions? Will they, ought
they to be satisfied with being told that the one third, compose the greater
number of states. The rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the
same in the [second] as in the [first] branch. If the Government be not laid
on this foundation, it can be neither solid.3 7
Although Wilson lost the argument as to Senator voting power
generally, the issue of treaty making was again raised in September
1787, toward the end of the Convention. The Partial Report of the
Committee of Eleven, as adopted on September 4, 1787, provides at
paragraph 7: "[t]he President by and with the advice and consent of'
the Senate, should have the power to make Treaties... [b.Jut no
Treaty shall be made without the consent of two-thirds of the
members present."''
On September 7, Madison successfully moved to insert after the
word "treaty" the words "except treaties of peace," therefore
allowing peace treaties to be made with less difficulty than other
treaties.3"9 On September 8, 1787, a motion carried to reconsider the
Treaty Clause, and upon reconsideration, Madison's exception fbr
treaties of peace was struck. Without a peace-treaty provision, the
Treaty Clause, as it now reads, was passed.
320
317. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 482 (Max Farrand
ed., 1966).
318. MADISON, supra note 315, at 575.
319. Seeidat599.
320. See id. at 602-04; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL. CONVENTION OF 1787,
supra note 317, at 544-54; see also Brett W. King, The Use of Sl)ermajoril'
Provisions in the Constitution: The Frainers, the Federalist Papewrs and the
Reinforcement of a Fundamental Principle, 8 SETON HALL CONsT. L. J. 363, 382-
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The debate at the Constitutional Convention was conducted
against the backdrop of a controversy that arose during the
Confederation preceding adoption of the Constitution in 1786. The
controversy involved Secretary of Foreign Affairs John Jay's
proposal to conclude a treaty with Spain by which the United States
would for twenty-five to thirty years relinquish its right to sail the
Mississippi River to its outlet in exchange for diplomatic privileges
and economic benefits. Delegates from the South claimed this would
benefit the North and East at the expense of the South."' According
to Slonim,
[T]he underlying consideration prompting the delegates to vest treaty-
making power in the Senate was the desire of the states to retain maximal
control over foreign affairs. The final clause on treaty-making power
emerged as the product of several basic conflicts which had beset the
Constitutional Convention: clashes between 'nationalists' and
'federalists', between large and small States, and between the North and
the South. By means of compromise, the President was given a role in the
treaty-making power process, while the vote required in the Senate was
raised from a simple majority to two-thirds. Against this background, it
becomes evident that the latter requirement was a deliberate policy
decision designed to ensure protection of factional interests, other than
merely a less stringent alternative to a majority vote in both houses.
3 22
Thus, at least as to the power to make legally binding promises to
other nations, the Framers diminished the power "of less than one-
third to overrule two-thirds of the population" whenever a question
should happen to divide the States in that manner and "assured that a
treaty would not come into existence without the support of 'the
whole people'. 323
83 (1998) (recounting the adoption of Hamilton's proposal of vesting the treaty-
making power with the President and the Committee's modification, which
included the two-thirds voting requirement of the Senate).
321. See Solomon Slonim, Congressional-Execuive Agreements. 14 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 434,443-44 (1975).
322. Id. at 436-37.
323. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 317, at
482-83; see also Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978) (arguing that the Framers chose a "supermajoritarian
requirement in the Senate [for treaty concurrence], rather than House approval, to
serve as a check upon the improvident cession of United States territory."); John C.
Yoo, Globalisin and the Constitution: Treaties. Non-Self Frecution, and the
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On the need for popular representation, see THE FEDERALIST No.
22 138, 142 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., Charles
Scribner's Sons 1897):
Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to
condemn a principal which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the
scale of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to
Delaware an equal voice in national deliberations with Pennsylvania, or
Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation contradicts that fundamental
maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the
majority should prevail.
Similarly, according to Alexander Hamilton in TFiE FEDERALIST
No. 74 519, 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson cd.,
Charles Scribner's Sons 1897):
To have entrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone would
have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the
President in the conduct of foreign relations. It is true that the Senate
would, in that case, have the option of employing him in this capacity, but
they would also have the option of letting it alone, and pique or cabal
might induce the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministerial
service of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence and
respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the constitutional
representations of the nation, and, of course, would not be able to act with
an equal degree of weight or efficacy. While the Union would from this
cause, lose a considerable advantage in the management of its external
concerns, the people would lose the additional security which would
result from the co-operation of the Executive. Though it would be
imprudent to confide in him solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be
doubted that his participation would materially add to the safety of the
society. It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint
possession of the power in question, by the President and the Senate,
would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate possession
Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 2074 (1999) (asserting that
"permitting one-third of the Senate plus one to block treaties amounted to a
normative decision by the Framers to make it difficult for the nation to enter
international agreements. A popular voice in treaty-making was seen as necessary
to prevent treaties, not to form them"); King, supra note 320 at 363 (examining the
history behind the supermajority provisions in the United States Constitution). See
generally Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive Expediency and
Executive Agi-eenents, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 731-38 (1998) (describing the




of it by either of them.
2. The Serious Consequences of Breach of a Treaty
The Framers' caution as to the making of treaties is easy to
comprehend in light of the then well-known serious consequence of a
breach of treaty-the right of the aggrieved treaty partner to make war
on the partner that committed the breach. At that time, war was
considered an acceptable remedy for breach of a treaty. According to
Emmerich De Vattel, whose work was much read in the American
Colonies and in the Confederation of the United States of America,
an intentional breach of treaty was so reprehensible that states other
than the injured state were justified in forming an alliance to make
war on the treaty-breaching state:
As all nations are interested in maintaining the faith of treaties, and
causing it to be everywhere considered as sacred and inviolable, so
likewise they are justifiable in forming a confederacy for the purpose of
repressing him who testifies a disregard for it-who openly sports with it-
who violates and tramples it under foot. Such a man is a public enemy
who saps the foundations of the peace and common safety of nations.
-3 2'
According to The Brig An' , Warwick, et al. ( "Prize Cases"), 67
U.S. 635, 666 (1862), "[w]ar has been well defined to be, '[t]hat state
in which a nation prosecutes its right by force."' The historic notions
of a just war and an unjust war are described in THOMAS M. FRANCK,
FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTION 245-59 (1995).
Similarly, George B. Davis, who was Judge-Advocate-General of the
United States Army and a Delegate Plenipotentiary to the Geneva
Conference of 1906 and to the Second Peace Conference at the
Hague in 1907, stated in GEORGE B. DAVIS, THE ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 94-95 (3d ed. 1908) that "[t]reaties are
voluntary engagements entered into by sovereign states, by which
duties and obligations are created or defined. As they operate to
convert imnpeifect into peifect rights, the violation of a treaty
stipulation may afford just cause for war."(footnote omitted).
324. EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND
SOVEREIGNS 229-30 (1876).
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According to RENE ALBRECHT-CARRIE, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
OF EUROPE SINCE THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA 7 (1958) (emphasis
added):
Treaties, to be sure, are supposed to retain their validity tinder the tacit
qualification -ebus sic stantibus, conditions persisting that prevailed at the
time of their making. When these conditions alter, as in time they will,
there is no agency with power to adjudicate the measure of the change or
the consequences that should ensue from it. Against the breach of a
treat',, there is only one recourse, force, and to speak of the sanctilY of
treaties is to make a purely moral judgment that carries no breseeable or
previously known sanction with it.
John Jay, in undertaking to show why a "United America" would
be safer from "foreign arms and influence," than from a "Disunited
America," employed the argument that a united nation would be
likely to give the fewest "just causes of war." THE FEDERALIST No. 3
13 (John Jay) (Henry B. Dawson ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1897).
Jay asserted that "[tihe just causes of war, for the most part, arise
either from violation of treaties or from direct violence." Id. Jay
further wrote in THE FEDERALIST No. 4 17 (John Jay) (-lenry B.
Dawson ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1897):
But the safety of the people of America against dangers from ]breign
force depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to
other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such
a situation as not to invite hostility or insult; for it need not be observed
that there are pretended as well as just causes of war.
Furthermore, according to SIR SHERSTON BAKER, 1 HALLECK'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW 288 (3d ed. 1878) (1893),
One who openly violates the obligations of a treaty, will incur the
disgrace of infamy and the reproach of mankind, but, so far as penal
consequences are concerned, it is only the injured party who is justified in
resorting to open and solemn war for the purpose of inflicting
punishment.
An abbreviated account of the many violations of "political"
treaties, or "pledges to aid in war and to make or keep peace," in the
century that immediately preceded the Constitutional Convention
occupies nearly fifty pages in LAURENCE W. BEILENSON, TIlE
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TREATY TRAP 56-95 (1969). The futility of relying on an oath to
guarantee faithfulness to a treaty is illustrated by an event with which
some of the Framers must have been familiar: Harold the Saxon
promised to support William of Normandy's claim to succeed
Edward the Confessor as King of England. Harold made the promise
under oath while touching an altar that was located above a sacred
relic and his promise was supported by the Pope. Nonetheless,
Harold broke his promise and resisted William's landing at Hastings
to claim the Crown. See CYRIL E. ROBINSON, ENGLAND: A HISTORY
OF BRITISH PROGRESS FROM THE EARLY AGES TO THE PRESENT DAY
38-39 (1932). Even today, according to some scholars, the fact that
powerful states "cannot be punished when they violate international
law" may particularly tempt them to violate international law. See
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A, Posner, A Theor-v of Customary
International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1135-36 (1999).
Among civilized nations, warfare was considered a lawful means
to remedy a breach of treaty until the adoption of the League of
Nations Covenant. See LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT arts. 12-16,
reprinted in 2 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 1648-
1967 1265-81 (Fred L. Israel ed., Chelsea House 1967). Article 13 of
the League of Nations Covenant provides:
Disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty. as to any question of
international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the
extent and nature of the reparation to be made for any such breach, are
declared generally suitable for submission to arbitration.
LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 13.
Article 13 further provides that members of the League "will carry
out in full good faith any award that may be rendered, and that they
will not resort to war against a Member of the League which
complies therewith." Id. Furthermore, Article 16 provides that
"should any Member of the League resort to warfare in disregard of
its covenants under [Article 13] it shall ipsofacto be deemed to have
committed an act of war against all other members of the League."
Id. art. 16. Other members are obligated to sever trade and financial
with and place an embargo on the offending state, and the Council of
the League is obliged to recommend to the states concerned "what
effective military, naval or air force the Members of the League shall
2002]
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severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the
covenants of the League." Id.
The disapproval of war to settle disputes was further enunciated in
1928 in the Kellogg-Briand Pact, in which Germany, France, Great
Britain, Japan, Italy, Canada, the USSR, China and thirty-four other
nations renounced the use of war to settle disputes, thereby implicitly
abjuring warfare as a remedy for breach of treaty.32 5
Concerning the binding effect of treaties, William Hall asserted in
WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 343
(61h ed. 1909) (emphasis added) that:
In organi[z]ed communities it is settled by municipal law whether a
contract which has been broken shall be enforced or annulled; but
internationally, as no superior coercive power exists, and as eibrcemnent
is not always convenient or practicable to the injured party, the individual
state must be allowed in all cases to enforce or annul for itself as it mav
choose. The general rule then is clear that a treaty which has been broken
by one of the parties to it is not binding upon the other, through the fact
itself of the breach, and without reference to any kind of tribunal.
Moreover, as explained in THE FEDERALIST No. 63 446, 451 (John
Jay) (Henry B. Dawson ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1897):
These gentlemen [who are averse to treaties being the supreme laws of the
land] would do well to reflect that a treaty is only another name for a
bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who would make
any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolute,, but on
325. See Treaty of Paris (Kellogg-Briand), Aug. 27, 1928, arts. 2, 3, reprinted in
4 MAJOR PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 2393-96 (Fred Israel ed., Chelsea
House 1967). Article 2 of the United Nations Charter also prohibits warfare as a
means of resolving disputes. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, paras. 3-4 (noting that all
U.N. Members must settle international disputes by peaceful means and refrain
from the threat or use of force against a State). But see 2 SIR WLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (James Dewitt
Andrews, 4 " ed. 1899) (emphasis added) ("For offences against this law are
principally incident to whole states or nations, in which case recourse can only be
had to war; which is an appeal to the God of hosts, to punish such infractions of
public faith as are committed by one independent people against another: neither
state having any superior jurisdiction to resort to upon earth for justice."); Michael
D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non) Treaty power. 77 N.C. L. REv.
134, 196 (1998) (commenting that "[o]f course, international law generally is not
(and plainly in 1817 was not) subject to supernational enforcement mechanisms,
and as a practical matter is (and was) subject to violation on a regular basis.").
ABM TREATY31
us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They
who make laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not
be disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still
let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting
parties, but by both; and consequently. that as the consent of both was
essential to their formation at first, so must it ever afterwards be to alter or
cancel them. The proposed Constitution, therefore, has not in the least
extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far
beyond the lawful reach of Legislative Acts now, as they will be at any
future period, or under any form of government.
John Jay also argued that a federal union was superior to a loose
confederation with regard to observing treaties because, among other
things: (i) a violation of a treaty was one of the "just causes of war;"
and (ii) the United States was more likely to observe treaties, or
"obey the law of nations", if these were one national government
rather than "in thirteen States or in three or four confederacies." THE
FEDERALIST No. 3 14-16 (John Jay) (Charles Scribner's Sons ed.,
1897).326
H. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE CONSTITUTION GAVE A
PRESIDENT UNLIMITED DISCRETION WITHOUT SENATE
CONCURRENCE TO MAKE AN AGREEMENT WITH A FOREIGN STATE
THAT WOULD LEGALLY BIND THE UNITED STATES, PRESIDENT
BUSH (ACTING THROUGH SECRETARY BAKER) DID NOT EXERCISE
THAT OPTION BY WAY OF A JANUARY, 1992 EXCHANGE BETWEEN
SECRETARY BAKER AND RUSSIA'S PRESIDENT BORIS YELTSIN.
1. Secretaiy Baker's Press Statement on Januar, 29, 1992 Cannot
Reasonably Be Inteipreted as Accepting a Russian Offer to Make a
Legally Binding Agreement
Under international law, as well as U.S. law, words of
commitment, accord, or agreement do not create a legally binding
agreement unless they were so intended. Otherwise the words create
only a political or moral agreement. Hence, the validity of the theory
that Secretary Baker's words of commitment created a legally
326. John Jay did not say, "perhaps," because it was (and still is) understood that
it is lawful to terminate for a treaty breach, change of fundamental circumstances,
and impossibility of performance.
2002] 319
AM. U. INT'L L. REP:[
binding agreement with Russia depends on how Secretary Baker's
words are interpreted. The discussion below shows that Linder
accepted rules of interpretation, Secretary Baker's words cannot
reasonably be interpreted as manifesting an intent to create a legally
binding agreement. Hence, when Secretary Baker said that the
United States remains "committed" to the ABM Treaty, he was
referring to a political or moral commitment to work toward the
making of an agreement on ABM systems that would account for the
fundamental changes resulting from the USSR's dissolution and tile
emergence of fifteen successor States on what had been the USSR's
territory. Such a commitment is often called a molhts vivendi and
constitutes what Professor Glennon referred to as a declaration of
"nonbinding adherence to a treaty. 3 27 The State Department has
referred to such undertakings as "intended to have political or moral
weight, but not intended to be legally binding agreements. '28
Some of the reasons for using non-legally binding agreements are
described in RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES: INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
DEFINITION, NATURE, AND SCOPE § 303 n.2 (1987), which include to
avoid legal remedies and to avoid "processes required by a national
constitutional system for making legally binding agreements." The
United States practice of using a modus vivenci has been described
as making an agreement of a "temporary nature, effective pending
the completion of some other process, like the resolution of an
international arbitration or the conclusion of a formal treaty." BLruce
Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 IA, V.
L. REV. 801, 816 (1995). Modi vivendi were "sometimes very
important, and lasted for considerable periods, but their stop-gap
character was their raison d'etre". Id. (footnote omitted).
A modus vivendi is "an instrument recording an international
agreement of temporary or provisional nature intended to be replaced
by an arrangement of a more permanent nature and detailed
character. It is usually made in an informal way and never requires
327. Michael J. Glennon, The Senate Role in Treatl' Rati/cation. 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 257, 267 (1983).
328. United States Department of State, Airgram to All Diplomatic Posts (Mar.
9. 1976), reprinted in I UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: DOcUMIEN'IS
AND SOURCES (Michael J. Glennon and Thomas M. Franck, eds., 1980).
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ratification." United Nations, Definition of K'V Ternis Used in the
Treaty Collection, at
http://untreaty.un.org/English/guide.asp#modus. See also 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 442-'44 (Peter
Macalister-Smith ed., 1997) (explaining the motion of modus
vivendi); N. Am. Commercial Co. v. United States, 171 U.S. 110,
130-34 (1898) (illustrating the use of modii vivendi in the nineteenth
century); SAMUEL B. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND
ENFORCEMENT 87-88 (Colum. Univ. Press 1904) (describing various
nodus vivendi transactions where the United States was a party); 2
CHARLES HENRY BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES 369-70 (1902) (providing instances where modus
vivendi have been used); John Bassett Moore, Treaties and Executive
Agreements, 20 POL. SCI. Q. 385, 397-98 (1905) (offering
background information on miodus vivendi in the United States). On
the character of inodi vivendi and "mere pious declarations" of
intentions, see Myres McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements:
Interchangeable Instrunents of National Polic.v, 54 YALE L.J. 181,
308 (1945).
Sometimes provisional agreements as to "the basis of future
negotiations" are called "protocols of agreement", a term that is used
interchangeably with niodus vivendi. See SAMUEL B. CRANDALL at
87-88. President Theodore Roosevelt's agreement to protect Santo
Domingo during the construction of the Panama Canal is an example
of the use of a provisional presidential commitment that lapses when
the President who made the commitment leaves office. According to
THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 551 (1919):
The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the
necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not
forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I
continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted: and I would
have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary, without any
action by Congress. But it was far preferable that there should be action
by Congress, so that we might be proceeding under a treaty which was the
law of the land and not merely by a direction of the Chief Executive
which would lapse when that particular executive left office. I therefore
did my best to get the Senate to ratify what I had done.
For an account of how the State Department decides which
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agreements are legally binding on the United States and which are
not, see Marian Nash (Leich), Contemporary Practice of the United
States Relating to International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 515-19
(1994). The Nash article refers to a 1994 Memorandum prepared by
Robert B. Dalton, Assistant Legal Advisor for Treaty Affairs, which
in turn refers to the State Department Regulations issued to comply
with the Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, as amended, 1 U.S.C. § 112a-b
(2001). See id. at 515. The Case-Zablocki Act requires the State
Department to transmit to the Congress the text of any international
agreement other than a treaty to which the United States is a party
''as soon as practicable" after coming into force but "in no event later
than sixty days thereafter. 3 29 The regulations implementing the Act
list four criteria for deciding whether an agreement must be reported.
See 22 C.F.R. § 181.2(a)(l)- (a)(4) (2001). Under the first criterion
"[t]he parties must intend their undertaking to be legally binding, and
not merely of political or personal effect."330 Further, the parties
"must intend their undertaking to be governed by international law,
although this intent need not be manifested by a third-party dispute
settlement mechanism or any express reference to international
law.
,33'
According to Alfred P. Rubin, Enforcing the Rules of
International Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 149, 157 (1993):
Frequently enough, the human lawmakers and statesmen engaging in
diplomatic correspondence or concluding treaties evade precision about
the legal results that might flow from various supposed delicts. On close
reading, many treaties that purport to translate public or private virtue into
rules binding in the positive legal order only restate principles or
agreement on policy goals. They cannot be enforced as positive law
because they do not define rules of positive law or allocate authority to
determine whether their prescriptions are violated and what legal result
should flow from a violation.
On the other hand, some negotiated non-treaties, like the 1975
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, marshal the moral order to enforce virtue. They use the
329. 22 C.F.R. § 1 12b(a) (2001).




enforcement tools of the virtue-moral order: publicity, exposure of
hypocrisy, and opprobrium.
Another kind of non-binding agreement is a "gentlemen's
agreement." The DICTIONARY OF INTERNATIONAL AND
COMPARATIVE LAW 174 (James R. Fox ed., 1992) defines a
"gentlemen's agreement" as an "agreement (not legally binding)
between statesmen or diplomats, who are to perform the obligation
on the basis of good faith. Because the commitment is only political,
there is no legal or legally enforceable claim to specific
performance." An example of such an agreement is that between the
U.S. and Japan in 1907-1908, whereby Japan promised to restrict the
emigration of Japanese laborers to the United States. See Treaties, 5
Hackworth DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1943). Japan later
replaced this agreement with an immigration act. See id. Regarding
such agreements, one diplomat has quipped that "before you can
have a gentlemen's agreement you have to have gentlemen," and "a
gentlemen's agreement is something which a gentleman would
avoid."332
Diplomats and scholars use the term "legally binding" in a broader
sense than common lawyers. In the argot of international law, an
obligation is legally binding if it is intended to be legally binding,
irrespective of whether it is enforceable in a court or other
independent tribunal.333
An example of a non-legally binding "convention" that is not a
treaty is found in Watts v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. (N.S.) 288,
293-294 (1870). In Watts, the court dealt with a provisional sole-
Executive "convention" made between the United States and Great
Britain, under which the United States conducted certain
governmental functions in a disputed territory (San Juan Island) in
the Washington Territory. The court held that the President had
authority to enter into the convention.
332. SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW Oi! TREATIES 1945-1986
116 (1989).
333. See supra Part II.A. (addressing the international law implications of U.S.-
USSR relations regarding the ABM Treaty of 1972 uses "legally binding" in the
broad sense, i.e., to include a promise made by a state with the intention that it be
legally binding on that state).
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The power to make and enforce such a temporary convention respecting
its own territory is a necessary incident to every national government, and
inheres where the executive power is vested. Such conventions are not
treaties within the meaning of the Constitution, and, as treaties, supreme
law of the law, conclusive on the courts, but they are provisional
arrangements, rendered necessary by national differences involving the
faith of the nation and entitled to the respect of the courts. " '
Diplomats and international scholars commonly accept the notion
a promise can at the same time be both "legally binding" and not
legally enforceable. If international law scholars wanted to be
understood by common lawyers, they would define a legally binding
promise to include a promise that though not enforceable in a neutral
tribunal would be legally binding if it were enforceable in a neutral
tribunal.
The case law of the United States recognizes that not every
promise made by an international agreement is legally enforceable.
An obligation in an international agreement that is not "self-
executing" and for that reason is not legally enforceable is called
"merely precatory".335
2. The Non-Publication of the Baker- Yeltsin Exchange and the
Failure to Send the Documents to the Congress Suggest That the
State Department Did Not Consider the Baker- Yeltsin Exchange to
Be Either a Treaty Requiring Senate Concurrence or Otherwise a
Legally Binding International Agreement to Which the United States
334. Watts v. United States, I Wash. Terr. (N.S.) 288, 294 (1870). See also Fritz
Munch, Comments on the 1968 Draft Convention on the Law' of Treaties: Non-
binding Ag-eetnents, 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCIHES OFFENTLICFIFS Rlc-'!r
UND VOLKERRECHT 1 (1969): Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977)
(describing non-legally binding international agreements).
335. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984) (indicating that the
language of Article 34 of the Refugee Convention was precatory and not self-
executing and, as such, merely called on nations to facilitate the admission of'
refugees to the extent possible); see also INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca. 480 U.S. 42 1.
441 (1987) (describing Article 34 as a precatory and non-self-executing principle):
American Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 770 (N.D. Cal. 1989)
(finding that Article I of the Geneva Convention is a non-self-executing treaty
provision). See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-
Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 712 (1995) (noting that non-self.




The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 requires the Secretary of State to
publish annually all treaties and "international agreements other than
treaties" to which the United States became a party during that year.
See 1 U.S.C. § 112a(a) (2001). The Secretary of State must transmit
to the Congress every treaty or other international agreement to
which the United States has become a party "as soon as is practicable
after such agreement has entered into force with respect to the United
States but in no event later than sixty days thereafter," with a special
provision for secret transmissions where public disclosure would
prejudice national security. See 1 U.S.C. § 1 12b. Although there is no
evidence that the State Department ever transmitted the text of the
Baker-Yeltsin exchange to the Congress pursuant to the Case-
Zablocki Act, since the USSR's dissolution the State Department has
transmitted to the Congress at least 135 treaties and other
international agreements with Russia.
3. The Distinction Between Legally Binding Commitnents on the
One Hand and Moral and Political Commitments on the Other is
Understood by the Congress
Senator Joseph Biden emphasized the distinction between legally
binding commitments and moral and political commitments in his
remarks on consideration of NATO's "Strategic Concept," in the
context of the National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2000:
Mr. President, one of the things that we sometimes confuse here-I know
I do-is what is a political obligation and what is a constitutional
obligation. I respectfully suggest that there is no constitutional
requirement for the President of the United States- this President or any
future President-to submit to the Senate for ratification, as if it were an
amendment to a treaty, a Strategic Concept that is a political document.
We use the words interchangeably on this floor. A new commitment or
obligation, as I said, does not a treaty make.
3 36
In addition, Senator Biden stated that international law also
recognizes the distinction required by U.S. law:
336. 145 CONG. REC. S5901 (daily ed. May 25, 1999) (statement of Sen. Biden).
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The rules under U.S. law on what constitutes a binding international
agreement are set forth in the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of
the United States, as well as in the State Department regulations
implementing the Case-Zablocki Act.
Under the Restatement, the key criterion as to whether an international
agreement is legally binding is if the parties intend that it be legally
binding and governed by international law. (Restatement Sec. 301(1)).
Similarly, the State Department regulations state that the "parties must
intend their undertaking to be legally binding and not merely of political
or personal effect." (22 Code of Federal Regulations § 181.2(a)( 1 )).
Thus, many agreements that are not binding are essentially political
statements. There is a moral and political obligation to conply in such
cases, but not a legal one.
The most well-known example of such a political statement is the
Helsinki Final Act of 1975, negotiated under the Ford administration and
credited by most of us as the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union, the
most significant political act that began to tear the Berlin Wall down.
33 7
4. Secretaty of State James Baker Could Not Have Intended to
Create a Legally Binding Agreement
Secretary Baker's words, standing alone, do not express an
intention to create a legally binding agreement. Moreover, Secretary
Baker's words do not stand alone. Rather, they appear in the context
of adjustment to the USSR's dissolution and uncertainty within the
U.S. Executive Branch as to how to create an ABM regime that
accounts for the fact that four USSR successor-States possessed in
their territories substantial parts of what had been one ABM defense
system under the USSR's control. The dissolution-caused
uncertainties include the following:
0 Not only Russia, but each of fourteen other newly independent
337. Id. at S5902 (emphasis added). See also Michael J. Glennon, The Senate
Role in Treat, Ratification, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 257, 268 n.72 (1983) (explaining
that in Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) 1974 I.C.J. 457, 472 (Dec. 20), the International
Court of Justice cautioned that a State's declaration of intent to pursue a course of
action does not bind the State legally unless "it is the intention of the state making
the declaration that it should become bound.").
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states, could claim a right to deploy 100 launchers of an ABM
defense system around its capital.
• Six of the twelve early warning radar systems granted to the
USSR by the ABM Treaty were located outside the territory of
Russia, i.e., in Latvia, Belarus, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.
* ICBM launch sites, equipped with nuclear-armed ICBMs,
were located in states other than Russia, i.e., in Belarus, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan.
0 Ukraine alone was the third largest nuclear-weapon state in the
world. See ROMAN POPADIUK, AMERICAN-UKRAINIAN NUCLEAR
RELATIONS 2 (1996). Ukraine's nuclear arsenal included 176 ICBMs
with 1,240 nuclear-tipped warheads, and 3,000 tactical nuclear
weapons. Id at 279.
* Both before and after Baker's January 29, 1992 conference
with Yeltsin, the U.S. Executive Branch was troubled by Ukraine's
and Kazakhstan's possession and control of strategic nuclear
weapons and sought to have those weapons placed under the control
of Russia. See POPADIUK at 6.
• By April 1992, "it had become obvious that this plan would
not work, as Ukraine and Kazakhstan, unable to work out their
differences with Russia at CIS summits, began to insist on equal
treatment with Russia." Id.
• During the period before May 1992, when Ukraine signed the
Lisbon Protocol to START I (a treaty that required, and received,
two-thirds consent of the U.S. Senate), Ukraine had "balked" when it
came to implementing its promises to give up control of or
dismantle, its nuclear weapons. Id. at 7.
* After the signing of START I, and before it was ratified,
Ukraine's Prime Minister Leonid Kuchma stated that Ukraine may
have to retain its more modern SS-24 missiles "temporarily." Id. at
12.
* In March 1993, the Executive Branch was "deeply concerned"
that Ukraine was developing its own launch capability and Russia
expressed its own concern on that score to the United States. Id. at
26-30.
0 The issue of right-to-control Ukraine's nuclear weapons, as a
practical matter, was not resolved until November 1994, when the
20021
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
Ukrainian parliament acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. ld at
41-43.
* The only ABM testing site in the USSR's territory was in
Kazakhstan.
0 The distance between Moscow and the USSR's periphery (on
its west and southwest) was far greater than the distance between
Moscow and Russia's periphery (on its west and southwest). This
change raised questions as to the capacity of Russia's radar to protect
a Moscow ABM defense area as compared to the capacity of the
USSR's capacity to protect a Moscow ABM defense area. The
careful arrangement of the locations of early warning radars was
critical to a reliable defense against inter-continental ballistic
missiles. For that reason, the USSR's early warning radar located in
Latvia was a critical part of its ABM defense. The USSR's
dissolution restored the independence of Latvia. As a consequence,
Latvia was no longer controlled by a regime in Moscow and the early
warning radar in Latvia was closed creating a large gap in northern
coverage of Russia's ABM defense. The gap was not filled, which
for the United States has meant a lower level of confidence that the
Moscow-controlled system can correctly determine whether an
object perceived to be coming from the area that had been covered
by the Latvian radar is an incoming ICBM. Hence, the United States
has less confidence that the Moscow-controlled system will not
launch a first strike out of error. See David Hoffman, Russia "Blind"
to Attack by US. Missiles: Satellites' Deficiencies Fuel Fears of
Shield, WASH, POST, June 1, 2000, at Al (providing an account of'
this weakness and others in the Moscow based early-warning
system).
• By a separate Agreement on Joint Measures with Respect to
Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 21. 1991, 31 I.L.M. 152, at Alma Ata,
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to "jointly develop
a policy on nuclear issues." Id. art. 3. Also, they agreed that until
nuclear weapons were eliminated from the territories of Ukraine and
Belarus, a decision to use those weapons would require agreement of'
Belarus, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Russia (the "participating states").
Id. art. 4. At the same time, no participating state agreed to share
with any other participating state its decision as to whether to
develop and deploy an ABM defense system.
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• By contrast, Secretary Baker expected "the States of the
Commonwealth to abide by all of the international treaties and
obligations that were entered into by the former Soviet Union,
including the ABM treaty." Supra Part II (A) (2). Yet, the
Commonwealth included seven states that were not "participating
States" within the meaning of the Alma Ata separate agreement on
nuclear weapons. Hence, it was not clear how much control
Secretary Baker assumed the seven non-participating states would
have over the four participating states as regards ABM defense
matters.
George Bunn and John B. Rhinelander, U.S. officials who
participated substantially in the development of U.S. arms-control
policies and treaties and advocated the continuation of an ABM1
Treaty regime with the USSR successor states, made the following
observations in 1993:
If each of the former Soviet republics - including all the *'states of the
Commonwealth" in Secretary Baker's words-succeeded to all Soviet
rights under the ABM treaty, each might theoretically claim the right to
build 100 launchers for an ABM system around its capital. (There is
already one around Moscow equipped with short- and longer-range
nuclear-armed ABM missiles). That would clearly' be inconsistent with
the purpose of the ABM Treaty, as aniended ih 1974. to limit the AlBM
systems to one small, regional systen ON EAUI side. Unless the ABM
Treaty were formnally anended, to permit each republic to have an A BM
systen would change the basic bargain of the ABM Treat " as much as
permitting each to become a nuclear-weapon state woul change the
NPT. Nevertheless, as in the case of each of the other three arms control
treaties discussed in this Article, firther negotiations between the United
States and the pertinent former republics will be necessarv. 338
At the Commonwealth of Independent States summit in Bishkek on
October 9, 1992, ten of the Commonwealth members, including Ukraine,
stated that they "will implement the terms" of the ABM Treaty "as
applied to their territories and in consideration of the national security
interests of each of them." The simplest way of doing this might have
been to treat Russia as the primary successor to the Soviet Union and ask
it to work out whatever implementation steps are necessary with other
former republics concerning the ABM Treaty. This method, however, did
338. George Bunn & John B. Rhinelander. The Arms Control Obligations of the
Former Soviet Union, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 323, 339-40 (1993) (footnotes omitted)
(emphasis added).
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not work for the START I Treaty .... An alternative that is suggested by
the Bishkek resolution is the method used for START I: a multilateral
agreement between the United States and all of the relevant former
republics with either treaty-limited facilities on their territories or with the
possibility of building defensive missile systems.
339
Bunn and Rhinelander's observations predicted the course that the
U.S. Executive Branch has pursued and that led to the publication of
a proposed multilateralization Memorandum of Understanding of
September 1997. Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of'
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems of May 26, 1972, Sept. 26, 1997, available at
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/factsheets/missdef/abm_mou
.html. The MOU is a proposed multilateral agreement among the
United States and all of the relevant successor States that possess
what had been ABM Treaty-limited facilities on their territories.
What Bunn and Rhinelander spoke of in 1993 must have been
known to Secretary Baker and President Yeltsin in 1992: An ABM
treaty with Russia that did not place necessary restraints on Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan "would change the basic bargain of the
ABM Treaty. 3 40 Secretary Baker therefore must have known at the
time of his January 29, 1992 press conference that he was not, as a
matter of law, committing the United States to continue to abjure
strategic missile defense while Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine
(which together had massive ICBM delivery capacity and substantial
ABM early warning radars on their western and southern
peripheries) were legally free to develop and deploy full ABM
systems. It is also implausible that Yeltsin understood Baker as
committing the United States to such a one-sided bargain.
Moreover, the words of Baker and Yeltsin do not have to be read
to reach such an absurd result. Baker must have known that at that
time the State Department was studying the question of which U.S.-
USSR treaties (if any) legally survived the USSR's dissolution, he
surely knew that the State Department had not declared the ABM
Treaty to be in effect with any state other than the USSR. Indeed, the
339. Id.
340. Id. at 340.
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January 1, 1993 issue of the State Department's official annual
listing of treaties in force does not list an ABM Treaty between the
United States and Russia. See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE (1993). Moreover, with respect to the
USSR, that listing states that the ABM Treaty's status is "under
review" in view of the developments in the USSR in 1991. See id. at
252-53.
5. Secretaiy of State Baker's Remarks Can Be Read as Expressing a
Moral or Political Commitment
Secretary Baker's remarks can be understood as a moral or
political commitment to make an ABM treaty that would take into
account the changes resulting from the USSR's dissolution and
thereby fulfill the object and purpose of the ABM Treaty of 1972.
Such a reading not only comports with the reality of changed
circumstances, but adheres to the rule that the words of an agreement
should be construed in context to avoid producing an absurd result.,"
In O'Connor v United States, 479 U.S. 27 (1986), the Court
rejected the reading of a treaty out of context where that would lead
to an "utterly implausible" result. 479 U.S. at 3 1; see also Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991) (listing cases
standing for the proposition that "when interpreting a treaty, we
'begin with the text of the treaty and the context in which the words
are used."'). See generally Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman,
Economic Analysis of hIternational Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 28, 29
(1999) (analogizing treaties to contract law); David J. Bederman,
Revivalist Canons and Trea, Inteipretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953,
975-1015 (1994) (chronicling the Rehnquist Court's treaty
interpretation cases). An ABM treaty that did not place under its
341. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 286. 294 (1810) (citation
omitted) ("No construction of a treaty is to be admitted which leads to an
absurdity. ); see also Chan v. Korean Air Lines. Ltd.. 490 U.S. 122, 134
(1989) (utilizing textual analysis to resolve conflicting provisions of a treaty);
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct. for the S.
Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 533 (1987) (noting that a treaty is -in the nature of a
contract between nations.") (quoting TransWorld Airlines. Inc. v. Franklin Mint
Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984)); Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985)
(ruling that a treaty analysis incorporates both the document's text and the context
of the written words).
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control the ABM facilities of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
would have been absurd because, as Bunn and Rhinelander observed,
it "would change the basic bargain of the ABM Treaty.
342
6. The Executive Branch's Conduct After Januaty 1992
Independently Shows That Secretaty Baker's Words Were Not
Understood to Have Created a Legally Binding ABM Treaty with
Russia.
The following evidence demonstrates that Secretary Baker's
words were not understood to have created a legally binding ABM
Treaty:
* Neither the President, the Department of Justice, nor the State
Department has ever publicly declared that Secretary Baker's
January 29, 1992 response to President Yeltsin created a legally
binding ABM agreement with Russia.
* The purpose of Assistant Attorney General Walter Dellinger's
Memorandum to John Quinn, Counsel to President Clinton of June
26, 1996, was to establish support for an argument that the ABM
treaty of 1972 survived the USSR's dissolution, yet the
Memorandum does not even mention the Baker-Yeltsin exchange.
• As recently as October 1997, the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency's Chief Negotiator on the MOU and START II
claimed that the conclusions of those agreements in September 1997
preserved and enhanced the "viability" of the ABM Treaty in three
ways, the first of which was "by settling the issue of which states of'
the former Soviet Union are parties to the ABM Treaty." Matt
Murphy, ACDA: Threat Control Through Arms Control, ST. MAG.,
Nov./Dec. 1997, at 1.
- The Executive Branch did not register the Baker-Yeltsin
exchange with the United Nations, an action that U.N. Charter
Article 102 requires of "every international agreement" entered into
by a U.N. Member. U.N. CHARTER art. 102, para. 1.
• The State Department has never reported the Baker-Yeltsin
exchange to the Congress, as the State Department would be required
to do under the Case-Zablocki Act if the State Department considers
342. Bunn & Rhinelander, supra note 338, at 340.
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the exchange to constitute a legally enforceable agreement.
In any case, Secretary Baker should be imputed with knowledge of
22 U.S.C. § 2573, which provides in pertinent part as follows:
The Director [of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] is
authorized and directed to prepare for the President, the Secretary of
State, and the heads of such other Government agencies. as the President
may determine, recommendations concerning United States arms control
and disarmament policy: Provided, however, that no action shall be taken
under this chapter or any other law that will obligate the United States to
disarm or to reduce or to limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the
United States, except pursuant to the treat " making power oj the
President under the Constitution or wiless authorized by firther
affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United States... 43
Thus, Secretary Baker knew that the President was statutorily
barred from obligating the United States, pursuant to any law, to
"limit" the "armaments" of the United States, except pursuant to a
Senate-approved treaty or if authorized by "further affirmative
legislation."' Secretary Baker could not have reasonably read that
prohibition as containing a loophole whereby he could legally
obligate the United States if he did so in a manner that was not
pursuant to a law of the United States.
7. The United States is Not Required by 'v te-national Law to
Denounce a Lapsed Treaty
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Professor Michael Glennon separately invoked the principle of
international law that if a party to a treaty in force wishes to
terminate it or to declare it invalid, that party must take an
affirmative step toward doing so. See Ballistic Missiles: Threat and
Response: The Legal Status qf the ABMV Treat.: -leaings Bejbre the
Commn. On Foreign Relations, 10 6 h Cong. 276-79 (1999) (statement
of Michael Glennon). That is a correct statement of the rule, but the
rule assumes that a treaty is in effect. If no treaty is in effect, there is
no treaty to terminate or to declare invalid. When a state becomes
343. 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (1994). anended by Pub. L. No. 103-236, § 709, 22
U.S.C.A. § 2573 (West Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
344. Id.
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extinct, all of its bilateral treaties (other than dispositive ones) lapse
by operation of law. See supra Part IV (D). Hence, when the USSR
became extinct, there was no ABM Treaty in effect with the USSR.
Indeed, Professor Glennon implicitly conceded this point when he
argued that only after Secretary Baker's press statement on January
29, 1992, did a process begin for making the United States a party to
a legally binding ABM agreement with Russia.
The difference between denouncing a treaty that is in effect and
taking as given that an extinct state's bilateral, non-dispositive
treaties have lapsed by operation of law is illustrated by the fact that
the drafters of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(which includes a provision for giving notification of intention to
denounce treaties that are in effect) intentionally avoided dealing
with treaty relations in the context of State succession. Article 73
provides: "[t]he provisions of the present Convention shall not
prejudge any question that may arise in regard to a treaty from a
succession of States or from the international responsibility of a Statc
or ... from the outbreak of hostilities between States. 
'345
8. Neither Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession
of States in Respect of Treaties nor the Principle That It Exemplifies
is Legally Binding on the United States
Professor Glennon also cited Article 34 of the 1978 Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties as support
for his thesis that the Baker-Yeltsin press conference of January 29,
1992, produced a legally binding ABM agreement between the
United States and Russia. See Ballistic Missiles: Threat and
Response: The Legal Status of the ABM Treaty: Hearings Bebre the
Commn. On Foreign Relations at 276-79. The 1978 Vienna
Convention, however, does not legally bind the United States
because the United States is not a party and because Article 34 of the
1978 Vienna Convention has not passed into customary international
law. See supra Part IV (H).
9. The United States isNnot Estopped to Deny That It Has a Legallv




Binding ABM Treaty with Russia
Citing Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr'.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20),
Professor Glennon asserted that the United States is barred from
denying that a legally binding ABM agreement between the United
States and Russia came into existence. In Professor Glennon's
opinion, U.S. officials (Executive Branch and the Congress) made
public statements that the ABM Treaty of 1972 was in effect
between the United States and Russia. Presumably, Professor
Glennon believes Russia would argue that the United States was
estopped to deny that it made a legally binding agreement with
Russia, but the law of promissory estoppel, like the law on
agreements, does not enforce a promise that the promisee knew or
should have known was absurd. 3"M
Russia knew or should have known that it would have been absurd
for Secretary Baker to have promised that the United States would
abjure a defense against ICBMs irrespective of whether the three
ICBM powers (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) were legally
bound as tightly as the United States and Russia allegedly were
bound to obligations of the character imposed by the ABM Treaty of
1972. Moreover, Russia knew or should have known of the practice
of States of making commitments that are not legally binding, though
they may have moral or political effect.
The distinction between legally binding agreements and
agreements having only political or moral effect is a recognized part
of international law. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW
635-36 (4' ed. 1997); 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 606-12 (Rudolf Bernhardt et al. eds., 1997); Marian Nash
(Leich), Contemporaiy Practice of the United States Relating to
International Law, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 89 (1994) NOT A RESPONSIVE
SOURCE; Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Twilight
Existence of Nonbinding hternational Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L
L. 296 (1977) (commenting that international agreements are not
legally binding if parties do not intend to create legal rights and
346. See, e.g., Principal Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Charter Barclay Hosp., Inc., 81
F.3d 53, 57 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding reliance must be reasonable to invoke
promissory estoppel); Wilsmann v. Upjohn Co. 865 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1989)
(unpublished opinion) (holding that promissory estoppel is not an available remedy
if the alleged obligation appears to be totally implausible).
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obligations); David A. Koplow, When is an Amendment Not an
Amendment? Modification of Arms Control Agreements Without the
Senate, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 981, 1005-06 (1992) (stating that the
President has occasionally made policy through non-binding political
agreements or through the exchange of revocable "statements of
intention"). In short, Russia cannot make a case that it understood
that the United States, by means of Secretary Baker's oral comments,
had legally foregone its right to develop a defense against ICBMs.
10. The Nuclear Tests Case Decision ofthe International Court of
Justice Does Not Support a Conclusion That Secretary Baker
Intended to Make a Legally Binding ABM Treaty with Russia
Professor Glennon cites Nuclear Tests (Aust. v. Fr.) in support of
his estoppel argument. This case, however, does not depart from, and
indeed does not address, the rule that words should be interpreted so
as to avoid (to the extent possible) an absurd construction. The case
involves an interpretation of statements by the government of France
that it intended to end atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific after
the summer of 1974. France did not appear in the proceedings. After
Australia filed its claim, France announced several times that, it did
not intend to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests after 1974. France's
announcement included a proviso: "[t]hus, the atmospheric tests
which are soon to be carried out will, in the normal course of events,
be the last of this type." Nuclear Tests, 1974 I.C.J. at 266 (emphasis
added). Australia tried to convince the Court that France's
announcements were inadequate because a proviso therein left
France free to resume testing. Therefore, Australia argued, France's
announced intention to end testing was not by itself legally binding.
Id. at 268-69. The Court disagreed: "[t]he Court finds that the
unilateral undertaking resulting from [France's] statements cannot be
interpreted as having been made in implicit reliance of an arbitrary
power of reconsideration." Id. at 270. The Court ruled that France's
announcement gave Australia all the relief it sought in Court, i.e., an
unambiguous promise to end the testing, and Australia's claim
therefore need not be given further consideration. Id. at 272. Nuclear
Tests involved an interpretation of a particular state's announcement
of a particular commitment, not the establishment of a broad rule that
every state's announcement of a commitment on any subject must be
read as intending to create a legally binding obligation. In any event,
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to the extent that the Court opined on the method of interpreting the
promise of a state, it cautioned that when the "[s]tates make
statements by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a
restrictive interpretation is called for." Id. at 267.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ABM Treaty was a bilateral, non-dispositive treaty. In
accordance with longstanding principles of international law,
expounded with remarkable consistency by numerous officials and
scholars from various countries over hundreds of years, when the
USSR became extinct, its bilateral, non-dispositive treaties lapsed.
Hence, the ABM Treaty lapsed by operation of law -that is,
automatically - when the USSR dissolved in 1991. It did not
become a treaty between the United States and the Russian
Federation.
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APPENDIX A
Constitutionally-Allocated Powers of Each Branc of the U.S.
Government Regarding "Foreign Relations, " "Foreign AJijrs,
"Foregin Policy, "or "External Relations"
Branch
Executive Legislative Judicial
A Power to make law without the consent of another Branch
i. By veto override to regulate No Yes No
commerce with foreign nations, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.347
ii. By veto override to provide for the
common defense, U.S. CONST. art. , No Yes No
§ 8, ci. 1.
iii. By veto override to establish a
uniform rule of naturalization, U.S. No Yes No
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
iv. By veto override to regulate the
value of foreign coin, U.S. CONST. No Yes No
art. I, § 8, cl. 5.
v. By veto override to define and No Yes No
punish piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, U.S.
CONST. art. I
§ 8, cl. 10.
347. As of March of 1995, Presidents had exercised the veto power 2.513 times.
The Congress overrode the veto 104 times. 141 Cong. Rec. S4426 (daily ed. Mar.
23, 1995) (statement of Senator Leahy). Between 1975 and 1998 the President
vetoed bills 226 times. Noteworthy statutes created by override include the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737; Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Publ. L. No. 102-
385. 106 Stat. 1460; Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259,
102 Stat. 27; Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7:
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1086;
the War Powers Resolution Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-148; 87 Stat. 555; Labor





vi. By veto override to define offenses No Yes No
against the law of nations. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
vii. By veto override to make rules
concerning captures on land and No Yes No
water, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 11.
viii. By veto override to raise and support No Yes No
armies, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
13.
ix. By veto override to make rules for
the government and regulation of the No Yes No
land and naval forces,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
x. By veto override to provide for
calling forth the militia to execute
the laws of the Union,
supress insurrection, and repel
invasion, U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.
15.
xi. By veto override to exercise
exclusive legislation over all places No Yes No
purchased by the consent of
the legislature of a state, for the
erection of forts, magazines,
arsenals, and dockyards, U.S.
CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17.
xii. By veto override to make all laws No Yes No
necessary and proper for carrying
into execution the powers
listed above, and all other powers
vested by the Constitution "in the
Government of the United
States or in any Department of
officer thereof," e.g., the President,
and the departments and
officers conducting foreign policy.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
xiii. By veto override to appropriate
funds for foreign-policy activity of No Yes No
the office of the President, and
of any other part of the Government,
L U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
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Executive Legislative Judicial
xiv. By veto override to vest the
appointment of inferior officers in No Yes No
the President alone, the courts
of law, or the heads of departments,
U.S. CONST. art. II, §2, cl. 2.
B. Power that can be excercised other than by the making of law.
i. To declare war, U.S. CONST. art. I, § No Yes No
8, cl. 11.
ii. To grant letters of Marque and No Yes No
Reprisal, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
11.
iii. By a two-thirds vote to remove an
officer of another Branch (including No Yes No
an officer who exercises D85
foreign-policy power) upon that
officer's impeachment and
conviction of a designated offense,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6, 7.
iv. To permit any officer-holder of the No Yes No
United States to accept a present
emolument, office or title
from any King, Prince or foreign
state, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8.
v. To permit a state to lay imposts or
duties on imports or exports (except No Yes No
as necessary to
execute its inspection laws), U.S.
_ CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
vi. To revise and control state inspection No Yes No
laws as they relate to imposts or
duties on imports or
exports, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
2.
vii. To permit a state to lay a duty on No Yes No
tonnage, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.
3.
viii. To permit a state to keep troops or No Yes No
ships of war in time of peace, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
ix. To permit a state to enter into an
agreement or compact with a foreign No Yes No





x. To permit a state to engage in war
notwithstanding that the state has not No Yes No
been actually
invaded or in such an imminent
danger as will not admit of delay,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
xi. To propose amendments to the No Yes No
Constitution (not excluding
amendments relating to
foreign-policy matters). U.S. CONST.
art. V.
xii. Upon application of the legislatures No Yes No
of two-thirds of the states, to call a
convention to propose
amendments to the Constitution,
I IU.S. CONST. art. V.
C. Power, without participation of another No No No
Branch, to make a treaty
D. Power, with participation of another
Branch, to make a treaty, Art. II Sec. 2. Cl. Yes Yes No
2
E. Power to interpret treaties definitively
irrespective of the view of another Branch, No No Yes
Art. VI Sec. 2 with
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
F. Power, without participation of another No No No
Branch, to amend a treaty
G. Power, with participation of another
Branch, to amend a treaty, U.S. CONST. Yes Yes No
art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
H. Executive Power, U.S. CONST. art. II, § . Yes No No
. Power attaching to the office of
Commander in Chief of the Army and the Yes No No
Navy, and of the state
militias when called into active service of
the United States, U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 2,
ci. 1. 1 1 1
j. Power, with participation of another
Branch, to appoint ambassadors, U.S. Yes No No
CONST. art. II, § 2.
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Executive Legislative Judicial
K. Power, without participation of another
Branch, to fill vacancies that occur during Yes No No
a Senate recess,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 3.
L. Power, without participation of another
Branch, to receive ambassadors and other No No No
public ministers,
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
M. Power, without participation of another
Branch, to take care that the laws Yes No No
(including those relating to
foreign policy) be faithfully executed, U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3.
N. Power, without participation of another
Branch, to commission all officers of the Yes No No
United States
(including those whose duties relate to
foreign policy), U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
O. Judicial power with respect to cases
arising under treaties, U.S. CONST. art. Il, No No Yes
§ 2, cl. 1.
p. Judicial power with respect to cases
affecting ambassadors, other public No No Yes
ministers, and consuls,
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. I.
Q. Judicial power with respect to cases of
admirality and maritime jurisdiction, U.S. No No Yes
CONST. art. I1, § 2, cl. 1.
R. Judicial power with respect to a
controversy between a state or citizens No No Yes
thereof of a state and foreign states,
citizens or subjects, Art. Il l Sec. 2 Cl. 1.
citizens or subjects, U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §
2, cl. 1.
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